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 Rights interpretation is intimately bound up with questions about the basis of 
rights.  Within the context of American constitutionalism, questions about the 
universality of rights are especially pressing.  Does constitutional interpretation properly 
involve reasoning from universalistic principles, or should it be limited to particularly 
American preferences, traditions, texts, and practices?  This study examines how the 
Supreme Court justices have approached this question.  To the extent that public law 
studies consider the Court’s use of universalistic reasoning, they typically fall under the 
rubric of “natural law” jurisprudence in a discrete issue area or time period.  “Natural 
law” often carries associations, such as an emphasis on property rights, that may 
unnecessarily constrict the field of investigation.  This dissertation is not aimed at a pre-
determined version of universalistic jurisprudence, or at a single time period or issue 
area.  Rather, it shows that universalistic reasoning has played an important role in the 
Court’s rights jurisprudence across a wide range of issue areas from the Court’s earliest 
rights decisions to the present day.  With an expanded focus, this study demonstrates 
patterns and shifts in the use of universalistic reasoning, and axes of disagreement 
between the justices, that transcend boundaries between issue areas.  By exploring the 
Court’s jurisprudence through the prism of questions about the grounding of rights, this 
dissertation sheds light both on constitutional law and on fundamental tensions between 
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 This study examines the role of universalistic reasoning (“UR”)1 in the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.  To the extent that public law studies consider the 
Court’s use of UR, they typically fall under the rubric of “natural law” jurisprudence in a 
discrete issue area or time period.  Most commonly, studies concentrate on the natural 
law jurisprudence of the Marshall Court and the era of economic due process (roughly the 
late nineteenth century to the late 1930s).  “Natural law” or “natural rights,” in the 
context of American jurisprudence, carry certain associations, such as an emphasis on 
property rights, which may restrict the scope of investigation.  This study examines the 
Marshall Court and economic due process, but incorporates them into a broader 
examination, concentrating not on a specific version of universalistic reasoning, but, on 
the Court’s use of UR, in whatever form it might take.  It demonstrates that UR has 
played a more important role in the Court’s jurisprudence than has generally been 
recognized, from the Court’s earliest rights decisions to the present day, across a wide 
range of issues areas.  Moreover, significant connections emerge which transcend 
doctrinal boundaries.  By investigating the Court’s use of UR across time periods and 
issue areas, this research illuminates the important role UR has played, and continues to 
play, in the Court’s jurisprudence, and sheds light on the interrelationship between UR 
and fundamental tensions within American constitutionalism. 
 The following sections: (A) describe the topic’s nature and salience; (B) explain 
the study’s contribution to the public law literature; (C) describe the questions to be 
investigated, and the approach to conducting the research; and (D) summarize the 
findings and conclusions. 
                                                 
1 The dissertation uses abbreviations for a number of oft-repeated phrases--they are listed in a key to 
abbreviations following the text. 
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A. The Nature and Salience of the Topic 
 1. Tensions Concerning Universality as a 
  Basis of Rights in American Constitutionalism 
 
 The language of rights is pervasive in American political discourse.  From capital 
punishment to abortion, appeals to constitutional protections place the meaning of rights 
at the heart of salient controversies.  Constitutional interpretation is intimately bound up 
with questions about the basis of rights (Smith 1985, 91).  While each rights issue has its 
own context, all interpretive debates turn on underlying questions concerning the basis of 
rights.  When one accepts that a legislative act may be invalidated if it violates individual 
rights, one presumes the existence of rights with authority to override public policies.  
What is the source of that authority?  Understanding the basis of rights is critical to 
discerning the relevant considerations in making determinations about the meaning and 
application of rights.  For instance, if rights are based in popular sovereignty, then the 
preferences of the people are pivotal.  One might refer to the understandings of those who 
enacted legal texts, or consult dominant public opinions.  On the other hand, if rights 
emanate from universalistic principles of justice, then interpretation entails ascertainment 
of the content and implications of those principles.  In short, to discern rights’ meanings, 
we must understand their basis. 
 This study’s focus on UR is based on the premise that universality is important to 
tensions in American constitutionalism.  The research investigates the use of UR, with an 
eye toward whether the Court’s jurisprudence reflects such tensions, and, if so, what may 
be learned about them.  This section discusses elements of American constitutionalism 
that potentially pull in different directions.  However, while the study aims to break new 
ground with respect to analysis of the Court’s approach to UR, this brief introductory 
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section does not purport to advance new findings with respect to roots of American 
constitutionalism.  Rather, it explains the salience of questions about universality.  The 
term “American constitutionalism,” of course, is extraordinarily general, papering over 
numerous controversies.  The discussion, here, also does not intend to enter these 
controversies, but, rather, to highlight points of view that have played roles in American 
constitutional thought, and that are potentially in tension. 
 One important principle in this context is that the governed must not be subject to 
the arbitrary, unrestrained will and discretion of the lawmaker.  The rules or principles 
that bind the lawmaker, therefore, should have a source of authority that is independent 
of, and superior to, the lawmaker (Reid 1988, 48; Grey 1978, 849-50).  Given the role 
played in American lawmaking by elected representatives, it follows that constitutional 
constraints on the lawmakers should be independent of, and superior to, the will of 
momentary majorities and temporarily empowered government officials.  The importance 
of this appeal to independent constraints, in turn, places importance on identifying the 
source of authority for those constraints. 
 In identifying sources of constraints on lawmakers, American constitutional 
thought provides bases for arguments pointing in more than one direction.  One way of 
understanding the basis of constraints is in terms of universal rights.  It is widely 
recognized that natural rights played a role in the political discourse of the Founding era.  
During the period in which the colonists declared their independence and framed a 
national constitution, influential political figures often appealed to natural rights, which 
were understood as universal, immutable, and inalienable (Hamburger 1989, 261-62; 
Sherry 1987, 1132; Reid 1986, 89; Cover 1975, 36; Grey 1975, 716; Haines 1930, ch. 3, 
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sec. 1).  Emanating from God, human nature, reason, or a combination, natural rights 
were superior to positive law (Reid 1986, 87-88; Grey 1975, 715).  The importance of 
natural rights was reflected in the arguments Americans made against British policies 
(Gerber 1995, 20; Wright 1926, 526; Wagner 1925, 565-66.).  In 1761, for example, 
James Otis appealed to natural rights in arguing against the validity of writs of assistance 
(a procedure giving British officials wide-ranging search powers).  In 1774, the 
Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress included “the immutable laws 
of nature” as a source of the rights claimed in that document, including life, liberty, and 
property.  The Declaration of Independence proclaims “that all men are created equal, 
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these 
are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness,” and states that the protection of these 
rights is the purpose for which men institute government. 
 The importance of natural rights was reflected in early state constitutions, some of 
which echoed the Declaration’s assertion that the protection of natural rights is 
government’s basic purpose (Gerber 1995, 90; Jaffa 1994, 31).  The Constitution of 
Massachusetts (1780), for instance, stated in the Preamble: 
The end of the institution, maintenance, and administration 
of government is to secure the existence of the body-politic, 
to protect it, and to furnish the individuals who compose it 
with the power of enjoying, in safety and tranquility, their 
natural rights and the blessings of life . . . 
 
Article I of the document declared: 
 
All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, 
essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be 
reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and 
liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting 




Similarly, Virginia’s Declaration of Rights (1776) opened with the following 
proclamation of natural rights as the basis of government: 
A declaration of rights made by the representatives of the 
good people of Virginia, assembled in full and free 
convention; which rights do pertain to them and their 
posterity, as the basis and foundation of government. 
 
Section I. That all men are by nature equally free and 
independent and have certain inherent rights, of which, 
when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any 
compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the 
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring 
and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining 
happiness and safety. 
 
 Both sides in the ratification debate over the national constitution referred, at 
times, to natural rights in their arguments (Wright 1926, 529-30).  In Federalist No. 2, for 
example John Jay wrote: 
Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of 
government, and it is equally undeniable, that whenever 
and however it is instituted, the people must cede to it some 
of their natural rights in order to vest it with requisite 
powers.  
 
While stressing their cession, the statement recognized natural rights and their vital 
connection to the institution of government.  In Federalist No. 44, James Madison evoked 
the Declaration’s social contractarian philosophy in stating: 
Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the 
obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of 
the social compact, and to every principle of sound 
legislation.  
 
The arguments of prominent Anti-Federalists, including George Mason, Patrick Henry, 
Luther Martin, and Elbridge Gerry, also sometimes drew on natural rights (Gerber 1995, 
65-66; Wright 1926, 529).  Anti-Federalists argued that a bill of rights was necessary to 
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protect natural rights, while Federalists countered that such rights did not require 
enumeration (Gerber 1995, 66-67).  The Ninth Amendment2 is viewed by some scholars 
as recognition by the Framers of certain inherent rights that, for their efficacy, do not 
depend upon textual articulation (E.g., Sherry 1987, 1162-65; Corwin 1948, 11).  More 
broadly, many scholars view the constitutional enterprise as an attempt to realize the 
Declaration’s commitment to natural rights (E.g., Konvitz 2001 160; Gerber 1995, 59; 
Zuckert 1994, 4).  The constitutional discourse of the period following ratification often 
included appeals to principles of natural justice (Powell 1993, 964).  While the relative 
importance of natural rights in the Founding remains controversial,3 it is necessary here 
only to observe that natural rights thought was an element in the blend of ideas that gave 
rise to American constitutionalism.   
 Roots of American constitutionalism also support arguments for constraints on 
government based in popular sovereignty--the idea that the exercise of governmental 
authority finds its legitimacy in expressions of consent by the governed.  Theorists 
influential in pre-Revolutionary America posited that people in a state of nature entered 
into political communities via constitutional contracts limiting the legitimate powers of 
government (Hamburger 1989, 260-61).  Reflecting these ideas, the Declaration states, to 
secure the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness: 
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just 
powers from the consent of the governed, — That 
whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of 
these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish 
                                                 
2 “The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others 
retained by the people.”
3  Scholars debate, for example, the relative roles of liberalism and republicanism (see, e.g., Gibson 2001 
and 2000; Carrese 2000; Zuckert 1994; Smith 1985; Bailyn 1967), and the extent to which natural rights 
thought shaped the Founding. See, e.g.,Corwin 1965; McDowell 1993; Stockton 1971 (minimizing the 
extent of natural rights thought in the Federalist Papers.).  
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it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation 
on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, 
as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and 
Happiness. 
 
Not only do the people form government, but their consent is critical to the  government’s 
legitimacy, and they can choose to alter or abolish a government that is destructive of its 
proper ends.  During the Founding era, enacted constitutions were understood as 
manifesting the will of the people (Sherry 1987, 1149-51).  The Articles of Confederation 
and earlier state constitutions had been adopted by legislatures, but the use of special 
conventions to ratify some state charters linked fundamental law more directly to the 
people as a source of authority (Griffin 1996, 12).  In ratification debates, Federalists 
stressed the theme of popular sovereignty (Griffin 1996, 20).  The Constitution, which 
declares itself the “supreme Law of the Land,” was ratified by popular conventions in the 
states, and could be amended only by procedures requiring super-majorities of 
democratically representative institutions.  The Preamble also indicates that the supreme 
law emanates from popular will: 
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a 
more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic 
Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the 
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to 
ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this 
Constitution for the United States of America.  
 
 Political thought at the Founding also supported arguments appealing to tradition 
as a basis of rights.  The British had long viewed customary practices embodied in their 
“ancient constitution” as the basis of restraints on the exercise of official power (Zuckert 
1994, 54-55).  The colonists drew on this view of constitutional restraints, appealing to 
British customs and colonial practices in their objections to England’s policies.  
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Parliamentary actions inconsistent with long-standing constitutional practices were 
criticized as threats to rule of law (Reid 1986, 73).  In listing grievances against the King, 
the Declaration cites violations of practices sanctioned by English practice.  The adoption 
of the common law system--with its doctrine of stare decisis, and reverence for the value 
of rules crafted through time and experience--reflects the role of tradition in law. 
 While natural rights, popular sovereignty, and tradition all enjoyed status, the 
Founding generation largely viewed various bases of rights as equally supportive of the 
same rights claims.4  In objecting to English policies, colonists frequently advanced  
arguments in combination, and without careful distinction (Rakove 1997, 292-93; Smith 
1985, 41).  Early state constitutions also reflected an eclectic approach, drawing on 
natural rights, British and colonial practices, the common law, and the enactment of 
written rules distributing and limiting governmental powers.  Early state court decisions 
interpreting rights, too, relied on a loose combination of text, long-standing practices, and 
natural law (Sherry 1987, 1134-35).  Similarly, the Framers understood fundamental law 
as rooted variously in divine law, natural law, common law or customary practices, and 
the written text as an enacted expression of popular sovereignty (Sherry 1987,1156).  
 If there is consensus on the content of rights, and different bases of rights are 
understood as leading to the same substantive outcomes, then, as a practical matter, those 
bases may be employed interchangeably.  However, in the absence of consensus, 
different bases of rights will be marshaled in support of opposing interpretations.  As 
bases for rights, universalistic principles and popular sovereignty are potentially in 
tension.  The tension is evident in the political philosophy of John Locke, whose writings 
                                                 
4 Colonists appealed to a wider range of bases of rights, including rights of Englishmen, the emigration 
purchase and contract, and colonial charters. Reid 1986, 66.   
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were influential with the colonists (Zuckert 1994, xviii).  For Locke, men in the state of 
nature are equal, with no one possessing authority to rule over others.  The legitimate 
exercise of political authority depends upon agreement to enter into a political 
community.  The people may withdraw their consent if government fails to fulfill its 
principal ends.  Limits on the legitimate exercise of political authority, however, are not 
grounded only in consent.  People consent to be governed for the specified end of 
protecting their natural rights--including life, liberty, and property.  After the 
establishment of government, natural rights remain the standard for evaluating 
legitimacy.  Even after people enter into political society: 
the power of the society, or legislative constituted by them, 
can never be supposed to extend farther, than the common 
good; but is obliged to secure every one's property . . . And 
so whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any 
common-wealth, is bound to govern by established 
standing laws, promulgated and known to the people, and 
not by extemporary decrees; by indifferent and upright 
judges, who are to decide controversies by those laws 
(Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, ch. 9, § 131). 
 
While legitimacy requires consent, government is also constrained by certain inherent 
principles.  It may not rule arbitrarily, but only in accordance with requirements of rule of 
law, and it retains legitimacy only so long as it continues to protect natural rights, its 
raison d’etre.  Nature and consent both restrain government, making it difficult to 
identify a single grounding of rights as bedrock (Smith 1985, 16). 
 Tension between consent and nature also runs through the Declaration, with 
Lockean elements recognizable.  The Declaration’s rights exist independently of 
government, positive law, or acts of human will.  Men institute governments “to secure 
these rights”  The goal of securing universal rights is so basic to government “[t]hat 
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whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of 
the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government.”  After the formation 
of government, rights remain a standard for evaluating government's legitimacy.  
However, the Declaration indicates a second requirement for legitimacy. Governments 
“deriv[e] their just powers from the consent of the governed.”  Unlike natural rights, 
consent hinges on human choices.  The people not only form government, but are entitled 
to decide when its actions are so contrary to its basic ends that it must be overthrown.  If 
the people’s judgment is the test of legitimacy, then consent restrains government 
(Zuckert 1994, 10).  Identifying multiple criteria for legitimacy engenders uncertainty 
concerning sources of obligations (Smith 1985, 43-44). 
 The Constitution, too, reflects the Framers’ beliefs both in popular sovereignty 
and standards independent of popular will (Reck 1989, 483-84).  The Preamble’s opening 
words--“We the People”--indicate that the establishment of the Constitution is an act of 
popular sovereignty.  At the same time, the Preamble’s identification of the 
Constitution’s ends--which include establishing justice, promoting the general good, and 
securing liberty--suggests standards existing independently of will (Reck 1989, 484-86; 
1985, 70-71).  Constitutional protections were understood by many as declarative of 
rights existing independently of positive law (Sherry 1987, 1156-57).  And the Ninth 
Amendment implies the existence of rights existing regardless of enumeration.
 Tension between natural rights and popular sovereignty can be understood, more 
broadly, as tension between universalistic and particularistic bases of rights.  
Particularistic reasoning grounds rights in considerations specific to a given political 
community.  In the context of American constitutionalism, particularistic reasoning looks 
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to the American people’s desires, history, traditions, or other considerations unique to 
American circumstances.  By contrast, universalistic reasoning grounds rights in 
considerations transcending the American experience.  UR, for example, may ground 
rights in principles inherent in the concept of freedom.  The approach is universalistic in 
that, as a criterion of evaluation, it looks to a concept or purposive standard that does not 
hinge entirely on an accounting of the American people’s preferences and practices.   
 Universalistic and particularistic bases of rights are in tension because 
universalistic ends must be implemented within a specific polity.  The ends of 
government may be expressed in universalistic terms, but they can be pursued only 
through particularistic means (acts of volition by a specific people).  Realization of 
universal rights requires establishment of government and rule of law.  This entails 
enactment of positive laws, which are particularistic.  They are made by a specific 
people, and embody expressions of lawmakers’ will.  They are made for a specific 
people, binding only those subject to the polity’s authority.  Universal principles operate 
at a high level of generality, but rule of law requires guidelines specific enough to direct 
behavior.  As Thomas Aquinas recognized in the thirteenth century, positive laws are 
required to apply universal principles with greater concreteness and specificity than the 
principles alone can provide (Rommen 1947, 52-55; Haines 1930, ch. 1, sec. 2). 
 Debate over universality, of course, did not originate in the American context, but 
dates to ancient times.  Before Socrates, for example, Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 536-470 
B.C.) spoke of a fixed, eternal order governing human events, and of a higher divine law 
that set standards for human ethics (Rommen 1947, 6).  The question of whether justice is 
rooted in nature, or in conventions of human making, was a recurring topic of debate in 
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Greece (Wiltshire 1992, 12; d’Entrèves 1970, 27).  Pointing to discrepancies in laws 
between polities, fifth-century Sophists argued against the notion that universal principles 
of justice emanate from gods or nature (McIlwain 1932, 14).  In Plato’s Republic, 
Thrasymachus advances a version of this position, contending that the rules of justice are 
based in nothing more than the will of those with the strength to impose them on others 
(Republic, 338c-339a).  Socrates counters by describing at length how a polity might seek 
justice through the guidance of transcendent standards of justice. 
 Scholars, including Edward Corwin (1965) and Charles McIlwain (1932), have 
traced the development of Western constitutional thought, observing the contributions of 
classical Greece, Roman Stoicism, medieval Christianity, England’s ancient constitution, 
and other philosophical frameworks pre-dating the American Founding.  Influential 
thinkers from Plato and Aristotle, to Cicero, to Aquinas, to the English jurists Henry de 
Bracton, John Fortescue, and Edward Coke contributed to the complex amalgam of 
political theories that laid the foundations of American constitutionalism.  Included are 
the ideas that: nature serves as a standard for evaluating justice, applicable to all times 
and places; those standards are knowable by human beings; equality characterizes men’s 
access to universal standards, and subjection to those standards; the legitimacy of 
political authority depends on conformity with universal standards of justice; political 
rule disregarding those standards and premised on nothing more than the will of the ruler, 
is arbitrary and lacks the authority of law; consent of the people is the source of sovereign 
authority; even rulers are bound by a fundamental law rooted in long-standing custom; 
and the legitimacy of governmental power, and limitations on its exercise, can be 
understood as arising from the social contract (see, generally, Zuckert 1994; Wiltshire 
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1992; Snowiss 1990; Reid 1988; Sherry 1987; Donnelly 1985; Grey 1978; Dickinson 
1976; Sigmund 1971; d’Entrèves 1970; Corwin 1965 and 1948; McIlwain 1947 and 
1932; Rommen 1947). 
 Philosophically, the justices were not writing on a blank slate.  Yet the Founding 
represents an important chapter in the development of constitutional thought, as the 
Declaration places the protection of universal rights at the core of national objectives 
(Donnelly 2003), and the Constitution enacts a fundamental law understood as both an 
embodiment of higher law and a legally enforceable, positive code of law (McCloskey 
2000).  Thus, while philosophers had long pondered universality, the justices had no 
predecessors in exercising judicial review within the context of a nation officially 
devoted to the protection of natural rights. 
 The interconnection between universalistic and particularistic in American 
constitutional thought presents justices with difficult questions concerning judicial 
reliance on UR.  The Court gains its authority from American sources, and its jurisdiction 
is circumscribed by limits of American power.  More specifically, the Court gains its 
authority from the Constitution--a document made by and for a particular people.  The 
Constitution’s authority, in turn, is linked to enactment procedures, and the American 
people’s continuing acceptance of the document as authoritative.  At the same time, 
justices resolve rights controversies within the context of a national community that has 
declared its existence as an independent people on the basis of universal rights, and 
whose Founding generation embraced the notion that a basic purpose of government is to 
protect those rights (Grey 1975, 716; Haines 1930, ch. 3, sec. 1).  To what extent may 
interpretation concern itself with mandates of universalistic principles?  If the ultimate 
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standard of evaluation issues in universalistic principles, may the interpreter refer directly 
to those principles?  Or, should rights interpreters consider themselves authorized only to 
consider particularistic bases of rights? 
 These questions confront anyone engaged in rights interpretation.  The following 
section explains why study is warranted on how S.C. justices have addressed them. 
 2. Importance of Studying the Supreme Court’s 
  Approach to Universality as a Basis of Rights 
 
 For the reasons discussed above, questions about universalistic bases of rights 
within the American political system warrant investigation.  To gain the fullest 
understanding, it would be worthwhile to examine how these questions have been 
addressed, not only within one branch, but in all branches of the government, as well as 
in the media, in electoral campaigns, and in popular culture, among other arenas relevant 
to the shaping of political discourse and outcomes.  To be feasible, however, a single 
study must select a narrower focus.  The judiciary makes an important target of study 
because of its prominent role in the interpretation of constitutional rights.  When disputes 
over constitutional meanings find their way into litigation, the judiciary has the authority 
to make determinations that are binding on other political actors.  The importance of 
studying the judiciary’s role as expounder of the meaning of rights is enhanced by the 
fact that the judiciary has assumed greater responsibility in articulating the boundaries of 
constitutional rights than have other branches.  While legislators and executive officials 
surely, at least some of the time, concern themselves with constitutional limitations, and 
judges surely think about policy implications, the American judiciary has assumed the 
predominant role with respect to detailed elaboration of the meaning of constitutional 
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rights, and the specific ways in which they restrain governmental action (McCloskey 
2000, 7-8.).   
 The judiciary is also an interesting target of study, because, unlike executive and 
legislative officials, judges routinely provide written justifications, often detailed, for 
their decisions.  In the American common law system, judicial reasoning about rights 
comprises part of the fabric of the law.  The doctrine of stare decisis provides an 
institutional reason for judges to conduct ongoing discourse with past and present judges 
over the basis of their decisions.  It is true that judges may go to great lengths to 
distinguish apparently applicable precedents, but this practice also entails engaging past 
opinions. As a consequence of the judiciary’s emphasis on providing written 
justifications for its decisionmaking, a massive body of texts has been produced, which 
serves as the lifeblood of legal argumentation.  The existence of comprehensive, 
searchable databases reflects this emphasis.  Written justifications are central to the 
institution’s operations, and to the activities of those who seek to influence it.  These 
institutional practices allow judicial reasoning to more readily impact public 
understandings than it might otherwise.  Given that judges are subject to the influence of 
developments within the legal community, and, more broadly, within American politics, 
the courts both reflect and help to shape American political and legal discourse (Smith 
1985, 6).   
 Since, in the American legal system, courts at all levels of government--federal, 
state, and local--and at all levels of the judiciary hierarchy, are empowered to enforce 
individual rights, study is warranted on how the judiciary as a whole has approached 
questions about universalistic bases of rights.  Again, feasibility demands a narrower 
 16
focus.  The U.S. Supreme Court serves as an excellent focus at the outset.  Sitting atop 
the judicial hierarchy, the Court’s pronouncements are the most visible, legally and 
politically.  Its role as supervisor of the federal judiciary makes it especially important 
that the justices support their actions with written explanations, which serve as guideposts 
for the approaches taken by lower courts.  The supreme hierarchical position also makes 
the justices the only judicial officials with authority to overrule any previous judicial 
decision, including the Court’s own precedents.  This provides the justices with greater 
leeway to elaborate their legal philosophies, and to challenge those advanced by other 
justices.  The justices, in fact, have developed a robust practice of writing substantial 
concurring and dissenting opinions, often explaining nuanced distinctions between their 
own interpretive frameworks and those employed by their colleagues, present and past 
(Griffin 1996, 129).  The Supreme Court is also unique in the degree of control that it 
exercises over its docket, allowing justices to select controversies that provide the best 
opportunities for revisiting long-standing disputes over the basis of rights.  For these 
reasons, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is a suitable point of embarkation for 
studying the judiciary’s use of UR. 
B. Literature Review, and the Study’s Contributions 
 A review of the literature reveals no publications with the same focus as this 
study.  Many publications with a bearing on the present topic fall into two categories.  
One category concentrates on normative analysis of questions about rights, but does not 
extensively examine the Supreme Court's jurisprudence (E.g., George 1999; Dworkin 
1986; Finnis 1980).  Studies in a second category contain detailed discussion of the 
Court’s jurisprudence, but do not focus on questions concerning universality and the 
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grounding of rights (E.g., McCloskey 2000; Currie 1990 and 1985; Urofsky 1988).  
Studies in these categories differ from this project in that none extensively investigates 
the Court’s jurisprudence to discern how the justices themselves have approached 
fundamental questions about universality. 
 To the extent that the literature discusses the Court’s use of universal reasoning, it 
concentrates heavily on “natural law” or “natural rights” jurisprudence during the 
Marshall Court (E.g., Corwin 1950; Hale 1944; Grant 1931; Haines 1924) and in the 
economic substantive due process jurisprudence of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries (E.g., Eastman and Sandefur 2001; Arkes 1994; Gillman 1993; Frankfurter 
1916).  While the Marshall Court and the era of economic substantive due process have 
received the greatest attention, a number of studies have considered the role of natural 
law in other narrowly defined time periods, such as the Warren Court (E.g., Foley 1965), 
or in narrowly defined issue areas, such as freedom of speech (E.g., Carroll 1966-67). 
The debate between Justices Felix Frankfurter and Hugo Black over incorporation of the 
Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment is an example of a narrowly circumscribed 
judicial exchange, with a bearing on the basis of rights, that also has received attention 
from scholars (E.g., Simon 1989).  These studies are distinct from the present study in 
that they focus on an aspect of the Court’s jurisprudence as a discrete, confined topic. 
 This dissertation expands the focus from natural law within a specific issue area 
or time period to broader questions about the role of universality in the Court’s rights 
reasoning.  The terms “natural law” and “natural rights”5 carry baggage.  In the context of 
                                                 
5 To many philosophers and traditions, “natural law” and “natural rights” hold distinct meanings.  They are 
used interchangeably here because the justices have not paid careful attention to the distinction.  “Natural 
rights” is more accurate, as the justices have most commonly appealed to nature as a basis upon which 
 18
American jurisprudence, they may be associated with static property rights linked to 
theology and the protection of business interests, or some combination of these elements.  
This study is interested in universalistic rights reasoning, which need not include any of 
the elements listed.  As noted, the role of natural law during the eras of the Marshall 
Court and economic due process has received substantial attention from scholars.  As is 
well-covered in the literature, these lines of jurisprudence were abandoned by the late 
1930s, when the Court generally shifted its attention away from property rights and 
towards other categories of rights.  Universality was one element of the Court’s natural 
law jurisprudence, but universality need not be tied to property rights.  By broadening the 
focus, this study is able to inquire into the role of universality apart from any specific 
category of rights or version of natural law jurisprudence.  When the Court abandoned 
economic due process in the late 1930s, did it abandon UR altogether?  Or has UR 
continued to play a role in other arenas?  Another reason it is best not to define the topic 
in terms of “natural law” is that, due largely to the noted associations, it has long been 
discredited.  Today’s justices continue to use UR, though none would purport to enforce 
natural law.  The broadened focus allows this study to reveal similarities in the Court’s 
use of UR in a wide range of issue areas, from the Court’s earliest rights decisions to the 
present day.  It also reveals shifts that have occurred with respect to UR’s role, which 
helps to place contemporary debates between the justices within an historical perspective. 
 It was noted that one large category of works in the literature is predominantly 
concerned with spelling out positions on the philosophy of law.  Another large category 
is predominantly concerned with judicial doctrine.  This dissertation neither advances a 
                                                                                                                                                 
individuals may seek to block illegitimate exercises of governmental power.  The term “natural justice” 
appears in more Court decisions than “natural law” or “natural rights.” Westlaw search, July 5, 2007. 
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comprehensive interpretive theory, nor concerns itself with the details of legal doctrine.  
Rather, it begins with questions basic to philosophy of law and investigates how the 
justices have approached them.  To be sure, judicial opinions do not read like works of 
philosophy.  Nevertheless, the task of adjudicating rights disputes inevitably presents the 
justices with basic philosophical questions, and, investigating the Court’s jurisprudence 
over time shows that the justices have often explicitly addressed these questions in 
explaining their approach to reaching decisions.  Directing attention to the justices’ 
voices on these questions brings into view an understanding of the Court’s rights 
jurisprudence as more than a conglomeration of doctrinal pronouncements.  It represents 
an ongoing attempt to address fundamental questions about the basis of rights, a difficult 
challenge exacerbated by tensions within American constitutionalism.  Studying how the 
justices have grappled with this challenge also sheds light on the nature of these tensions.   
C. The Questions to Be Investigated, and the Approach to Conducting the Research 
 We should expect to find pervasive use of particularistic reasoning within a 
common law system built on respect for judicial precedents and long-standing custom.  In 
itself, reliance on such particularistic considerations is unremarkable.  The questions, 
here, are framed around the justices’ use of UR: 
(1) Have the justices relied on UR at all?  If so, has the use of UR been confined to one 
specific issue area or time period? 
 
(2) If the justices have relied on UR, what form has this taken?  What kinds of 
universalistic standards have the justices employed?  What role have they played?   
 
(3) If the justices have relied on UR in more than one issue area or time period, are there 
similarities across issue areas and/or time periods? 
 
(4) Are there discernible shifts over time in the nature of the Court’s use of UR? 
 
 20
(5) Have the justices debated the use of UR in more than one issue area or time period, 
and, if so, are there any similarities in the nature of the debate across issue areas or time 
periods? 
 
(6) The discussion above describes theoretical tensions embedded within American 
constitutionalism concerning the relationship between universalistic and particularistic 
bases of rights--to what extent are these tensions evident in the Court’s jurisprudence? 
 
(7) Does UR play a role in the contemporary Court’s jurisprudence?  If so, how does the 
Court’s treatment of UR compare with earlier periods? 
 
 To investigate these questions, the study examines a set of specific issue areas.  
The Court reveals its approach to universality in the context of specific controversies.  
Article III, § 2 of the Constitution lists the varieties of “Cases” and “Controversies” that 
the federal judiciary is empowered to hear.  The Court has, from the beginning, limited 
the scope of its power, which it has defined as extending only to the determination of 
“actual controversies arising between adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper 
jurisdiction.”  It has no general, roving,  “revisory” power to review governmental actions 
in the absence of a justiciable controversy between litigants before the court, 6 much less 
the occasion to issue free-standing philosophical statements on the basis of rights.  Judges 
typically locate disputes within issue areas, and look first to precedents falling within 
those areas.  To glean insights into UR’s role, it is most useful to investigate within 
specified issue areas. 
                                                 
6 Muskrat v. U.S., 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911); see also Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 408 (1792). 
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 The project covers a wide range of substantive issue areas.7  Chapter Two 
examines the Court’s Contract Clause jurisprudence, including, but not limited to, the 
Marshall Court.  Economic due process jurisprudence of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries is considered in ch. 3.  The discussion is placed within a broader 
examination of the Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence, considering non-
economic categories or rights as well, especially rights of expression and privacy.  
Chapter Four discusses procedural due process, and particularly the extent to which 
certain constitutional protections concerning criminal procedure apply against state 
governments.  Although the topic is related to substantive due process in that it also arises 
out of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the issue areas involved are 
distinct.  For example, while substantive due process has encompassed debates over a 
woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy, it is procedural due process that encompasses 
such rights as appointed counsel in a criminal case and the privilege against self-
incrimination.  In addition, the study considers the applicability of the Constitution in 
overseas U.S. territories (ch. 5), and the prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishments (ch. 6).8  Together, these topics encompass a wide range of intrinsically 
important substantive issues that range from the Court’s early period to the present day.  
                                                 
7 The project’s objectives require examination of multiple legal issues, and the topic areas have been 
selected to ensure the coverage of a wide range of issues and time periods.  The coverage, however, for 
reasons of feasibility, is not exhaustive.  Indeed, it is clear that UR has played a role in additional issue 
areas.  For example, in a prominent equal protection decision invalidating a law providing for sterilization 
as a punishment, the Court stated: “We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic 
civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the 
race.” Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).  In another equal protection decision, regarding 
curfew regulations applicable to persons of Japanese ancestry, the Court stated: “Distinctions between 
citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions 
are founded upon the doctrine of equality.” Hirayabashi v. U.S., 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).  
8 Each chapter more specifically describes the specific focus of the examination within the broader topic 
identified.  While the study is cast broadly to consider a wide range of legal topics, the chapters do not 
discuss every legal question that the justices have confronted within each issue area.  To address the 
questions posed by this research, it is neither necessary nor possible to do so. 
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The study probes the main lines of reasoning in the development of jurisprudence within 
each topic considered, focusing primarily on important cases--groundbreaking cases that 
gained footing within the Court’s jurisprudence, and cases looked to by the justices 
themselves as important guideposts.  The final chapter (Chapter Seven) discusses 
conclusions and implications drawn from the research. 
D. Summary of Findings and Conclusions 
 This reseach shows that UR has played an important role across a wide range of 
issues and time periods.  One of UR’s most significant roles has been to distinguish 
categories of rights in terms of their relative importance.  Rights deemed essential to 
universalistic standards have received greater judicial protection.  UR has often taken the 
form of a model of reasoning referred to here as reasoning from essential principles.  This 
form of reasoning begins with the identification of a universalistic standard of evaluation 
(“USE”) (such as the requirements of free government), and then identifies a category of 
rights whose protection is mandated by the USE (such as property rights until the late 
1930s, and rights of expression since the mid-1920s).  The next step in reasoning is the 
identification of intermediate premises (“IMPs”), representing more specific principles 
whose observance is essential to meaningful protection of the category of rights.  During 
the era of economic due process, for example, the right to pursue a lawful calling was 
identified as an IMP essential to the protection of property rights.  More recently, an 
individual’s autonomy over decisions relating to one’s intimate life has emerged as an 
IMP essential to the right of privacy.  In addition, one of this study’s unanticipated 
findings is that universalistic reasoning has played an important role, not only with 
respect to the identification of rights, but also with respect to the grounding of inherent 
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and inalienable governmental powers.  While the topic warrants separate investigation, it 
is observed here that universalistic powers reasoning has been critical in certain issue 
areas, and has been closely related to developments in the use of UR (ch. 2, C; ch. 3, E). 
 The use of UR shows similarities across issue areas.  First, when justices have 
employed USEs, they have often done so with standards combining universalistic and 
particularistic elements.  Second, the Court’s prevailing approach has been to combine 
UR with an approach permitting constitutional meanings to evolve.  Third, in applying 
USEs, justices have commonly looked for guidance to practices (past or present), or other 
societal indicators.  Fourth, the justices’ disagreements over the use of UR show similar 
fault lines across issue areas.  As noted, the Court’s dominant approach has been 
universalistic and evolutive.  From the late eighteenth century to the present day, 
however, a number of justices have objected to such an approach, advancing what is 
referred to here as the Delegative Model.  While the details and contexts of the arguments 
naturally vary, justices from James Iredell in the late eighteenth century to Antonin Scalia 
today have advocated a particularistic approach to interpretation that views the 
Constitution as a set of specific, static commands severely constraining judicial 
discretion. 
 The research also reveals significant shifts that have occurred across issue areas 
concerning the use of UR.  For instance, while the early Court sometimes used UR in a 
way that was extra-constitutional, the justices eventually shifted away from extra-
constitutional reasoning, making sure to frame their UR as interpretation of constitutional 
provisions.  Another shift concerns the manner in which the justices have incorporated 
practices and other societal indicators into the application of UR.  Within an interpretive 
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approach that allows for constitutional meanings to evolve, history cannot be the only 
standard.  What role, then, is there for past and present practices?  The Court has long 
looked to practices as evidence bearing on a right’s universal status.  If observance of a 
right is the uniform practice in jurisdictions dedicated to free government, this may be 
seen as evidence that the right is indispensable to freedom.  Conversely, lack of 
uniformity in observance of the right may count against the right’s universalistic 
grounding.  Under this approach, the ultimate evaluative standard is universalistic--the 
requirements or liberty, or of free government, or of justice.  The reference to existing 
practices is not decisive, in itself, but counts as evidence helpful to determining whether 
the right is essential to fulfillment of the universalistic standard.  More recently, the Court 
has incorporated practices in a different manner, referred to here as the “Emerging 
Trends” approach.  Under this approach, dissensus does not necessarily count against a 
right’s universal status.  The direction of change may be as important as the current state 
of practice.  A trend in state legislation may count as strong evidence in support of a 
right’s protected status.  The justices have also incorporated other indicators into this 
approach, including, for example, the opinions of professional associations. 
 These patterns and shifts in the Court’s use of UR reflect tensions embedded 
within American constitutional thought.  The context of American constitutionalism 
within which the justices operate suggests a set of commitments or pressures that are not 
easily reconciled.  First, constitutional rights should have a basis that is independent of 
the will of the lawmaker.  Important streams of thought view rights as having universal 
roots, grounded, not simply in the momentary preferences of a particular people, but in 
enduring human nature.  These considerations provide the constitutional interpreter with 
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reasons to appeal directly to universalistic principles.  At the same time, the end goal of 
protecting universal rights is realized within the American political system through the 
establishment of rule of law and branches of government with carefully delineated 
bounds of authority.  Universalistic principles, in themselves, are vague and contested.  
Judicial appeals to universality may be attacked as lacking authority, and undermining of 
the rule of law.  Under the Delegative Model that has been advanced by a number of 
justices, the judiciary’s duty is to enforce the Constitution’s specific commands.  Proper 
judicial reasoning is particularistic, rooted in the will of the people who enacted the 
document, and in the traditional practices that shed light on the Framers’ understandings.   
 The early Court employed UR that appealed directly to universalistic principles.  
When UR is used in a form not linked with text, however, it is the most vulnerable to 
charges that it is acting without authority.  By folding UR under the rubric of interpreting 
text, justices avoid such obvious vulnerability.  Framing UR as part of textual 
interpretation is one of the most important ways that justices have combined 
universalistic and particularistic bases.  Constitutional provisions supply a link between 
judicial reasoning and the particularistic authority provided by an enacted text, as when 
the Court views due process as embodying the essential requirements of liberty, or the 
Eighth Amendment as requiring comportment with human dignity.  The justices have 
often articulated standards of evaluation that combine universalistic and particularistic 
elements (referred to here as “mixed rights reasoning,” or “MRR”).  These MRR 
formulations identify a particularistic source of commitment (such as Framers’ beliefs, 
common law, or American institutions) to universalistic principles.  Thus, in following 
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the mandates of universalistic principles, the justices are at the same time following 
particularistic commitments to those principles. 
 The use of MRR, nevertheless, does not fully allay concerns associated with the 
use of UR, which has remained subject to attack.  From the perspective of the Delegative 
Model, the Constitution’s Framers have already performed all of the necessary UR.  Once 
the document is enacted, the judiciary must be guided by its specific commands.  Appeals 
to universalistic standards provide too much leeway for excessive judicial discretion.  
Today’s justices remain highly cognizant of UR’s vulnerability.  The Emerging Trends 
approach can be understood as an attempt to provide insulation for the use of UR.  One of 
the great concerns with the use of UR is that it opens the door to justices simply 
enforcing their own subjective will.  Emerging Trends incorporates “objective” indicators 
into its application of USEs.  
 Emerging Trends, however, raises troubling implications.  Responding to the 
reality of dramatic shifts in public morality over time, the Court has allowed for the 
recognition of changes in constitutional meanings.  An evolutive approach raises the 
question of how the justices are to discern new meanings.  The Court’s overarching 
standards are universalistic, but they cannot comfortably rest their opinions on nothing 
more than their own free-standing UR.  It was noted that the Court had earlier relied on 
existing practices largely by discerning whether a right was uniformly observed.  The line 
of reasoning appeared to be that, if a practice were uniformly practiced, this provided 
evidence supporting a conclusion that the right was essential according to USEs.  The 
recent Court, however, has relied, not simply on uniformity, or a lack of uniformity, but 
on recent legislative trends.  The difficulty with this approach is that it threatens to reduce 
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constitutional reasoning to majoritarian nose-counting.  The Court has long applied USEs 
in a way that incorporates reference to practices.  In itself, the combination of 
universalistic and particularistic bases is neither remarkable nor objectionable.  It is 
important, however, to retain an approach that retains constitutional rights as an 
independent constraint on lawmakers.  It essential, therefore, to make clear that the 














 As noted, this study examines the use of UR within specific issue areas.  The 
Contract Clause is a useful starting point, because it was the most significant 
constitutional provision in the early Court’s rights jurisprudence.  In light of the Clause’s  
uniquely important role in this era, the analysis focuses largely, though not exclusively, 
on the Marshall Court’s treatment of the Contract Clause, and the closely associated 
doctrine of vested rights.  Section A discusses two of the Court’s first rights decisions,9 
handed down before John Marshall assumed the position of Chief Justice, focusing on the 
nature of the UR employed by a number of the justices, and on the disagreement between 
some of the justices regarding the proper role of extra-constitutional, universalistic 
reasoning.  Although they did not directly concern the Contract Clause, their inclusion 
provides a window into the Court’s earliest period.  Section B discusses the Marshall 
Court’s use of extra-constitutional, universalistic reasoning, and generally characterizes 
the form of the Court’s approach during that period.  It also notes that the Court shifted 
away from extra-constitutional reasoning, without abandoning universalistic principles.  
Section C discusses the Court’s use of universalistic reasoning in developing the concept 
of inherent and inalienable police powers.  The concept was important in the justices’ 
thinking as the Court addressed Contract Clause issues.  The section closes with 
consideration of the Clause’s decline.  The Court’s treatment of the Contract Clause is 
closely associated with its later handling of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause with respect to review of economic regulations (economic due process).   Thus, a 
number of themes central to this chapter are continued in the next. 
 
 
                                                 
9 Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793); and Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798). 
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A. Chisolm and Calder--Early Rights Decisions Before Marshall 
 Prior to 1801, the Court heard only a few cases involving constitutional issues 
(Currie 1985, 4).  During this period, a large portion of the docket concerned questions of 
jurisdiction (Gerber 1995, 241 n. 8), and few decisions resulted in the invalidation of 
legislation (Snowiss 1990, 59-60).  This section considers two of the Court’s earliest 
rights decisions--Chisholm v. Georgia (1793)10 and Calder v. Bull (1798).11  Examination 
of these cases reveals that UR, and disagreement over its use, have been with the Court 
since its earliest period.  In Chisolm, the Court’s first constitutional case (Gerber 1995, 
1), three of the Justices--John Jay, James Wilson, and William Cushing--employed UR.  
In Calder, two Justices--Samuel Chase and Iredell--though reaching the same result, 
clashed over the role of UR.  Moreover, the nature of the UR employed by a number of 
the justices in Chisolm and Calder is similar in important ways to that employed by 
justices throughout the Court’s history, and the debate between Chase and Iredell was 
similar to fault lines that have persisted throughout the Court’s history.   
 The central issue in Chisholm was whether the federal courts had jurisdiction to 
hear a claim brought by an individual from one state against another state, without the 
second state’s consent.  The issue came to the Court when Chisholm, a citizen of South 
Carolina, sought to recover a debt from the State of Georgia, alleging that he had never 
received payment for goods delivered.  Georgia refused to appear, denying federal court 
jurisdiction.  With only Iredell dissenting, Justices Wilson, Jay, Cushing, and John Blair 
issued opinions holding that Georgia was subject to suit under these circumstances in the 
                                                 
10 2 U.S. 419. 
11 3 U.S. 386.  A third constitutional decision prior to the Marshall Court, Hylton v. Ware, 3 U.S. 199 
(1796), principally concerned the questions of whether a U.S. treaty overrode an otherwise valid state law, 
and whether the Court could review state laws. 
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federal courts.12  The impact of the decision was reflected in the ratification, just two 
years later, of the Eleventh Amendment, which provided that the federal courts did not 
have jurisdiction over suits by citizens of one state against another state. 
 In considering the opinions of Justices Wilson, Jay, and Cushing in Chisholm, we 
see illustrations of one of the most striking features of the Court’s early rights 
jurisprudence (extending into the Marshall Court)--the reliance on extra-constitutional 
universalistic reasoning.  Wilson examined the controversy first by “principles of general 
jurisprudence,” and then, separately, and “chiefly” by the U.S. Constitution.13  In the 
former section, Wilson’s identified “general principles of right and equality” that applied 
to individuals.  Wilson saw no reason why these same principles should not also be 
applied to states, which were artificial persons.  Like a natural person, a state has rights 
and can acquire property.  Just as an individual can enter into contracts and voluntarily 
assume certain duties, a state incurs legally binding obligations.  In short, as a creation of 
men, consisting of a combination of men, a state, like an individual person, is subject to 
the basic principles of right, justice, and equality.  According to these principles, if a state 
can initiate litigation, then it must also be itself subject to suit.14  The greater part of 
Wilson’s opinion was devoted to elaboration of this universalistic argument.   
 Like Wilson, Jay reasoned from “the obvious dictates of justice, and the purposes 
of society,”15 which encompassed the principle that “one free citizen may sue another.”  
Also like Wilson, Jay began with principles relevant to relationships between individual 
                                                 
12 Before the tenure of Chief Justice Marshall, the justices issued their opinions seriatim.  That is, each 
justice issued a separate opinion, with none identified as the opinion of the Court.  Marshall introduced the 
practice of identifying the Court’s opinion.  Gerber 1998. 
13 2 U.S. at 453. 
14 2 U.S. at 455-56. 
15 2 U.S. at 472. 
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persons, and applied these principles to the relations between an individual and a state.  
Not only can one individual sue another, but an individual also can launch litigation 
against a large group of people, as when a citizen sues a corporation.  Since a state can 
sue an individual, a state also must subject itself to being sued.  Immunizing states from 
lawsuits would contradict principles of equality and sovereignty.  Jay reasoned further 
that administering justice “without respect of persons” and “securing individual citizens 
as well as States, in their respective rights” forms part of “the promise which every free 
Government makes to every free citizen, of equal justice and protection.”  In sum, Jay 
stated that the Court’s decision “recognizes and strongly rests on this great moral truth, 
that justice is the same whether due from one man or a million, or from a million to one 
man.”16  Cushing also based his opinion, not only on the text of the Constitution, but also 
on “the reason of the thing.”17  Like Wilson and Jay, Cushing insisted that states were 
subject to basic principles of justice, as individuals were.  This point was critical for 
Cushing, because the “great end and object of [states] must be to secure and support the 
rights of individuals, or else vain is Government.”18
 Wilson, Jay, and Cushing each relied on extra-constitutional and universalistic 
arguments.  Both features are significant, but they are not co-terminous.  An extra-
constitutional argument need not be universalistic.  One might, for example, appeal to 
long-standing American customs that are not understood as linked in any way to the 
constitutional text.  What made the arguments of Wilson, Jay, and Cushing universalistic 
was that they reasoned from principles (such as right, justice, equality, reciprocity, and 
sovereignty), that did not hinge on peculiarly American preferences, traditions, or 
                                                 
16 2 U.S. at 479. 
17 2 U.S. at 467. 
18 2 U.S. at 468. 
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conditions.  Under the rubric of “general principles of jurisprudence,” for instance, 
Wilson identified principles that applied to states, as artificial persons, because they 
applied to natural persons.  Their basis and applicability were not limited to the people or 
circumstances of the United States.  Not all members of the Chisolm Court, however, 
agreed on the use of extra-constitutional UR.  Indeed, Blair (concurring) and Iredell 
(dissenting) looked only to the constitutional text in their reasoning, with Blair stating 
flatly: “The Constitution of the United States is the only fountain from which I shall 
draw; the only authority to which I shall appeal.”19
 In Calder v. Bull (1798),20 the Court unanimously rejected a claim that the 
Connecticut legislature interfered with vested rights by altering the outcome of a probate 
court decision.  The probate court had rejected a will as invalid, finding for Calder.  After 
the state adopted legislation overturning the ruling, the same court held another trial, and 
this time found the will valid.  Following affirmance by the highest state court, Calder 
argued before the Supreme Court that the Connecticut legislation overturning the probate 
court’s initial ruling amounted to an ex post facto law in violation of Art. I, § 10 of the 
Constitution.  While the justices’ arguments varied, an important common determination 
was that the Ex Post Facto Clause applied only in the criminal context.21  Since Calder’s 
was a civil claim, the Clause did not apply.  While Chase and Iredell both rejected the 
Calders’ claim, they nevertheless clashed over the appropriateness of judicial reliance on 
extra-constitutional, universalistic principles.  Chase initiated the discussion of extra-
constitutional reasoning as a response to his own query of whether, absent constitutional 
provisions prohibiting it, a legislature can overturn any judicial decision without 
                                                 
19 2 U.S. at 449. 
20 3 U.S. 386. 
21 The interpretation has proven enduring.  See, e.g., Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41 (1990). 
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restriction.  Although Calder did not require an answer to that question (since the 
legislature had not asserted such authority), he used the question to argue that there were 
limitations on state legislatures beyond those in the constitutional text, stating: 
I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a State 
Legislature, or that it is absolute and without control; 
although its authority should not be expressly restrained by 
the Constitution, or fundamental law, of the State.22
 
 Chase’s discussion of the restraints on legislatures combined universalistic and 
particularistic elements.  In referring to the social compact, Chase seemed at times to 
refer to the compact as a written constitution--a specific text of enacted law.  At other 
times, he referred to the social contract as a universalistic frame providing guidance 
through an examination of the basic purposes of all free, republican governments.  These 
two varieties of social contractarian reasoning were intertwined throughout the opinion.  
He referred to the American people as living under the laws of “governments established 
on express compact, and on republican principles,” and stated that the “obligation of a 
law” in such governments “must be determined by the nature of the power, on which it is 
founded.”  That power was founded through the social compact: 
The people of the United States erected their Constitutions, 
or forms of government, to establish justice, to promote the 
general welfare, to secure the blessings of liberty; and to 
protect their persons and property from violence.  The 
purposes for which men enter into society will determine 
the nature and terms of the social compact; and as they are 
the foundation of the legislative power, they will decide 
what are the proper objects of it: The nature, and ends of 
legislative power will limit the exercise of it. 
 
The social compact was an efficacious restraint on lawmakers: 
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An act of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary 
to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be 
considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority. 
 
The phrase “great first principles of the social compact,” however, could be referring to 
the terms of an enacted constitution, or to the basic requirements applicable to any 
society founded upon a social contractarian framework.  He also stated that there were 
“vital principles in our free Republican governments, which determined and over-ruled 
an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power.”  The acts that Chase identified as 
violative of these principles included: 
[an act] to authorize manifest injustice by positive law; or 
to take away that security for personal liberty, or private 
property, for the protection whereof of the government was 
established . . . A law that punished a citizen for an 
innocent action, or, in other words, for an act, which, when 
done, was in violation of no existing law; a law that 
destroys, or impairs, the lawful private contracts of citizens; 
a law that makes a man a Judge in his own cause; or a law 
that takes property from A. and gives it to B . . .23
 
The list included restraints not listed in the text of the federal Constitution, such as the 
prohibition on laws that take property from A and give it to B.   
 Chase’s opinion can be understood as combining universalistic and particularistic 
threads of argument.  The particularistic thread was based in the will of the American 
people as expressed in written constitutional text, historically enacted.  This line of 
thinking was suggested by Chase’s reference to express compacts and constitutions 
established by the American people.  Chase’s argument was also universalistic.  He 
identified legislative acts that were barred by the “general principles of law and reason.”  
His repeated references to the principles of a free, republican government suggested the 
ability to reason about the nature of all such governments, independently of a specific 
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constitutional text.  Moreover, Chase suggested that the nature of the social contract itself 
was circumscribed by universalistic principles.  Concerning certain forbidden acts: 
It is against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a 
Legislature with such powers; and, therefore, it cannot be 
presumed that they have done it.24  
 
Chase, here, used reason and justice as standards for evaluating the content of the social 
contract, and for ruling out possible interpretations.  One could use the concept of the 
social contract as a means of reasoning from the basic purposes of government, and the 
essential principles of free, republican government.  From these broad standards were 
derived somewhat more specific limitations, such as the principle that no legislature 
could take property from one party and give it to another. 
 The universalistic and particularistic threads of Chase’s argument were not 
inherently contradictory.  Used in conjunction, one might view a constitution as 
representing more than a state’s supreme positive law.  A constitution represents the act 
by which the people signal their decision to enter into the social contract.  Thus, it 
represents their collective commitment to pursue a common set of fundamental purposes, 
beginning with establishment of a free, republican government.  The basic outlines of the 
social contract follow from that commitment, including certain constraints on 
government.  Under such an understanding, the social contract supports two lines of 
reasoning.  The first is particularistic.  It looks to the written constitution as the 
expression of a specific people’s will through enactment of a supreme positive law.  The 
second, combining universalistic and particularistic elements, proceeds in two steps.  
Initially, it recognizes the constitution as an affirmation of the people’s collective 
commitment to free, republican government (particularistic).  However, having 
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recognized the people’s general commitment, this line of reasoning then looks directly to 
concepts such as freedom and republicanism for understanding (universalistic).  Chase’s 
discussion of general constraints on legislatures was more indicative of the second line of 
reasoning than the first.  In discussing the social contract, he did not emphasize the text of 
a specific enacted document.  Rather, recognizing that the American people had chosen 
to live according to the basic ends of the social contract, he emphasized the fundamental 
principles that naturally followed from that foundation.   
 Though not referring to it explicitly, Iredell responded to the thrust of Chase’s 
discussion, rejecting the position held by some “speculative jurists” that “natural justice” 
provides grounds for judicial invalidation.25  In the absence of restraints imposed by the 
Constitution, the judiciary had no power to invalidate legislative acts.  Iredell advanced 
two principal arguments against judicial reliance on natural justice.  First, citing 
Blackstone for the proposition that courts were subordinate to legislative will, Iredell 
argued that courts lacked authority to enforce principles beyond those included in enacted 
laws.  Second, the vague and contested principles of natural justice were, in any event, 
too indefinite to provide meaningful guidance: “The ideas of natural justice are regulated 
by no fixed standard: the ablest and the purest men have differed upon the subject.”26  
Reliance on natural justice would place excessive discretion in the hands of judges.27
 To a degree, the disagreement between Chase and Iredell concerned judicial use 
of extra-constitutional reasoning.  As discussed below (sec. B), the Court as a whole 
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27 Justice William Paterson also argued for exclusive reliance on text.  Though believing that retroactive 
laws, like the one at issue in Calder, “neither accord with sound legislation, nor the fundamental principles 
of the social compact,” 3 U.S. at 397, Paterson rested his opinion entirely on textual interpretation.  Since, 
in his view, the Ex Post Facto Clause applied only in the criminal context, he could not find that the 
legislature violated the Constitution, and, consequently, could not find the act invalid. 
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shifted away from extra-constitutional reasoning.  The significance of the Chase-Iredell 
debate, however, transcends the question of extra-constitutionality.  Chase’s reasoning 
was not only extra-constitutional, but also universalistic.  We will see that reasoning used 
by later justices in some ways followed the basic approach Chase outlined, though 
framing the UR as interpretation of constitutional provisions.  Likewise, Iredell’s 
argument was similar to arguments advanced by later justices against the use of UR.  
Even when framed as textual interpretation, the use of UR has been attacked as lacking 
authority, and so vague as to allow for excessive judicial discretion.  Indeed, Iredell’s 
opinion fits within the Delegative Model (“DM”).  DM stresses particularistic bases for 
rights.  The DM advocate may believe that the Constitution is consistent with 
universalistic ends and values, but, from the perspective of a judge, the Constitution has 
authority because it is the enacted will of the people.  If the Constitution was framed with 
universalistic ends in mind, the judge must understand these ends as lying behind the 
textual provisions.  The judge’s role is to enforce those provisions’ specific commands.  
Direct appeal to universalistic standards, like “natural law,” or “natural justice,” afford 
the judge too much room for imposition of subjective will.  To a significant degree, the 
fault line between Chase and Iredell in Calder remains with us today. 
B. The Marshall Court’s Use of Extra-Constitutional, 
 Universal Reasoning___________________                                                                           
 
 In its first few decades, the Court heard fewer rights cases than it did in later 
periods.  The Bill of Rights provided the most extensive array of protections, but it was 
understood at the time as applicable only against the federal government,28 and the 
federal government did not have the reach that it would attain later.  State governments 
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were more active, but the Constitution provides few rights provisions applicable against  
states (Gillman 1993, 46).29  American political thought during the period of the Marshall 
Court placed great importance on the security of property, which was viewed as vital to 
liberty in itself, and also as instrumentally important for pursuit of the public good (Ely 
1992, 63).  During the period that Marshall served as Chief Justice (1801-1835), the 
Court made the Contract Clause the most significant constitutional limitation on state 
regulations, a distinction it held for much of the nineteenth century (Ely 1992, 64, 69; 
Currie 1985, 128).  The Clause, appearing in Article I, § 10, prohibits the states from 
passing any law “impairing the obligation of contracts.”  In determining whether 
government actions violated property rights, the justices also relied on the closely related 
doctrine of vested rights (Corwin 1914, 247), which had roots in the common law.  The 
doctrine held generally that legislatures could not interfere with contract or property 
rights already recognized by, or “vested” under, existing law.  Application of the doctrine 
fell within the judiciary’s accepted role of safeguarding existing legal rights (Gillman 
1994, 627-28), and accorded with the common law’s general disapproval of retroactive 
legislation (Corwin 1914, 258).  The doctrine also derived from the natural rights view 
that, regardless of textual provisions, one of government’s primary purposes is to protect 
property rights, which includes safeguarding vested rights (Haines 1930, ch. 4, sec. 5).    
Fletcher v. Peck (1810)30 was the first case in which the Court employed the 
Contract Clause to invalidate governmental action (Currie 1985, 128; Hale 1944, “The 
Supreme Court and the Contract Clause II,” 629), and the first case in which the Court 
exercised its authority to invalidate state laws (McCloskey 2000, 33).  Marshall wrote for 
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30 10 U.S. 87. 
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a unanimous Court (the Marshall Court’s decisions on constitutional issues into the 1820s 
were characterized by a large degree of consensus) (Currie 1985, 127-28).  The decision 
rendered interpretations of the Clause that proved to have lasting impact on its 
subsequent development.  Marshall held, for example, that grants could be contracts 
under the Clause, and, that the Clause applied to contracts between private parties and a 
state.  The case arose out of the Yazoo land scandal, in which the Georgia legislature, 
influenced by corruption, sold huge tracts of land to private companies.  After the 
corruption became public, a later legislature rescinded the acts that had effected the sale, 
which raised questions about the rights of third parties who had innocently acquired the 
lands.  Peck had conveyed property to Fletcher, who later sued to void the sale on the 
grounds that Peck did not have good title.  The central question concerned the 
constitutionality of the act rescinding the initial sale, and the Court determined that later 
legislatures were bound by the initial sale. 
 While Marshall based the decision, in part, on the Contract Clause, he also 
supported the decision with arguments finding no clear source in the constitutional text.  
He drew on the doctrine of vested rights to support his argument that the acts of one 
legislature could not be undone by a later legislature if the effect would be to interfere 
with property rights already vested.  In articulating grounds for the decision, he also 
stated “there are certain great principles of justice, whose authority is universally 
acknowledged, that ought not to be entirely disregarded,”31 and that: 
It may well be doubted whether the nature of society and of 
government does not prescribe some limits to the 
legislative power; and, if any be prescribed, where are they 
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to be found, if the property of an individual, fairly and 
honestly acquired, may be seized without compensation.32  
 
In summarizing the decision’s basis, Marshall said Georgia’s rescission of the sales was 
prohibited “either by general principles which are common to our free institutions, or by 
the particular provisions of the constitution of the United States.”33  Justice Thomas 
Johnson wrote separately to make clear that he rested his decision entirely on extra-
constitutional principles prohibiting legislative violation of vested rights: 
I do not hesitate to declare that a state does not possess the 
power of revoking its own grants. But I do it on a general 
principle, on the reason and nature of things: a principle 
which will impose laws even on the deity.34  
 
Johnson voted to overturn Georgia’s repealing act, despite the fact that, in his view, the 
act did not violate the Contract Clause, or any other constitutional provision.35  
 Four aspects of the Fletcher opinions merit attention.  First, Marshall (and 
Johnson in concurrence) appealed to universalistic bases for the decision.  He did not 
reference uniquely American principles, but “great principles of justice, whose authority 
is universally acknowledged.”  He did not reference the contingent circumstances of the 
United States, but “the nature of society and of government” (see Arkes 1990, 33).  
Johnson appealed to “a general principle,” “the reason and nature of things,” and “a 
principle which will impose laws even on the deity.”  Second, Marshall’s UR (and 
Johnson’s ) was extra-constitutional (Sherry 1987, 1175-76; Smith 1985, 70).  Marshall 
did not link UR with constitutional text, and Johnson stated expressly that his opinion did 
not rest on the Constitution. 
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33 10 U.S. at 139. 
34 10 U.S. at 143 (Johnson, J., concurring). 
35 10 U.S. at 144-45.  While Johnson agreed with Marshall that a grant could be a contract under the 
Clause, he did not believe that the obligation of the contract continued after such a contract was executed. 
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 Third, Marshall’s UR followed a broad model of reasoning, referred to here as 
reasoning from essential principles (“REP”) that the Court has used in other issue areas.  
The approach begins with an appeal to a universalistic standard of evaluation (“USE”), 
like Marshall’s appeal to the nature of society and government.  It assumes a category of 
rights essential to comportment with the USE (here, property rights), and identifies more 
specific principles or requirements (intermediate premises, or “IMPs”), whose 
observance is essential to meaningful protection of the category of rights at stake.  
Marshall’s line of argument was that, if there were any constraints at all growing out of 
the nature of society and government, they concerned property rights, and, more 
specifically, prevented a legislature from seizing an individual’s property without 
providing compensation.  Discussion here of REP is not meant to suggest that Marshall, 
or later justices, rigorously applied the model described, or that it was always applied in 
precisely the same way.  Rather, it indicates a general way that the justices have 
incorporated universalistic reasoning into their opinions.  Later chapters will note 
examples of how REP has been used in other issue areas as well. 
 Fourth, Marshall’s reference to “general principles which are common to our free 
institutions” contained an ambiguity concerning the basis of rights.  Grounding rights in 
principles common to “our institutions” suggests particularistic reasoning, with rights 
gaining their force from the fact that they are followed by American institutions and are 
the ones Americans have chosen and followed.  Grounding rights in the principles 
common to “free institutions” suggests universalistic reasoning, with rights gaining their 
force from the requirements of freedom.  Marshall, however, grounded rights in 
principles common to “our free institutions.”  The reference was a form of mixed rights 
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reasoning (“MRR”), combining universalistic and particularistic elements.  Chase’s 
reasoning in Calder was also a form of MRR.  Like Chase’s opinion, Marshall’s 
reference can be understood as weaving together universalistic and particularistic threads 
of argument.  The particularistic thread places weight on the fact that the American 
people chose to organize their political society around free institutions.  Hewing to the 
general principles common to those institutions, then, is faithful to the expressed will of a 
particular people.  The universalistic thread emphasizes that the concept of freedom has 
meaningful content, apart from the expressed will of any specific people.  Once we know 
that a people are committed to free institutions, we can reason about certain principles 
that are essential to the maintenance of those institutions.  Appealing to principles 
common to “our free institutions” is a means of strengthening the basis of those 
principles by weaving the particularistic and universalistic threads together.  We will see 
that the use of MRR has been common in other areas of the Court’s rights jurisprudence. 
 The Marshall Court used extra-constitutional UR in other notable cases, including 
Terrett v. Taylor (1815).36  Like Fletcher, Terrett concerned a state legislature’s 
interference with private property rights through the reversal of earlier legislation.  In 
1776 and 1786, the Virginia legislature had recognized and confirmed the Episcopal 
Church’s title to certain lands.  But in 1798 and 1801, the legislature repealed the 
previous acts and asserted the state’s ownership in the property.  As in Fletcher, the 
Court held that the state was bound by the prior legislation.  The state could not 
constitutionally assert its rights over the property that it had previously recognized as 
belonging to the Church.  In his opinion for the Court, Justice Joseph Story rested the 
decision on the principles of vested rights.  Prior to the Revolution, the Church had 
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acquired the lands through various statutes and the common law, and the title to the 
property had “indefeasibly vested in the churches.”37  Story stated that the Church’s 
vested rights were unaffected by the events of the Revolution, according to a principle of 
the common law that was “equally consonant with the common sense of mankind and the 
maxims of eternal justice.”  Moreover, even assuming that the Revolution had deprived 
the Church of its rights in the lands, Virginia’s subsequent legislation “vested an 
indefeasible and irrevocable title.”  Thus, Terrett reaffirmed the critical holding of 
Fletcher--that a state was bound by its own grants.  Story identified this as “a great and 
fundamental principle of a republican government, the right of the citizens to the free 
enjoyment of their property.”38  The decision stood: 
upon the principles of natural justice, upon the fundamental 
laws of every free government, upon the spirit and the letter 
of the constitution of the United States, and upon the 
decisions of most respectable judicial tribunals.39
 
The doctrine of vested rights, then, was presented with universalistic bases, supported by 
the “common sense of mankind,” the “maxims of eternal justice, “the principles of 
natural justice,” “a great and fundamental principle of a republican government,” and the 
fundamental laws of every free government.”  While Story referred to “the spirit and 
letter of the constitution,” unlike Marshall in Fletcher, he did not explicitly link his 
discussion with the Contract Clause or any other constitutional provision. 
 Wilkinson v. Leland (1829)40 stands as a later example of the Marshall Court’s 
reliance on extra-constitutional, universalistic reasoning.  In discussing the inherent 
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protections for property rights and the restraints that confined the legislature, 
notwithstanding the absence of a written constitution in that state, Story wrote: 
That government can scarcely be deemed to be free, where 
the rights of property are left solely dependent upon the 
will of a legislative body, without any restraint. The 
fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require, 
that the rights of personal liberty and private property 
should be held sacred.41
 
 That the justices during this period sometimes viewed themselves as relying on 
extra-constitutional principles was reflected in their handling of Section 25 of the 1789 
Judiciary Act, which gave the Supreme Court jurisdiction over 
a final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest court 
of law or equity of a State in which a decision in the suit 
could be had, where is drawn in question the validity of a 
treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under the 
United States, and the decision is against their validity; or 
where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an 
authority exercised under any State, on the ground of their 
being repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the 
United States, and the decision is in favour of such their 
validity . . . (emphasis added) 
 
The Court drew a distinction between the scope of its authority concerning cases that 
came to it from the highest court of a state under the authority of Section 25, and the 
scope of its authority in cases that came to it from lower federal courts.  The distinction 
arose from the fact that Section 25 jurisdiction explicitly required a claim that a state act 
was “repugnant to the constitution.”  No such limitation applied to cases that came to the 
Supreme Court from lower federal courts.  When hearing appeals from lower federal 
court decisions, many justices saw themselves as free to appeal to extra-constitutional 
principles, whereas, in Section 25 cases, the claim had to be based in constitutional 
provisions (White 1988, 603, 608, 611; Siegan 1980, 92-93).  Writing for the Court in 
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Satterlee v. Mathewson (1829),42 for example, Justice Bushrod Washington explained 
that the Court could not, in that case, entertain the same extra-constitutional, vested rights 
arguments as it could in cases coming from lower federal courts, because the Court was 
limited to the scope of Section 25’s jurisdictional grant.43  The distinction regarding 
Section 25 represented an acknowledgement by the justices that they were, at times, 
relying on extra-constitutional bases of decision. 
 We have seen, then, that in a number of prominent cases, the early Court used 
UR, appealing to a variety of USEs.  In Calder, Chase outlined an approach based on 
principles derived from the social contract.  In other instances, justices appealed to broad 
principles or concepts, including justice, equality, the nature of government, and “the 
fundamental laws of every free government.”44  These USEs were presented, generally, 
as supporting the essential nature of property rights, and, more specifically, as supporting 
IMPs, such as the doctrine of vested rights, the requirement that government provide 
compensation when it seized private property,45 and, the prohibition on governments 
legislating that the property of A would be transferred to B.46  Adherence to these IMPs 
was viewed as indispensable to the realization of the broader standards. 
 We have also seen, in the cases examined, that the Court’s use of UR was extra-
constitutional.  The Court, however, eventually moved away from extra-constitutional 
reasoning.  Notwithstanding opinions like Marshall’s in Fletcher, and Story’s as late as 
1829 in Wilkinson, by the middle of Marshall’s tenure as Chief Justice, a shift was 
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underway towards an approach directly linking rights reasoning to the constitutional text.  
In prominent cases like Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819)47 and Sturges v. 
Crowinshield (1819),48 the Court continued to develop its Contract Clause jurisprudence 
(Currie 1985, 128), but, in doing so, increasingly ensured that their arguments were 
framed exclusively as interpretations of the text.  Vested rights principles were folded 
into broad understandings of the Contract Clause’s reach (Sherry 1987, 1170-71; Currie 
1985, 15).  This approach minimized jurisdictional complications associated with Section 
25, and made the justices less vulnerable to attack on the grounds that they only had 
authority to enforce positive law (White 1988, 628). 
 The initial reliance on extra-constitutional reasoning, and eventual shift away 
from it, reflected tension embedded within the social contractarian philosophical 
framework that played an important role in American constitutional thought--a  
framework seeking to protect pre-political, universalistic rights through the application of 
particularistic, positivistic laws.  We might think of the social contractarian framework as 
consisting of two principal components.  One component concerns the ends for which 
people enter into the social contract, centering on a description of the universal rights 
existing in the pre-political condition.  The second component concerns the mechanisms 
through which the people act collectively to pursue those ends, centering on the 
institution of government to better secure their rights.  With the institution of 
government, individuals surrender their natural liberty, and subject themselves to 
regulations for the common good.  In the broadest sense, the protection of pre-political, 
universal rights remain as a standard for evaluating the legitimacy of government.  Yet, 
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individuals do not retain the same degree of liberty after the institution of government.  
This set of ideas poses a difficult question for judges:  Once the second component of the 
social contractarian framework is implemented--the institution of government--does any 
role remain for judicial reference to the first component--assertions concerning the nature 
of pre-political, universal rights?  The second component includes the enactment of the 
Constitution.  Put another way, in interpreting that document, is it appropriate for justices 
to refer directly to the universalistic principles it is aimed at realizing? 
 On the one hand, if one’s ultimate commitment is to universal rights that exist 
independently of positive laws, and the positive laws are understood as instrumental to 
protecting those rights, one might wish to refer directly to those pre-political rights that 
served as the raison d’etre of the positive laws.  That is, one might wish to serve the ends 
directly, rather than the tools designed indirectly to implement them.  On the other hand, 
while the institution of government is a mechanism motivated by the securing of pre-
political rights, it is also a transformative event, altering the relationship between 
individuals and liberty.  Universal rights may be said to exist independently of 
government, but their actual protection depends upon the establishment of government 
and the rule of law, which requires the concretization of governing rules.  Because the 
content of universalistic principles is vague and contested, the institution of government 
requires mechanisms for arriving at collective decisions in the face of disagreements, and 
for resolving disputes over interpretation and application of the laws.  These mechanisms 
include delineation of the boundaries of authority between the various branches of 
governmental power.  One view, consistent with the Delegative Model, stresses that 
judicial authority emanates from particularistic sources--enacted texts and common 
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understandings that give the text its needed specificity.  On this view, if the judge refers 
directly to pre-political, universalistic principles, the judge transgresses the boundaries of 
judicial authority.  The judge would better serve the ultimate purposes of political society 
through careful compliance with established, governing laws. 
 By placing vested rights principles under the umbrella of the Contract Clause, the 
justices made themselves less vulnerable to the charge that they were acting outside their 
authority.  The shift away from extra-constitutional reasoning, however, did not 
necessitate an abandonment of UR.  The use of UR could be framed another way.  Rather 
than referring to universalistic principles extra-constitutionally, justices could link UR 
with particularistic bases of rights.  More specifically, they could link UR with the 
constitutional text, understanding specific provisions as embodying universalistic 
principles.  This approach enabled the justices to shed an element of their opinions that 
made them especially open to the charge of ultra vires decisionmaking.  It did not, 
however, completely insulate the use of UR from criticism.  Even when not presented 
extra-constitutionally, UR may be subjected to the charge that its indefiniteness opens the 
door to the exercise of excessive judicial discretion.  As discussed in the following 
section, the Court’s 4-3 split in a landmark case in 1827 revealed a fault line around the 
question of extra-constitutionality.  In the long run, however, while extra-constitutionality 
would largely be avoided, questions and disagreements over the use of UR would persist. 
C. Universal Powers--the Court’s Development of the Concept of Inherent 
 and Inalienable Governmental Powers, and the Decline of  the Contract Clause 
 
 Ogden v. Saunders (1827)49 represents a landmark case in the Court’s Contract 
Clause jurisprudence, and the first time that Marshall wrote in dissent on a constitutional 
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issue.  From that point on, dissensus was more prevalent (Currie 1985, 127-28).  The 
Court had almost never rejected a claim brought under the Clause, and, in upholding New 
York’s bankruptcy law, the Ogden Court laid down the significant limitation that the 
Clause did not apply to prospective legislation (Currie 1985, 156).  The Court had held in 
1819 that the retroactive application of bankruptcy laws violated the Contract Clause.50  
The issue in Ogden was whether a state could constitutionally apply a law prospectively 
that would provide for the discharge of debts through bankruptcy proceedings.  The Court 
divided 4-3, with Justices Washington, Johnson, Robert Trimble, and Smith Thompson 
each writing separate opinions upholding the New York law’s prospective application, 
and Marshall dissenting (joined by Justices Story and Gabriel Duvall).   
 A central area of disagreement between the majority and dissenting justices 
concerned the source of a contract’s obligation.  For Marshall, a contract’s obligation 
originated independently of political society.  Even absent the institution of government, 
individuals had both obligations and rights arising from their contractual agreements.  
The obligation to observe contractual agreements 
is not conferred on contracts by positive law, but is 
intrinsic, and is conferred by the act of the parties. This 
results from the right which every man retains to acquire 
property, to dispose of that property according to his own 
judgment, and to pledge himself for a future act. These 
rights are not given by society, but are brought into it.51
 
Marshall acknowledged that, through the social contract, individuals yielded a large 
degree of authority to the government to regulate various aspects of contractual relations.  
Individuals surrendered the right to self-enforcement of their contracts, and, in return, 
government assumed the responsibility of affording proper remedies.  Thus, Marshall’s 
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line of reasoning drew a critical distinction between the remedies for contract violations, 
which were the sole responsibility of government, and the obligation to fulfill a contract, 
which was a natural, pre-political dictate never surrendered to the government.  Since 
New York’s bankruptcy legislation, even in its prospective application, interfered with 
the obligation of contracts, and did not merely regulate remedies; it constituted a 
violation of the Contract Clause.  Marshall’s opinion, then, appealed to pre-political, 
universalistic principles as a source of limitations on the government. 
 For the majority, the only authoritative source of the obligation of contracts was 
positive law.  The majority did not contest the existence of normative principles applying 
to contractual relations in a state of nature.  However, these pre-political principles were 
not relevant to analysis under the Contract Clause.  Thus, Washington conceded that 
there was a “universal law of all civilized nations, which declares that men shall perform 
that to which they have agreed.”  This universal law applied in the absence of municipal 
law.  It governed in international affairs, or on a remote island with no semblance of 
organized political society.  It could not, however, bind people to contracts within a 
political society, since it was too vague to provide sufficient guidance.  Organized society 
required more specific regulation of contracts.  Government acquired the authority to 
regulate from the social contract.  The universal law pre-dating government was 
subordinated to the municipal laws of the place where a contract was executed.  These 
municipal laws became part of the contract itself, and traveled with the parties.  As part 
of the contract, it followed that this municipal law could not itself impair the contract.52
 Washington did find that states were constrained in their regulation of contracts, 
due to Art. I, § 10’s prohibition of ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, together with the 
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Contract Clause.  The universal principle underlying these clauses was the prohibition on  
retroactive laws, which were “oppressive, unjust, and tyrannical; and, as such, are 
condemned by the universal sentence of civilized man.”53  Since the law at issue in 
Ogden acted only prospectively, it did not run afoul of the Constitution.  Washington, 
then, appealed to universalistic principles as an interpretation of the core principles 
underlying several phrases in the constitutional text, while declining to rely on pre-
political principles as the source of the contract’s obligation. 
 Johnson also countered Marshall’s view of the relationship between pre-political, 
universalistic principles, and the commands of positive law.  He conceded the existence 
of contractual rights and obligations in a state of nature, “founded solely in the principles 
of natural or universal law.”  Nevertheless: 
when men form a social compact, and organize a civil 
government, they necessarily surrender the regulation and 
control of these natural rights and obligations into the 
hands of the government.54
 
Like Washington, Johnson stressed that rights flowing from contracts may be modified 
by positive laws because the “rights of all must be held and enjoyed in subserviency to 
the good of the whole.”55  The social contract fundamentally transformed the rights of 
contracts, because men in political society “can enter into no contract which the laws of 
that community forbid, and the validity and effect of their contracts is what the existing 
laws gives to them.”56  And, like Washington, Johnson argued that contracts were 
implicitly subject to municipal laws: 
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[T]he obligation of a contract made within a sovereign 
State, must be precisely that allowed by the law of the 
State, and none other.  
 
. . . [S]o far as relates to private contracts between 
individual and individual, it is the civil obligation of 
contracts; that obligation which is recognised by, and 
results from, the law of the State in which the contract is 
made, which is within the meaning of the constitution. If 
so, it follows, that the States have, since the adoption of the 
constitution, the authority to prescribe and declare, by their 
laws, prospectively, what shall be the obligation of all 
contracts made within them. Such a power seems to be 
almost indispensable to the very existence of the States, and 
is necessary to the safety and welfare of the people. The 
whole frame and theory of the constitution seems to favour 
this construction.57
 
 None of the justices in Ogden challenged the premises of a social contractarian 
philosophy, positing the existence of pre-political rights, and the establishment of a 
government authorized to legislative for the common good.   The rift between Marshall 
and the majority in Ogden can be understood, to a significant degree, as a disagreement 
over how to address the tension between the two components of the social contract.  For 
Marshall, even after the formation of government, there was a proper place in the 
interpretation of rights for reasoning based on pre-political rights.  The majority justices, 
on the other hand, while not quibbling with Marshall’s account of natural law, believed 
that it was improper to reason directly from these pre-political principles.  The authority 
of pre-political principles was subsumed by the social contract.  As Johnson put it, by 
entering into the social contract, individuals surrendered the regulation and control of 
their natural rights and obligations into the hands of government. 
 Johnson’s opinion was especially noteworthy, because, in addition to arguing that 
pre-political principles were subsumed in the social contract, he used universalistic 
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reasoning to support the existence of governmental powers.  The government’s authority 
to regulate contractual relations, Johnson argued, “seems to be almost indispensable to 
the very existence of the States, and is necessary to the safety and welfare of the people.”  
Johnson’s reasoning suggested that the authority to regulate contracts arose not simply 
from a specific text, but from the inherent requirements of a government capable of 
serving the public good.  While others had stressed rights that the social contract was 
meant to protect, Johnson sought to demonstrate that certain governmental powers 
followed from the nature of the social contract, and from the institution of government.  
As others had reasoned from rights essential to freedom, Johnson reasoned from powers 
essential to government capable of providing for “the safety and welfare of the people.”  
He declined to place weight on natural, pre-political, universal rights.  At the same time, 
however, that Johnson curtailed the judicial relevance of natural rights, he reasoned 
universalistically about the authority for governmental powers. 
 Johnson’s opinion in Ogden is especially notable when one recalls that this was 
the same Justice who had written separately in Fletcher to emphasize that, unlike 
Marshall, he had rested his opinion entirely on extra-constitutional, universal principles 
that “impose laws even on the deity.”58  Johnson’s evolution reflected the general shift of 
the justices away from reliance on extra-constitutional, universal rights, and presaged the 
major role to be played by universalistic, inherent and inalienable governmental powers. 
 The concept of inherent and inalienable governmental powers has had the 
broadest impact in the context of the police powers (states’ general power to enact laws 
for the public welfare), and especially in adjudication under the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause (discussed further in ch. 3).  However, the concept was initially 
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articulated in the context of the Contract Clause, and has been important in its 
development.  Although by the late nineteenth century, the Due Process Clause replaced 
the Contract Clause as the chief constitutional vehicle for protection of property rights, 
the Contract Clause remained a major focus of the Court throughout the bulk of the 
nineteenth century (Olken 1993, 516-17), with the Taney Court (1836-1864) wielding it 
more than any other constitutional provision to invalidate state legislation (Currie 1985, 
210-11).  An important category of cases concerned state chartering of private 
corporations to perform services used widely by the public, such as transportation.  The 
recipients of charters sometimes challenged state actions on the grounds that they 
impaired contractual obligations that the state itself had incurred by granting the charter.  
By the 1830s, the Court developed an approach that afforded the states greater leeway in 
regulating chartered corporations, not only by allowing them to expressly reserve certain 
powers, but also by strictly construing provisions in the grant potentially limiting 
regulation ( Olken 1993, 536-37).59  While this “doctrine of reserved state powers” 
expanded the states’ scope of regulation, it did not address situations in which states 
adopted regulations that did not fall under express reservations and that interfered with a 
chartered corporation’s activities.  The question the Court faced was the extent to which 
the Contract Clause could prevent states from exercising their police powers. 
 In a series of cases beginning in the late 1870s, the Court, relying on universalistic 
reasoning, determined that the states could not bargain away police powers.  The state’s 
authority to regulate for the public good was inherent and inalienable.  The Court first 
suggested this approach60 tentatively in Boyd v. Alabama (1876),61 stating that it was “not 
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prepared to admit that it is competent for one legislature, by any contract with an 
individual, to restrain the power of a subsequent legislature to legislate for the public 
welfare.”62  Shortly afterwards, the Court unequivocally articulated the principle of 
inherent and inalienable governmental powers.  In Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts 
(1877),63 as in Boyd, a state had issued a charter allowing a party to engage in an activity 
but later enacted legislation prohibiting that very activity.  In 1828, Massachusetts 
granted the Boston Beer Co. a license to manufacture malt liquors, but, in 1869, the state 
legislature enacted a prohibitory liquor law.  The Court unanimously rejected the claim 
that the prohibitory legislation violated the Contract Clause.  Justice Joseph Bradley 
reasoned that, even though the company was incorporated for the purpose of 
manufacturing malt liquors, the charter did not: 
exempt[] the corporation from any control therein to which 
a citizen would be subject, if the interests of the community 
should require it. If the public safety or the public morals 
require the discontinuance of any manufacture or traffic, 
the hand of the legislature cannot be stayed from providing 
for its discontinuance, by any incidental inconvenience 
which individuals or corporations may suffer. All rights are 
held subject to the police power of the State.64
 
The Massachusetts legislature that issued the 1828 charter did not have the power to grant 
immunity from valid exercises of the police power by future legislatures.  Banning the 
sale of liquors fell within the state’s police powers, and: 
The legislature cannot, by any contract, divest itself of the 
power to provide for these objects. . . . Legislative 
discretion [regarding the exercise of the police powers] can 
no more be bargained away than the power itself.65
                                                                                                                                                 
61 94 U.S. 645. 
62 94 U.S. at 649-50. 
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 Two years later, the Court linked inalienable governmental powers with the 
purposes for which government was organized.  In Stone v. Mississippi (1879),66 the state 
granted a company the right to operate a lottery, and then banned the operation of 
lotteries.  The Court again unanimously upheld the state’s action on the grounds that the 
police powers were inalienable.  Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite wrote: 
No legislature can bargain away the public health or the 
public morals. The people themselves cannot do it, much 
less their servants. The supervision of both these subjects of 
governmental power is continuing in its nature, and they 
are to be dealt with as the special exigencies of the moment 
may require. Government is organized with a view to their 
preservation, and cannot divest itself of the power to 
provide for them. For this purpose the largest legislative 
discretion is allowed, and the discretion cannot be parted 
with any more than the power itself.67
 
Evoking social contract theory, Waite explained the inalienability of the police powers as 
emanating from the sovereign people: 
[T]he power of governing is a trust committed by the 
people to the government, no part of which can be granted 
away. The people, in their sovereign capacity, have 
established their agencies for the preservation of the public 
health and the public morals, and the protection of public 
and private rights. These several agencies can govern 
according to their discretion, if within the scope of their 
general authority, while in power; but they cannot give 
away nor sell the discretion of those that are to come after 
them, in respect to matters the government of which, from 
the very nature of things, must ‘vary with varying 
circumstances.’68
 
Since the prohibition of lotteries was within the legitimate scope of the state’s police 
powers, any charter to conduct lotteries was issued “with the implied understanding” that 
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the state might at a later time regulate or even ban the practice.  In effect, every contract 
contained an implicit, unamendable provision it was subject to the state’s police powers.  
Five years after Stone, in terms reminiscent of Johnson’s opinion in Ogden, the Court tied 
the inalienability of governmental powers to their being “indispensable to the public 
welfare,” and “necessary to the best interests of social organization.”69  The degree of 
consensus on these propositions was striking; the decisions in Boyd, Boston Beer Co., and 
Stone were all issued without dissent.  As Waite wrote in Stone: “All agree that the 
legislature cannot bargain away the police power of a State.”70   
 Universalistic reasoning is more familiar with respect to the first component of 
the social contract--the assertion of pre-political rights.  In its development of the concept 
of inherent and inalienable police powers, the Court used universalistic reasoning with 
respect to the scope of governmental powers.  The justices’ rooted their reasoning in the 
second component of the social contract--individuals’ subjection to governance for the 
common good.  The evocation of the social contract was universalistic.  The justices were 
not referring simply to the provisions of a specific text, enacted by a particular people.  
They were referring to the basic purposes for which government was organized, and the 
essential requirements of collectively pursuing the common good.  We saw above (sec. 
A) that, in Calder, Chase evoked the social contract universalistically with respect to the 
grounding of rights.  He referred not to a particular enacted text, but to the basic purposes 
for which individuals surrendered liberty, and the essential requirements of freedom.  As 
the Declaration pronounced rights could not be alienated, the Court’s approach to the 
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Contract Clause pronounced that certain powers could not be alienated, regardless of 
particularistic preferences.71
 The concept of inalienable governmental powers was critical to the development 
of the Court’s Contract Clause jurisprudence, as the justices emphasized that contractual 
relationships were subject to the state’s police powers.  The following language from a 
1905 decision was typical of the Court’s approach: 
It is the settled law of this court that the interdiction of 
statutes impairing the obligation of contracts does not 
prevent the state from exercising such powers as are vested 
in it for the promotion of the common weal, or are 
necessary for the general good of the public, though 
contracts previously entered into between individuals may 
thereby be affected. This power . . . is paramount to any 
rights under contracts between individuals.72
 
With the police powers taking precedence over contractual relationships, the Court’s 
analysis largely amounted to whether the challenged state action was a valid, reasonable 
exercise of the state’s police powers.  Since this was the same approach used in 
challenges to economic regulations brought under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause, the Court’s approach to economic due process and Contract Clause cases 
converged, as reflected in the following statement from a 1914 decision: 
                                                 
71 The Court’s use of UR with respect to governmental powers appears to be extra-constitutional in the 
same way that Chase’s universalistic reasoning with respect to rights was extra-constitutional.  Yet, as 
noted, the Court’s universalistic reasoning with respect to powers has enjoyed a remarkable degree of 
consensus.  A question that merits investigation is why extra-constitutionality has been more controversial 
in the context of rights than powers.  Generally, the Court’s use of universalistic reasoning about 
governmental powers is a relatively neglected topic.  Justices have reasoned universalistically about powers 
since the Court’s earliest cases and across a wide range of issue areas.  In Calder v. Bull (1798), for 
example, Iredell, while rejecting the use of extra-constitutional, universalistic reasoning as a basis for 
rights, suggested that eminent domain was an inherent governmental power, one without which “the 
operations of Government would often be obstructed, and society itself would be endangered.” 3 U.S. 386, 
400.  Just two years later, Paterson wrote of the governmental power of confiscation and banishment as one 
that “grows out of the very nature of the social compact.”  Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. 14, 19 (1800).  An in-
depth examination of universalistic powers reasoning is warranted but beyond the scope of this project. 
72 Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480.
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[I]t is settled that neither the ‘contract’ clause nor the ‘due 
process' clause has the effect of overriding the power of the 
state to establish all regulations that are reasonably 
necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, 
or general welfare of the community; that this power can 
neither be abdicated nor bargained away, and is inalienable 
even by express grant; and that all contract and property 
rights are held subject to its fair exercise.73
 
For this proposition, Justice Mahlon Pitney cited Boston Beer Co. – one of the initial 
Contract Clause cases articulating the concept of inalienable governmental powers – 
along with prominent due process opinions.74  Under this approach, in the decades 
following the Court’s articulation of the concept of inalienable governmental powers, the 
significance of the Contract Clause declined (Clarke 1985, 192).  During this period, the 
Court upheld a wide range of state actions interfering with contractual obligations on the 
grounds that they represented valid exercises of the police powers, including, for 
example, regulations regarding railroad safety,75 placement of billboards,76 transportation 
of water across state lines,77 and state legislation allowing a party to maintain a dam after 
it had privately contracted not to do so.78
 The landmark case Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell (1934)79  
merits attention for the majority’s further elaboration of inalienable governmental 
powers, and disagreement over the alterability of constitutional meanings.  In the midst of 
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the Depression, the Minnesota legislature provided relief to homeowners by instituting a 
moratorium on mortgage foreclosures.  Under temporary measures, the mortgagor could 
retain possession if reasonable rent were paid.  The legislation was challenged as an 
impairment of the lenders’ contractual rights relating to foreclosure.  In a 5-4 decision, 
the majority upheld the legislation as a reasonable exercise of the state’s police powers.  
In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Charles Hughes linked the superiority of the 
police powers with their being inherent to sovereignty and necessary for public order: 
Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix 
obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of 
essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into 
contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The policy of 
protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the 
maintenance of a government by virtue of which 
contractual relations are worth while,-a government which 
retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good 
order of society.80
 
The state thus retained the authority to regulate for the common good, even if it “has the 
result of modifying or abrogating contracts already in effect.”81  If a state’s regulations 
otherwise constituted a valid exercise of power, “it is no objection that the performance 
of existing contracts may be frustrated.”  In adjudicating Contract Clause challenges, the 
issue was “not whether the legislative action affects contracts incidentally, or directly or 
indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures 
taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end.”82  Hughes cited Johnson’s opinion in 
Ogden, stressing that the Constitution’s prohibition of laws impairing contractual 
obligations must not be interpreted in a rigidly literal fashion, since: “Societies exercise a 
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positive control as well over the inception, construction and fulfillment of contracts, as 
over the form and measure of the remedy to enforce them.”83
 Hughes rested the decision in part on the emergency circumstances to which the 
Minnesota legislature was responding, but the opinion suggested great deference to 
legislatures even in the absence of special exigencies.84  Hughes also argued that 
constitutional rights evolved with changing understandings about private-public 
relationships and the legitimacy of governmental actions.  He described a “growing 
appreciation of public needs and of the necessity of finding ground for a rational 
compromise between individual rights and public welfare.”  More generally, Hughes 
rejected the notion that constitutional meanings are pegged to traditional understandings:   
It is no answer to say that . . . what the provision of the 
Constitution meant to the vision of that day it must mean to 
the vision of our time. If by the statement that what the 
Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it means to-
day, it is intended to say that the great clauses of the 
Constitution must be confined to the interpretation which 
the framers, with the conditions and outlook of their time, 
would have placed upon them, the statement carries its own 
refutation. . . The case before us must be considered in the 
light of our whole experience and not merely in that of 
what was said a hundred years ago.85
 
 In dissent, Justice George Sutherland (joined by Justices Willis Van Devanter, 
James McReynolds, and Pierce Butler) challenged the majority’s assertion that 
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years, however, the Court indicated that emergency circumstances and the limited duration of measures 
would not be prerequisites to constitutional interferences with contractual obligations.  E.g., Gelfert v. 
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constitutional meanings evolved with changing circumstances.  A constitutional 
provision, Sutherland argued, could not mean one thing at one time, and something 
contradictory at a later time.86  The dictates of the Constitution did not limit government 
less in difficult times.87  Sutherland allowed that circumstances could bring new 
situations within the ambit of constitutional provisions, but asserted that “their meaning is 
changeless; it is only their application which is extensible.”88  A constitution’s purpose 
was to fix fundamentals of government, placing them beyond the reach of changes in 
public opinion.  The judiciary’s role was to enforce the Constitution as written, based on 
the intentions and understandings of those who framed and adopted it.  If circumstances 
made changes to the Constitution desirable, those changes could only be made by the 
people through the amendment procedures.  There would be little point to a Constitution 
if its meaning fluctuated with new circumstances and trends in public opinion:89 “If the 
provisions of the Constitution be not upheld when they pinch as well as when they 
comfort, they may as well be abandoned.”90  Minnesota’s mortgage moratorium violated 
the Contract Clause, since the Clause was framed with “the studied purpose of preventing 
legislation designed to relieve debtors especially in time of financial distress.”91   
 Although the approach to the Contract Clause that Hughes described in Blaisdell 
was largely in place already, the decision crystallized and elaborated upon existing 
doctrine.  It captured the extent to which the Clause had already declined in potency since 
the early nineteenth century, while furthering its demise (Clarke 1985, 192).  In the early 
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nineteenth century, the Clause “was regarded as an absolute bar to any impairment.”92  
While controversy might center on any number of questions relevant to whether a state’s 
actions impair contractual obligations, once it was determined that an impairment had 
occurred, it was understood that the Constitution had been violated.  The approach the 
majority had adopted by the time of Blaisdell was not categorical in this way.  State acts 
that impaired, or even completely nullified contractual obligations, could be upheld as 
consistent with the Clause.  The analysis focused on whether the state act constituted a 
valid exercise of the police powers--a selection by the legislature of a reasonable means 
to pursue a legitimate governmental objective.  Since it revolved around an analysis of 
valid police powers, this approach was largely indistinguishable from the Court’s method 
of determining whether deprivations of property occasioned by economic or business 
regulations violated the Due Process Clause (Hale 1944, “The Supreme Court and the 
Contract Clause: III,” 890).  Contractual obligations, after all, represented a form of 
property.  To the extent that Contract Clause analysis reduced to an examination of 
whether a deprivation of property was reasonable, some considered it to have been 
rendered irrelevant.93  The decline of the Clause’s significance was of such magnitude 
that the Court did not invalidate a state law on Contract Clause grounds for a forty-year 
period between the late 1930s and late 1970s (Ely 1992, 144).94
 After confirming the dormancy (Clarke 1985, 193-94) of the Clause in 1965,95 
two cases in the late 1970s, suggested a potential revival, or at least the adoption of an 
approach that would involve greater scrutiny of state laws interfering with contractual 
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obligations.96  Two cases in the early 1980s, however, seemed to limit their significance 
substantially, calling into question their lasting impact.  The Court has done little since 
that time to clarify the law in this area, though perhaps the most telling indication is the 
relatively low amount of attention that the justices have paid to the Clause for more than 
two decades.  At any rate, these more recent cases confirmed important doctrines 
enunciated in Blaisdell and earlier, including the Court’s long-standing principles 
regarding inalienable governmental powers.  Legislatures can not bargain away their 
police powers, and contracts are understood as incorporating existing laws regarding the 
interpretation and enforcement of contracts.97  The “essential attributes of sovereign 
power” are “necessarily reserved by the States to safeguard the welfare of their 
citizens.”98  Thus, a state can not, by contract, surrender these essential attributes of 
sovereignty, and, can not be held to any contractual provision by which it had purported 
to do so.99  In short, the Contract Clause does not stand in the way of the valid exercise of 
a state’s police powers.  While more recent cases introduce some uncertainty concerning 
the precise guidelines that would govern the Court’s review of individual state acts, it 
remains clear that state actions might be upheld even if they interfere with obligations 
incurred by contract, or barred them completely.100
 While detailed discussion of economic substantive due process is left for the next 
chapter, it is important to note here that Blaisdell was handed down just a few years 
before a series of decisions in the late 1930s101 in which the Court effectively ceased 
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reviewing economic and business regulations to determine whether they interfered with 
constitutionally protected property rights.  In one sense, a cause of the Contract Clause’s 
decline was the rise of economic substantive due process, which, beginning in the late 
nineteenth century, made the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause the chief 
vehicle for judicial protection of property rights.102  In the long run, however, the more 
fundamental cause of the Contract Clause’s decline was the Court’s general shift away 
from interfering with economic and business regulations in order to protect property 
rights.  The line of jurisprudence--economic substantive due process--that stepped over 
the Contract Clause in importance in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
met its own demise in the late 1930s.  Ultimately, the virtual abandonment of significant 
Contract Clause review was a result of the same factors that led to the abandonment of 
serious economic due process review.  As discussed at length in the next chapter, the 
Court developed a universalistic framework revolving around an appraisal of the relative 
importance of distinct categories of rights.  The declining significance of the Contract 
Clause and economic due process resulted from the Court’s demotion of property rights 
to secondary status within its hierarchical framework.  As these two areas of 
jurisprudence were closely related, a number of themes from this Chapter are continued 
in the next, including the Court’s shift away from extra-constitutional reasoning, and the 
development of inherent and inalienable governmental powers. 
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 The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, ratified in the wake of the 
Civil War, abolished slavery and guaranteed certain rights to Americans, regardless of 
race.  While the aftermath of the Civil War and issues of race formed the backdrop for the 
enactment of these Amendments, the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s importance 
within American jurisprudence expanded beyond questions of racial equality.  Enacted in 
1868, the Fourteenth Amendment, made U.S. citizens of all “persons born or naturalized 
in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” independent of citizenship in 
any particular state.  The Amendment’s first section also added certain limitations on 
state governments, including a provision that: “No State shall . . . deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”103  The Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause makes an especially interesting target of study. (The Fifth 
Amendment contains a clause with nearly identical language.  Except when stated 
otherwise, “Due Process Clause” refers to the Fourteenth Amendment.)  By the late 
nineteenth century, the Due Process Clause took the place of the Contract Clause as the 
most important restriction on the states, and as the principal constitutional provision 
serving to protect property rights (Ely 1992, 92; Corwin 1950, 273-74).104  Prior to the 
                                                 
103 Of the three clauses in the first section of the Amendment--the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the 
Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause--the last two have played roles of tremendous 
importance within American constitutional jurisprudence, while the first has been relegated to obscurity.  
The Court’s decision in The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872) dealt the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause a blow from which it never recovered.  Although certain justices at times have advocated a broader 
role for the clause, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 527-28 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting), it has remained 
of relatively little consequence in the Court’s jurisprudence.
104 The sweeping phrases of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses overlap conceptually (The Equal 
Protection Clause provides that no state may “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws.”)  In the decades following the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, it was common for 
litigants to advance arguments under both clauses, and for the justices to address both clauses in the same 
opinions.  Kay 1980, 668-69; Haines 1930, ch. 7, sec. 1.  The justices’ approaches to the two clauses 
overlapped.  The concept of equality was critical to the Court’s due process analysis.  To withstand a due 
process challenge, legislative classifications had to have a rational basis, and to be general in application; 
they could not be aimed arbitrarily at a particular class.  E.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see 
Gillman 1993; Haines 1930, ch. 7, sec. 1.  Contemporary jurisprudence, too, reflects the close connection 
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Fourteenth Amendment’s enactment, the Bill of Rights had been interpreted as applying 
only against the federal government.105  The Due Process Clause became a locus of 
debate over which provisions of the Bill of Rights applied against the state.  Due Process 
jurisprudence spans a wide range of substantive areas, from economic and business 
regulations, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to laws banning abortion 
and homosexual sodomy in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
 The Court’s due process jurisprudence encompasses two sub-topics: substantive 
due process (discussed in this chapter) and procedural due process (discussed in ch. 4).  
By prohibiting the states from depriving a person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law, the Clause allows that a state may deprive a person of life, liberty, or 
property, if due process is provided.  Procedural due process (“PDP”) concerns, in large 
part, the procedures that a state must follow before it may constitutionally punish 
individuals by depriving them of life, liberty, or property.106  It concerns, for example, the 
right to a jury trial, and the right to counsel.  While the Clause’s language is most 
suggestive of procedural concerns, the courts have long held that certain regulations 
unconstitutionally deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property, regardless of the 
procedures afforded.  This branch has come to be known as substantive due process 
                                                                                                                                                 
between due process and equal protection.  In one recent case for example (discussed in sec. G), the 
majority relied on due process to strike down a Texas law that banned certain intimate sexual acts between 
persons of the same sex, noting that it eschewed the Equal Protection Clause for tactical reasons 
(invalidating the law on equal protection grounds would have made it too easy for the legislature to 
accomplish the same illegitimate end through crafty revision of the legislation).  A concurring justice 
(O’Connor) however, based her opinion on the Equal Protection Clause.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003).  Notwithstanding the conceptual overlap, however, the justices have developed bodies of 
jurisprudence with respect to the two clauses that are sufficiently distinct to allow for an examination 
specifically focused on due process. 
105 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1834). 
106 PDP also encompasses procedures provided in the civil context; the discussion in ch. 4 concentrates 
principally on the criminal context. 
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(“SDP”).107  Although the Fifth Amendment contains its own Due Process Clause, the 
Court said relatively little about due process until after the enactment of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,108 due in part to the relatively low level of the federal government’s activity 
in the first part of the nineteenth century.  The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment assumed a major role in the Court’s jurisprudence not long after enactment, 
and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause subsequently attained greater 
significance.109  Chapters Three and Four contain their scope by considering cases under 
                                                 
107 As early as 1898, the justices recognized the distinction between the two branches of due process.  In 
Holden v. Hardy, the Court differentiated between two kinds of due process claims. The first kind involved 
“the general system of jurisprudence,” “the proper administration of justice,” or “methods of trial.”  The 
second included cases “wherein the state legislature was charged with having transcended its proper police 
power in assuming to legislate for the health or morals of the community.”  169 U.S. 366, 383-84.  
Similarly, in Twining v. New Jersey (1908), the Court distinguished between cases dealing “with the 
principles which must be observed in the trial of criminal and civil causes,” versus cases involving “the 
effect of due process in restraining substantive laws.”  211 U.S. 78, 110.  More recently, justices have 
observed that, although the Clause’s language suggests “that it governs only the procedures by which a 
State may deprive persons of liberty,” at least since the late 1880s, the Clause “has been understood to 
contain a substantive component as well, one barring certain government actions regardless of the fairness 
of the procedures used to implement them.”  Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992); see 
also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Were due process merely a 
procedural safeguard it would fail to reach those situations where the deprivation of life, liberty or property 
was accomplished by legislation which by operating in the future could, given even the fairest possible 
procedure in application to individuals, nevertheless destroy the enjoyment of all three.”).
108 In Davidson v. New Orleans (1877), the Court acknowledged the relatively low level of attention that 
due process had received prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, stating: “It is not a little remarkable, that 
while this provision [the Due Process Clause] has been in the Constitution of the United States, as a 
restraint upon the authority of the Federal government, for nearly a century, and while, during all that time, 
the manner in which the powers of that government have been exercised has been watched with jealousy, 
and subjected to the most rigid criticism in all its branches, this special limitation upon its powers has rarely 
been invoked in the judicial forum or the more enlarged theatre of public discussion.” 96 U.S. 97, 103-04.
109 At least one justice initiated the concept of SDP under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, prior 
to the Fourteenth Amendment’s enactment.  Taney’s opinion in Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) is 
often cited as the first invocation of SDP by a justice.  E.g., Currie 1985, 327.  In that opinion, Taney 
wrote: “[A]n act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or property, merely 
because he came himself or brought his property into a particular Territory of the United States, and who 
had committed no offence against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law.” 
60 U.S. 450.  Taney had foreshadowed this use of the Clause five years earlier in his opinion for the Court 
in Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539 (1852), a case concerning the constitutionality of Congress’s 
extension of a patent, where the rights to the patent had already been sold to others.  The issue before the 
Court was whether the rights of purchasers of patents were protected when patent periods were extended.  
Taney interpreted the congressional act at issue to include protection for existing rights of the purchasers, 
so as not to interfere with existing rights.  He added that, if the act had not included provision for the 
protection of the rights of purchasers of patents, and interfered with those rights, then constitutional 
problems would be raised: “The right to construct and use these planing machines, had been purchased and 
paid for without any limitation as to the time for which they were to be used. They were the property of the 
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the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause only to the extent that they bear on the 
discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment.  This chapter also contains its focus by 
concentrating on a few issue areas of great significance: the Court’s jurisprudence in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries concerning economic and business 
regulations; and the Court’s jurisprudence, beginning in roughly the 1920s, applying 
rights of expression and privacy against the states. 
 Sections A, B, and C discuss the role that UR has played in the Court’s extension 
of due process protection to rights of property, expression, and privacy, respectively.  
Section D demonstrates that the Court has employed a common, universalistic framework 
in each of these arenas.  Section E discusses the role that universalistic reasoning has 
played in the Court’s SDP jurisprudence with respect to inherent and inalienable 
governmental powers.  Section F examines the role of UR in the Court’s development of 
a hierarchical approach to rights, and Section G, discusses fault lines in the contemporary 
Court with respect to the use of UR and the evolution of constitutional meanings.  
A. Economic Due Process 
 1. Due Process as a Textual Vehicle for 
  the Protection of Property Rights 
 
 It was noted in ch. 2 that a shift began, during the Marshall Court, away from 
appeals to extra-constitutional bases of rights.  The justices had increasingly relied on the 
constitutional text--especially in the form of the Contract Clause--in securing property 
rights.  As early as 1798, Iredell argued that justices had authority to interfere with 
                                                                                                                                                 
respondents. Their only value consists in their use. And a special act of Congress, passed afterwards, 
depriving the appellees of the right to use them, certainly could not be regarded as due process of law.” 55 
U.S. at 553.  See also Hepburn  v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603, 623-24 (1869). 
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legislation only when supported by constitutional text (ch. 2, A).110  By the late 
nineteenth century, the emphasis on linking judicial reasoning to positive law had grown 
stronger, and extra-constitutional arguments were rare (Grey 1988, 217-18).  As noted, in 
the decades following the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Due Process 
Clause largely took the place of the Contract Clause as the primary textual vehicle for the 
protection of property rights.  In a decision handed down just five years after the 
Amendment’s enactment, Bradley explicitly linked due process with vested rights.111  A 
central principle of property rights understandings dating back to the Court’s earliest 
period was that no legislature could validly declare that property properly belonging to A 
would be transferred to B.  The justices brought this principle under the umbrella of due 
process protection (Bird 1913, 46).  In a decision handed down less than ten years after 
the Amendment’s enactment, the Court stated: 
It seems to us that a statute which declares in terms, and 
without more, that the full and exclusive title of a described 
piece of land, which is now in A., shall be and is hereby 
vested in B., would, if effectual, deprive A. of his property 
without due process of law, within the meaning of the 
constitutional provision.112
 
 The shift away from extra-constitutionality, however, was not instantaneous.  In 
Loan Association v. Topeka (1874),113 the Court invalidated an act that authorized local 
governments to issue bonds benefiting private interests.  In holding that governments 
                                                 
110 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 398 (1798) (Iredell, J., concurring). 
111 Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. 129, 136 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring). 
112 Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 102 (1877); see also Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. 
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236-37 (1897) (upholding the challenged state action but indicating that the seizure 
of private property would violate due process absent the provision of just compensation); Missouri Pac. Ry. 
Co. v. State of Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896) (invalidating an order that a railroad company grant to 
an association of farmers the right to build an elevator on its property). 
113 87 U.S. 655. 
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could tax only for public purposes, the Court (in an opinion by Samuel Miller) did not 
rely on text, but the essential nature of free governments and the social compact:    
There are limitations on . . . power which grow out of the 
essential nature of all free governments. Implied 
reservations of individual rights, without which the social 
compact could not exist, and which are respected by all 
governments entitled to the name.114
 
These limitations included the prohibition on transferring private property from one 
individual to another.  The reasoning was similar to extra-constitutional, universalistic 
reasoning employed by justices from the Court’s earliest period.  Miller’s appeal to the 
“essential nature of all free governments” was reminiscent of Story’s reliance, in Terrett 
v. Taylor (1815), on the “fundamental laws of every free government.”115 (ch. 2, B).  The 
reasoning was universalistic, because the limitations he identified were essential, not 
merely to the particularistic preferences, traditions, and circumstances of the American 
people, but, rather, to the establishment of free government.  Miller’s reasoning from the 
social compact recalled Chase’s social contractarian reasoning in Calder v. Bull (1798)  
(ch. 2, A).  It was noted that Chase’s social contractarian reasoning was partly 
universalistic, as when he stated that it was “against all reason and justice, for a people to 
entrust a Legislature” with certain powers, suggesting standards transcending any 
particular, textual manifestation of the social contract.116  Miller’s reference to the social 
compact also suggested UR.  The limitations he identified were not simply part of the 
particular bargain into which the American people entered as evidenced by specific 
constitutional provisions.  He argued that the social compact could not exist without these 
limitations.  Miller’s standards transcended the social compact itself.  Moreover, like 
                                                 
114 87 U.S. at 663. 
115 13 U.S. 43, 52. 
116 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798) (Chase, J., concurring). 
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Chase and Story, Miller reasoned from USEs to IMPs, including the principle that no 
government could take the property of A and transfer it to B.  The Court concluded that 
the challenged act violated this paradigmatic principle of vested rights. 
 Miller might have hinted at due process by stating that only a despotic 
government would assert unlimited control over the “lives, liberty, and property” of its 
citizens, but he did not cite the Clause or any other textual provision.  The sole dissenting 
justice, Nathan Clifford, evidently interpreted Miller’s opinion as relying on extra-
constitutional reasoning, since he criticized the opinion on those grounds.  Citing Iredell’s 
opinion in Calder, Clifford argued that the Constitution provided the only legitimate 
authority for the judicial invalidation of legislation.  Justices could not invalidate state 
laws merely because they considered them “unwise, unjust, or inexpedient.”  Absent 
limitations rooted in constitutional text, “the power of legislation must be considered as 
practically absolute, whether the law operates according to natural justice or not in any 
particular case.”117  Limitations had to be specific.  The justices could not invalidate state 
laws “on the vague ground that they think it opposed to a general latent spirit supposed to 
pervade or underlie the constitution.”  Judicial reliance on such limitations would “make 
the courts sovereign over both the constitution and the people, and convert the 
government into a judicial despotism.”118  Where no constitutional text applied, 
representative government offered citizens the greatest security.  The fault line between 
the majority and Clifford in Loan Association was strikingly similar to that between 
Chase and Iredell seventy-six years earlier in Calder. 
                                                 
117 Loan Association v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 668 (1874) (Clifford, J., dissenting). 
118 87 U.S. at 669  (Clifford, J., dissenting). 
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 In later cases, the Court followed Loan Association in applying, without reference 
to constitutional text, the doctrine requiring public purposes for taxation .119  Ultimately, 
however, the doctrine was brought under the aegis of the Due Process Clause.120  Thus, 
although some early cases establishing the public purpose requirement departed from the 
dominant tendency, here, too, the Court eventually adopted an approach in line with the 
shift towards linking judicial reasoning with positive law.  The arguments of Iredell and 
Clifford retain their force today.  The distaste for extra-constitutional reasoning remains 
strong, and contemporary jurisprudence, too, is characterized by the inclination to ground 
judicial reasoning in enacted law (Sherry 1987, 117).  As discussed in the sections below, 
even while placing basic principles of vested rights under the umbrella of due process, 
the Court continued to rely on UR, and often this reasoning was similar to that employed 
by justices during the Court’s earliest period, and by Miller in Loan Association. 
    2. The Establishment of Economic Due Process 
 The pillars of the Court’s economic due process (“EDP”) jurisprudence were 
initially articulated in dissenting opinions (Brown 1927, 946).  Later, a majority adopted 
EDP doctrines in decisions upholding challenged governmental actions, and, by the late 
1890s, began using the doctrines to invalidate legislation.  The sections below examine 
the role of UR in the development of EDP. 
  a. Slaughterhouse, and the Separate 
   Opinions of Field and Bradley  
 
 In the Court’s first significant case interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
majority, in a 5-4 decision, took a restrictive view of the limitations it placed on the 
                                                 
119 E.g., Cole v. La Grange, 113 U.S. 1 (1885); Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U.S. 487 (1883). 
120 E.g., Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 238-39 (1920); Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 
155 (1896).
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states.  The Slaughterhouse Cases (1872)121 concerned a Louisiana statute that granted 
exclusive privileges to a specific company to operate commercial slaughterhouses in New 
Orleans.  The act was challenged on the grounds that it created a monopoly, preventing 
others from engaging in a lawful occupation.  Miller paid little attention to the due 
process challenge,122 concluding that the act was a legitimate exercise of the police 
power.  The dissenters agreed with the majority that states were entitled to engage in 
legitimate exercises of the state’s police powers for the public health, safety, and 
morality,123 but argued that the granting of exclusive privileges to a butchering 
establishment was not a valid exercise of the police powers.   
 In their dissenting opinions, Justices Stephen Field and Bradley began to develop 
an understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment as a more robust source of constraints on 
the states.124  Rejecting the majority’s position that the Fourteenth Amendment applied 
against the states only rights of national citizenship that were explicit or implicit in the 
text of the Constitution, Field (joined by Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, and Justices 
Noah H. Swayne and Bradley) argued that the Fourteenth Amendment encompassed the 
“natural and inalienable rights which . . . of right belong to the citizens of all free 
governments.”125  For Field, the content of the rights protected by the Fourteenth 
                                                 
121 83 U.S. 36. 
122 The act was also challenged under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.  The Court placed such a 
restrictive interpretation on the Clause that the opinion “all but read the Privileges or Immunities Clause out 
of the Constitution,” and “sapped [it] of any meaning.”  Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 521, 527 (1999) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
123 As in later cases, Field and Bradley were at pains to reaffirm their acceptance of the police powers.  See, 
e.g., Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. 129, 137-38 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring, and Field, J., concurring). 
124 Field placed his reasoning principally under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, while Bradley, 
foreshadowing the Court’s later direction, emphasized due process.  Field’s reasoning remains pertinent.  
When it became clear that a majority was more receptive to arguments advanced under due process, Field 
employed the same basic reasoning under that Clause.   
125 Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 96-97 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting); see also Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 
U.S. 129, 140 (1873) (Field, J., concurring) (“[The Fourteenth Amendment] declared that [American 
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Amendment was determined by USEs--natural rights and the requirements of freedom.  
The Amendment’s force came in applying these rights against the states.  Field linked the 
Amendment’s protections with the Declaration: 
[T]he fourteenth amendment . . . was intended to give 
practical effect to the declaration of 1776 of inalienable 
rights, rights which are the gift of the Creator, which the 
law does not confer, but only recognizes.126
 
For Field, freedom entailed property as an essential category of rights.  He cited Corfield 
v. Coryell (1823),127 which had included in a list of fundamental rights “the enjoyment of 
life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to 
pursue and obtain happiness and safety.”128  More specifically, he posited “the right to 
pursue a lawful employment in a lawful manner, without other restraint than such as 
equally affects all persons.”129  While all pursuits or callings were subject to the police 
powers, the right guaranteed that “all avocations are open without other restrictions than 
such as are imposed equally upon all others of the same age, sex, and condition.”  The 
importance of the right was magnified because the “right of free labor [was] one of the 
most sacred and imprescriptible rights of man.”  Indeed, the right was the “fundamental 
idea upon which our institutions rest, and unless adhered to in the legislation of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
citizens’] privileges and immunities, which embrace the fundamental rights belonging to citizens of all free 
governments, should not be abridged by any State”).
126 Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. at 106 (Field, J., dissenting). 
127 6 F.Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa.).  The Corfield opinion was written by J. Washington while sitting on circuit.  
The case, decided forty-five years before the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, arose under the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, which provides: “The Citizens of each State 
shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”  Field’s understanding of 
the relationship between the two Privileges and Immunities Clauses was that, with respect to those 
privileges and immunities “which of right belong to the citizens of all free government,” the Article Four 
Clause provided that no state could discriminate against the citizens of another state, while the Fourteenth 
Amendment provided that these rights applied equally to all U.S. citizens, regardless of state citizenship.
128 Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. at 97-101 (Field, J., dissenting).
129 83 U.S. at 97 (Field, J., dissenting). 
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country our government will be a republic only in name.”130  From the right to pursue a 
lawful calling (“RTC,” for brevity), followed the prohibition on the granting of exclusive 
privileges, which Field found to be “opposed to the whole theory of free government.”131  
Field allowed for the constitutionality of monopolies in a traditionally limited set of 
industries where the government had issued a grant, providing exclusive privileges.  
However, with respect to the “ordinary trades or callings of life,” monopolies violated the 
“liberty of citizens to acquire property and pursue happiness.”132  Field’s opinion evoked 
the early Court’s use of UR.  His reference to the RTC as “the fundamental idea upon 
which our institutions rest,” recalled Marshall’s reference in Fletcher to “general 
principles which are common to our free institutions.”133  This MRR formulation can be 
understood as drawing on the American people’s choice to live under free, republican 
governments, and then reasoning from the requirements of freedom and republicanism.  
The approach simultaneously serves universalistic dictates and the particularistic will of 
the American people.  
 Like Field, Bradley drew a link between the Declaration and Fourteenth 
Amendment, asserting that the Due Process Clause reflected: 
the great threefold division of the rights of freemen, 
asserted as the rights of man. Rights to life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness are equivalent to the rights of life, 
liberty, and property. These are the fundamental rights 
which can only be taken away by due process of law, and 
which can only be interfered with, or the enjoyment of 
which can only be modified, by lawful regulations 
necessary or proper for the mutual good of all; and these 
                                                 
130 83 U.S. at 109-10 (Field, J., dissenting). 
131 83 U.S. at 111 (Field, J., dissenting). 
132 83 U.S. at 101 (Field, J., dissenting). 
133 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 139 (1810). 
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rights, I contend, belong to the citizens of every free 
government.134
 
Among the general categories of rights meriting protection, Bradley asserted: 
[N]one is more essential and fundamental than the right to 
follow such profession or employment as each one may 
choose, subject only to uniform regulations equally 
applicable to all.135
 
For the preservation, exercise, and enjoyment of these 
rights the individual citizen, as a necessity, must be left free 
to adopt such calling, profession, or trade as may seem to 
him most conducive to that end. Without this right he 
cannot be a freeman. This right to choose one's calling is an 
essential part of that liberty which it is the object of 
government to protect; and a calling, when chosen, is a 
man's property and right. Liberty and property are not 
protected where these rights are arbitrarily assailed.136
 
The RTC implicated both liberty and property.  An individual’s right to choose an 
occupation was a form of liberty, and the employment itself constituted property.  Thus, a 
law blocking citizens from practicing a lawful employment of their choosing deprived 
them of liberty and property in violation of the Due Process Clause.137  
 The dissenting opinions by Field and Bradley follow the REP framework.  They 
began with USEs--natural rights and the requirements of a free, republican government.  
They identified a broad category of rights--property--whose protection was essential to 
the USEs.  IMPs, including the right to acquire and possess, followed as more specific 
principles essential to meaningful protection of property rights.  The right to free labor 
also followed, since earning income through one’s productive labor was the primary 
means of acquiring property.  It further followed that individuals must have the right to 
                                                 
134 83 U.S. at 116 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
135 83 U.S. at 119 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
136 83 U.S. at 116 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
137 83 U.S. at 122 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
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choose and pursue a lawful employment.  Since the granting of exclusive privileges for 
the ordinary callings interfered with that right, any act effecting such a grant was invalid.  
Within this framework, each link in the chain of reasoning was necessary to fulfillment of 
the links that were higher in the chain.  Thus, breaking any link in the chain amounted to 
a violation of the essential requirements of freedom. 
 In other opinions during the 1870s and 1880s, Field and Bradley continued to 
develop this line of reasoning.  Dissenting from an 1876 ruling upholding maximum 
charges for the storage of grain, for instance, Field (joined by Swayne) asserted that due 
process “has been supposed to secure to every individual the essential conditions for the 
pursuit of happiness,” and that “liberty” under the Clause meant more: 
than mere freedom from physical restraint or the bounds of 
a prison. It means freedom to go where one may choose, 
and to act in such manner, not inconsistent with the equal 
rights of others, as his judgment may dictate for the 
promotion of his happiness; that is, to pursue such callings 
and avocations as may be most suitable to develop his 
capacities, and give to them their highest enjoyment.138  
 
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Morrison Waite maintained that maximum charges 
were allowable in certain industries “affected with a public interest.”  Field, rejecting the 
conclusion that the grain storage business was affected with a public interest, saw the 
legislation as “subversive of the rights of private property,”139 because it improperly fixed 
the compensation that an individual could receive for use of his property in private 
business.140  Due process only permitted maximum charges in narrowly defined 
circumstances--where the government had granted rights or privileges to a party which 
increased the value of the grantee’s property, or bestowed an advantage to the grantee 
                                                 
138 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 142. 
139 94 U.S. at 136 (Field, J., dissenting). 
140 94 U.S. at 138 (Field, J., dissenting). 
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over competitors.  In any other circumstances, the setting of compensation amounted to 
confiscation.  Field reached this conclusion by reasoning about the essential elements of 
rights in property.  Without the owner’s ability to choose how to use property, the mere 
title in, and possession of, property meant little.141
 In an 1884 case that was an outgrowth of Slaughterhouse, Field and Bradley 
further articulated their understanding of SDP.142  While Slaughterhouse upheld the 
state’s grant of exclusive privileges, the legislature repealed the grant, opening up the 
slaughterhouse industry to competition.  The Court unanimously rejected a Contract 
Clause challenge of the repeal.143  Concurring, Field revisited his attack on the grant, 
stating that “certain inherent rights lie at the foundation of all action, and upon a 
recognition of them alone can free institutions be maintained.”  Field again linked these 
rights to the Declaration, stressing the inalienability of the rights to life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness, which could not “be bartered away, or given away, or taken away, 
except in punishment of crime.”  These rights necessarily included: 
the right to pursue any lawful business or vocation, in any 
manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, 
which may increase their prosperity or develop their 
faculties, so as to give to them their highest enjoyment. The 
common business and callings of life, the ordinary trades 
and pursuits, which are innocuous in themselves, and have 
been followed in all communities from time immemorial, 
must therefore be free in this country to all alike upon the 
same conditions. 
 
Citing Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, Field argued that the property each person 
maintained in his own labor was the most sacred because it was the basis of all other 
                                                 
141 94 U.S. at 142-43 (Field, J., dissenting); see also Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 U.S. 181, 186-87 (1876) (Field, 
J., dissenting). 
142 Butchers' Union v. Crescent Slaughterhouse Co., 111 U.S. 746 (1884). 
143 The majority opinion in Butchers' Union v. Crescent Slaughterhouse Co. was discussed above (ch. 2, D) 
in connection with the Court’s development of the concept of inalienable governmental powers. 
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property.  Consequently, to interfere with the manner in which a person wished to labor, 
when such labor was not injuring another, was to violate this sacred property, and to 
violate the liberty both of the worker and of those who might employ him.144  In his own 
concurrence (joined by Justices John Marshall Harlan and William Woods), Bradley also 
explained the right to a calling as rooted in the Declaration’s inalienable rights, stating: 
“The right to follow any of the common occupations of life is an inalienable right, it was 
formulated as such under the phrase ‘pursuit of happiness' in the declaration of 
independence.”145  In violation of due process, the granting of monopoly privileges with 
respect to an ordinary calling deprived individuals of both liberty and property. 
 As discussed in the next section, the approach developed by Field and Bradley 
was largely adopted by the Court, though initially in cases rejecting due process claims. 
  b. Substantive Due Process Gains Majority Acceptance 
 
 Between Slaughterhouse (1872) and the late 1880s, the approach developed by 
Field and Bradley gained the widespread acceptance of the justices (Haines 1930, ch. 6, 
sec. 2), although the Court had not yet invalidated state legislation on SDP grounds 
(Currie 1985, 365).  Just a year after Slaughterhouse, the Court hinted that due process 
might impose substantive restraints.146  In a series of later cases upholding state actions, 
majority opinions further indicated the Court’s willingness to consider claims that 
                                                 
144 111 U.S. at 756-57 (Field, J., concurring). 
145 111 U.S. at 763 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
146 Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. 129 (1873); see Brown 1925-26, 946.  Bartemeyer concerned Iowa’s ban 
on the sale of intoxicating liquors.  The owner of a liquor business claimed the act deprived him of the 
property he used to conduct that business.  While the Court did not reach the issue (because the record did 
not establish that the owner was in possession of the property prior to passage of the act banning the sale of 
liquor), Miller noted that if ownership of the property prior to the act had been established, it would have 
presented a “very grave question[]” as to whether due process had been violated.  85 U.S. at 133. 
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regulations deprived persons of liberty or property without due process.147  In an 1888 
decision upholding a state ban on the sale of oleomargarine, the Court recognized the 
RTC, affirming that due process protected an individual’s right to “enjoy[] upon terms of 
equality with all others in similar circumstances of the privilege of pursuing an ordinary 
calling or trade, and of acquiring, holding, and selling property.”  These guarantees were 
“an essential part” of an individual’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.148  Thus, by the late 
1880s, SDP had been established as a potential restriction on state legislation (Beth 1971, 
178; Brown 1927, 947; Currie 1985, 376-77). 
 Like Field and Bradley, the Court, in prominent cases such as Chicago, 
Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago (1897),149 Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897),150 and 
Holden v. Hardy (1898),151 placed SDP within a universalistic framework.  Chicago, 
Burlington & Quincy R.R. concerned a city ordinance that effected the construction of a 
public street across land owned by a railroad company.  After a trial resulted in an award 
of one dollar as compensation for the property taken by the city, the company claimed a 
due process violation.  Although the majority upheld the jury’s determination, the Court 
determined that due process encompassed the requirement that the state provide just 
compensation when it took private property for public use.152  The Court (Harlan) began 
                                                 
147 E.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876) (regulation of charges by owners of grain elevators); Stone v. 
Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co., 116 U.S. 307 (1886)  (regulation of railroad charges); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 
U.S. 623 (1887) ((law banning sale of intoxicating liquors).  See discussion in Currie 1985, 373; Brown 
1927, 946. 
148 Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 684. 
149 166 U.S. 226. 
150 165 U.S. 578. 
151 169 U.S. 366. 
152 The case is often cited as the first in which a specific provision of the Bill of Rights was applied against 
the states (the Fifth Amendment’s requirement that “just compensation” be provided when private property 
is taken for public use).  However, while Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago discussed the 
point in greater detail, earlier cases had suggested that regulations effectively taking property without 
compensation would violate the Fourteenth Amendment.  E.g., Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 116 
U.S. 307, 331 (1886).
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with the observation that the protection of property rights “has been regarded as a vital 
principle of republican institutions.”  The just compensation requirement was “founded in 
natural equity, and is laid down as a principle of universal law,”153 and “recognized by all 
temperate and civilized governments, from a deep and universal sense of its justice.”154  
Reasoning from the requirements of free government, Harlan stated that “in a free 
government, almost all other rights would become worthless if the government possessed 
an uncontrollable power over the private fortune of every citizen.”155  He quoted 
Marshall’s opinion in Fletcher  (ch. 2, B) for the propositions that the nature of society 
and government prescribed limits to legislative power, and that, for these limits to be 
meaningful, they had to include the just compensation requirement.156  He also quoted 
Loan Association v. Topeka (ch. 3, A(1)) for the propositions that: (1) there are certain 
property rights that grow out of the essential nature of free government; (2) these rights 
are necessary to the social compact; (3) freedom is only possible if these rights are 
protected; and (4) these rights include the prohibition on legislatures from taking the 
property of A and transferring it to B.157  While the Fifth Amendment explicitly 
establishes the “just compensation requirement,” Harlan did not mention it.  He reasoned 
directly from the commands of due process.158   
                                                 
153 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. at 235-36. 
154 166 U.S. at 238 (quoting Gardner v. Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch 162).
155 166 U.S. at 236. 
156 166 U.S. at 237. 
157 166 U.S. at 237. 
158 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago is commonly cited for the proposition that the just 
compensation requirement applies against the states, sometimes suggesting that the decision applied the 
Fifth Amendment’s just compensation requirement against the states through the portal of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  E.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001).  As noted, however, Harlan’s 
opinion does not rely on the Fifth Amendment.   
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 In Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897), the Court, while employing SDP for the first time 
to invalidate state legislation (Collins 2001, 71),159 further elaborated the universalistic 
underpinnings of the doctrine generally, and of the “liberty of contract” (“LOK,” for 
brevity).  Under regulations prohibiting out-of-state insurance companies from doing 
business within the state, Louisiana had punished an individual for writing, from within 
the state, a letter of notification in connection with an insurance contract to be performed 
outside of the state.  The Court found that, in so doing, Louisiana had violated the 
defendant’s due process rights, because it had interfered with his LOK.  The contract in 
question was to be performed outside of the state, ,and it was a valid contract where it 
was made, and where it was to be performed.  The giving of notice was merely a 
collateral act pursuant to that valid out-of-state contract, and the state had no right or 
jurisdiction to prevent its citizen from engaging in that act.160  The Court (J. Rufus 
Peckham) cited extensively from Bradley’s concurring opinion in Butchers' Union v. 
Crescent Slaughterhouse Co. (1884),161 accepting the propositions that: (1) the RTC was 
an inalienable right, essential to liberty; (2) rooted in the Declaration’s pursuit of 
happiness; and (3) protected by due process.  Due process liberty encompassed: 
the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his 
faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live 
and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any 
lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation; and 
for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be 
proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out to a 
successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.162
 
                                                 
159 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 760 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
160 The Court distinguished an earlier case, Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895) (in which it had 
upheld a state’s regulations concerning the procurement of insurance), because the earlier case involved 
preventing an individual from procuring insurance for a citizen of the state from an out-of-state company 
that was not authorized to do business within the state.  
161 111 U.S. 746. 
162 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589-90 (1897). 
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Allgeyer clearly established LOK, which was essential to RTC, as part of the Court’s 
SDP jurisprudence (Haines 1924, “Judicial Review III,” 18).163  The decision was cited as 
affirmation of the RTC and LOK in some of the most important decisions of the era, 
including Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, Holden v. Hardy (1898),164 
and Lochner v. New York (1905).165   
 In Holden v. Hardy (1898), a decision upholding a maximum hours law for 
miners, the Court further linked SDP with UR.  The Court (J. Henry Brown) wrote that 
there were “certain immutable principles of justice, which inhere in the very idea of free 
government, which no member of the Union may disregard.”  Due process “impl[ies] a 
conformity with natural and inherent principles of justice.”  From these USEs, Brown 
identified IMPs, including LOK, the just compensation requirement, and the prohibition 
on transferring the property of A to B.166
 The act challenged in Lochner v. New York (1905)167 included a variety of 
measures regarding working conditions in the baking industry, with requirements on 
matters ranging from plumbing and painting to the prohibition of domestic animals.  The 
legislation also contained maximum hours provisions.168  While upholding the 
regulations of working conditions, the Court (Peckham) invalidated the maximum hours 
provisions as violations of LOK.  Citing Allgeyer, the Peckham stated that due process 
                                                 
163 Currie (1990, 46) has argued that “Allgeyer was a choice-of-law decision, not strictly speaking a 
substantive one.”  The classification, however, does not alter the significance of the case to the present 
discussion, which lies in the emphasis that the Court placed on the kind of right with which the state’s 
extraterritorial act had interfered.  The Court’s extended discussion of the LOK was  by no means confined 
to questions of extraterritoriality.  The decision was looked to as a precedent for the LOK in prominent 
SDP decisions, such as Lochner  v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  In Lochner, the Court cited Allgeyer for 
the proposition that: “The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of 
the individual protected by the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution.” 198 U.S. at 53.
164 169 U.S. 366. 
165 198 U.S. 45. 
166 169 U.S. at 389-91. 
167 198 U.S. 45. 
168 Employees could not work more than sixty hours in a week, or more than ten hours in a day.  
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protected an individual’s “general right to make a contract in relation to his business.”  
Drawing on the connection between labor and property, Peckham wrote that each 
individual enjoyed the right “to enter into those contracts in relation to labor which may 
seem to him appropriate or necessary for the support of himself and his family[.]”169
 Harlan (joined by Justices William Day and Edward White), dissented, viewing 
the hours provisions as a valid health-related exercise of the police powers.  However, he 
accepted the majority’s basic account of LOK, reflecting the degree of consensus that 
prevailed during EDP’s heyday with respect to the basis of fundamental property rights.  
Even Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, while not endorsing LOK in his separate Lochner 
dissent, joined some later opinions employing the LOK framework.170
 Due to its high visibility, Lochner has become iconic of the period during which 
the Court wielded EDP as a significant check on social and economic legislation--roughly 
from the late nineteenth century to the mid-1930s.  Around 1890, the number of cases 
reviewed on SDP grounds began increasing dramatically (Corwin 1911, 366).  Over the 
next few decades, the justices reviewed a large number of state laws regulating aspects of 
business and the economy, including labor relations, the conditions of employment, and 
the business of public utilities (Smith 1985, 75; Haines 1930, ch. 6, sec. 3).  While the 
Court upheld a majority of the regulations it reviewed (Currie 1990, 41; Phillips 1987, 
273-74), it struck down a substantial number of state laws on SDP grounds (McCloskey 
2000, 101), often as violations of RTC and LOK.171  The legislation invalidated on due 
process grounds included, for example, maximum hour and minimum wage 
                                                 
169 198 U.S. at 56. 
170 E.g., Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations of Kansas, 267 U.S. 552 (1925); see 
discussion in Phillips 1999, 449-54.
171 See, e..g., Morehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587 (1936); Fairmont Creamery v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1 
(1927); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915). 
 88
regulations;172 price regulations;173 laws designed to protect union activity (such as a 
prohibition on firing employees on the grounds of union membership);174 laws designed 
to protect consumers from exploitative business practices,175 and inferior, fraudulent, or 
harmful products;176 and laws restricting access to certain industries.177
 Having come of age in the late nineteenth century, EDP did not survive more than 
a few months into President Franklin Roosevelt’s second term.  While there had been 
earlier suggestions that a majority of the justices might be inclined to effect a 
fundamental shift in the Court’s approach to the review of economic and business 
regulations,178 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937)179 marked a turning point from 
which there would be no return (Gillman 1993, 191-92).  In that case, and from that time 
on, the Court did not seriously review economic and business regulations to determine 
whether they comported with due process.  The Court’s stance towards such regulations 
was so deferential that it amounted to an abandonment of EDP.  However, as discussed 
below (secs. B and C), even before EDP’s demise, the Court began using SDP to protect 
other categories of rights, including expression and privacy.  Underlying this fundamental 
shift was a reappraisal of the categories of rights that were essential to free government.  
During the era of EDP, property rights were essential to free government.  IMPs, such as 
the RTC and LOK, had followed from the imperatives of protecting property rights.  
With respect to the chain of logic in the Court’s REP framework, the critical shift 
occasioning the collapse of EDP occurred between the USE and the identification of the 
                                                 
172 E.g., Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
173 E.g., Williams v. Standard Oil, 278 U.S. 235 (1929). 
174 E.g., Adair v. U.S., 208 U.S. 161 (1908). 
175 E.g., Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917). 
176 E.g. Weaver v. Palmer Bros., 270 U.S. 402 (1926). 
177 E.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932). 
178 E.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
179 300 U.S. 379. 
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essential categories of rights.  During the bulk of the EDP era, a majority of the justices 
had taken for granted that property rights were essential to liberty.  The post-EDP-era 
majority rejected that appraisal, cutting off EDP at the root.  If property rights as a whole 
were not essential to freedom, then there was no place for reasoning about which 
subsidiary rights were, in turn, essential to their protection. 
B. Substantive Due Process as a Basis for the Protection for Rights of Expression 
 Even before the Court jettisoned EDP, it had already begun identifying other 
categories of rights that were essential to free government.  During the EDP era, the 
justices had drawn RTC and LOK out of the broad language of the Due Process Clause, 
especially the words “liberty,” and “property.”  A natural question was what other rights 
could be drawn out of the Clause.  With respect to the federal government, which was 
subject to the Bill of Rights, the Constitution provided more textual guidance as to which 
categories of rights merited protection.  As against the federal government, there could be 
no question that the Constitution protected certain rights of expression.  The First 
Amendment states: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or 
of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble[.]”  Since the Amendment 
did not apply against states, however, the question arose whether rights of expression 
applied against state governments as part of due process liberty. 
  As early as 1907, Harlan foreshadowed the Court’s recognition that due process 
liberty encompassed expression.  In Patterson v. Colorado, the Court upheld a contempt 
order punishing published criticism of a state supreme court.  While the majority declined 
to address the issue, Harlan argued that due process protected the freedoms of speech and 
press, because they:  
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constitute essential parts of every man's liberty. . . It is, I 
think, impossible to conceive of liberty, as secured by the 
Constitution against hostile action, whether by the nation or 
by the states, which does not embrace the right to enjoy 
free speech and the right to have a free press.180
 
Eighteen years later, in Gitlow v. New York (1925), while upholding a criminal anarchy 
conviction, the Court stated: “For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom 
of speech and of the press . . . are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties' 
protected by the due process clause.”181  Another six years later, in a decision invalidating 
the state’s use of a libel law to enjoin the publication of a newspaper, based largely on its 
criticism of a local chief of police, the Court could say it was “no longer open to doubt” 
that due process protected speech and press, as it was “impossible to conclude that this 
essential personal liberty of the citizen was left unprotected by the general guaranty of 
fundamental rights of person and property.”182  In Grosjean v. American Press Co. 
(1936), too, the Court invalidated state action on free press grounds--a tax on the revenue 
received by newspapers and other publications.  The challenged tax presented: 
a question of the utmost gravity and importance; for, if well 
made, it goes to the heart of the natural right of the 
members of an organized society, united for their common 
good, to impart and acquire information about their 
common interests.183
 
In Schneider v. New Jersey (1939), which invalidated a city ordinance limiting the 
distribution of handbills, the Court wrote that the freedom of speech and press “reflects 
                                                 
180  205 U.S. 454, 465. 
181 268 U.S. 652, 666.  
182 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931). 
183 297 U.S. 233, 243. 
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the belief of the framers of the Constitution that exercise of the rights lies at the 
foundation of free government by free men.”184   
 In De Jonge v. Oregon (1937),185 the justices extended due process to include the 
right of peaceable assembly, a right that was “equally fundamental” to those of speech 
and press, implied by the “very idea of a government, republican in form,” and one that 
could not “be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice 
which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions-principles which the Fourteenth 
Amendment embodies in the general terms of its due process clause.”186  In De Jonge, the 
Court overturned a conviction for criminal syndicalism that was based on the defendant’s 
participation in a meeting of the Communist Party.  While C.J. Hughes allowed that 
states could constitutionally block speech and assembly that amounted to an incitement to 
violence or crime, he concluded that “peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be 
made a crime.”  The decision followed from the vital importance of assembly, which was 
based on the essential conditions of constitutional government: 
The greater the importance of safeguarding the community 
from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by 
force and violence, the more imperative is the need to 
preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, 
free press and free assembly in order to maintain the 
opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that 
government may be responsive to the will of the people and 
that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful 
means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very 
foundation of constitutional government.187
 
It was foundational to republican governments that they respond to the people’s will and 
allow for peaceful change.  Since responsiveness required open political discussion, 
                                                 
184 308 U.S. 147, 161. 
185 299 U.S. 353. 
186 299 U.S. at 364. 
187 299 U.S. at 365. 
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citizens must be allowed to assemble for political discussion.  In Thornhill v. Alabama 
(1940),188 in which the Court overturned a picketing conviction as violative of the 
defendant’s freedoms of speech and press, the Court reasoned: 
The safeguarding of these rights [speech and press] to the 
ends that men may speak as they think on matters vital to 
them and that falsehoods may be exposed through the 
processes of education and discussion is essential to free 
government.189
 
The Court (J. Frank Murphy) again rooted speech and press in the essential requirements 
of free government, and reasoned to correlative principles through an analysis of those 
requirements, emphasizing, for example, the importance of allowing opportunities for 
public education, the dissemination of ideas, and the public discussion and contestation of 
ideas, especially those relating to matters of public concern.  By examining the nature of 
the expression that had been curtailed in the case before the Court, Murphy reasoned to 
the principle more specifically applicable: 
Free discussion concerning the conditions in industry and 
the causes of labor disputes appears to us indispensable to 
the effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular 
government to shape the destiny of modern industrial 
society.190
 
 By the late 1950s, the justices also extended due process to include the freedom of 
association, which, unlike the freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, is not enumerated 
in the First Amendment.  In NAACP v. Alabama (1958),191 the Court unanimously 
reversed an order of civil contempt that had been issued against the NAACP for its 
                                                 
188 310 U.S. 88. 
189 310 U.S. at 95. 
190 310 U.S. at 103; see also Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 594 (1942) (“If all expression of religion or 
opinion . . . were subject to the discretion of authority, our unfettered dynamic thoughts or moral impulses 
might be made only colorless and sterile ideas. To give them life and force, the Constitution protects their 
use. ”). 
191 357 U.S. 449. 
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failure to comply with a state order to produce the names of its members.  The second 
Justice John Marshall Harlan192 reasoned that, like speech, press, and assembly, the 
freedom to associate in groups was an indispensable liberty.  Citing De Jonge for the 
“close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly,” Harlan asserted that 
“[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial 
ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association,” and the “freedom to engage in 
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas” was “an inseparable aspect of the 
‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause[.]”193  Harlan reasoned from the 
indispensability of association to privacy, stating that “[i]nviolability of privacy in group 
association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of 
association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.”  In light of the 
negative consequences suffered from past publicity of individuals’ membership, the 
compelled disclosure was “likely to affect adversely the ability of [the group’s] members 
to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs which they . . . have the right to 
advocate.”194  In a case raising similar issues, Bates v. Little Rock (1960),195 the Court 
unanimously reversed convictions for failure to comply with a city ordinance requiring 
the production of NAACP membership lists.  The Court again viewed association as an 
outgrowth of essential rights of expression.  Like speech and press, assembly “was 
considered by the Framers of our Constitution to lie at the foundation of a government 
based upon the consent of an informed citizenry--a government dedicated to the 
establishment of justice and the preservation of liberty.” 
                                                 
192 The first Justice John Marshall Harlan served on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1877-1911.  His 
grandson, John Marshall Harlan II, served on the Court from 1955-1971. 
193 357 U.S. at 460. 
194 357 U.S. at 462-63. 
195 361 U.S. 516. 
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 The reasoning that the Court used to extend due process protection to rights of 
expression fell within a similar, universalistic framework to the one the Court had used to 
extend due process protection to certain property rights in its EDP jurisprudence.  
Beginning with USEs, the justices appealed to the fundamental requirements of liberty in 
an organized, democratic society, and of free republican government, emphasizing the 
importance of allowing for peaceful political change.  As in other time periods and issue 
areas, the Court also employed MRR, appealing to standards combining universalistic 
and particularistic elements, such as the Framers’ beliefs concerning the requirements of 
freedom.196  The shift from EDP concerned the category of rights that was inseparable 
from universalistic standards.  Rather than the acquisition and use of property, here it was 
the ability to openly discuss matters of public concern that was deemed indispensable to 
the kind of society to which the American people were committed.  Speech and press, 
and later assembly and association as well, were brought under due process protection as 
rights fundamental to liberty.197
C. Substantive Due Process as a Basis of Protection for the Right of Privacy 
 Two years before the Court applied speech and press against the states via due 
process,198 it handed down a decision planting the seeds of the right to privacy.  In Meyer 
v. Nebraska (1923),199 the Court (McReynolds) overturned the conviction of a teacher for 
instructing a ten-year-old child in the German language.  The teacher had violated a state 
law that, in the name of fostering civic development, prohibited teachers from offering 
                                                 
196 Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939). 
197 The Court has also found religious freedoms applicable against the states via due process.  See, e.g., 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).  
The topic is omitted only for reasons of space. 
198 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
199 262 U.S. 390. 
 95
foreign-language instruction to children who had not yet passed the eight grade.  EDP 
still thrived, but the challenged act did not seem at its heart to concern property rights.  
While the act did implicate speech,200 the Court did not approach the controversy from 
that vantage point either.  Instead, the Court advanced a broader understanding of due 
process liberty, encompassing “those privileges long recognized at common law as 
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”  This MRR formulation 
appealed to rights recognized as universalistic by a particular body of law.  Through this 
lens, McReynolds identified a range of due process protections, including “the right of 
the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire 
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, [and] to worship 
God according to the dictates of his own conscience.”  McReynolds’s approach reflected 
the commonality in the roots of EDP and other branches of the Court’s SDP 
jurisprudence. The list began with RTC and LOK, while citing major cases from the 
Court’s EDP jurisprudence, such as Lochner and Allgeyer.  The reference to the right “to 
acquire useful knowledge” suggested rights of expression, soon to be brought within due 
process.  McReynolds also opened due process to new terrain by including the rights “to 
marry, [and] establish a home and bring up children.”201  
 Two years later, the Court laid further groundwork for expansion of due process 
liberty in a similar direction.  In Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925),202 the Court 
invalidated an Oregon statute that effectively banned private schools, by requiring public 
                                                 
200 See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Today [Meyer] would probably 
have gone by reference to the concepts of freedom of expression and conscience assured against state 
action by the Fourteenth Amendment, concepts that are derived from the explicit guarantees of the First 
Amendment against federal encroachment upon freedom of speech and belief.”). 
201 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. 
202 268 U.S. 510. 
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school attendance for all children between the ages of eight and sixteen.  The Court stated 
that due process encompassed: 
the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing 
and education of children under their control. . .  
  
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all 
governments in this Union repose excludes any general 
power of the state to standardize its children by forcing 
them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The 
child is not the mere creature of the state; those who 
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled 
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for 
additional obligations.203
 
 Meyer and Pierce did not use the word “privacy.”  The central theme concerned 
parental direction of education, but the implications reached further.  In an important 
sense, the decisions were precursors to Griswold (1965),204 Roe (1973),205 Casey 
(1992),206 Lawrence (2003),207 and other cases in which the Court has developed the right 
of personal autonomy in decisions pertaining to intimate relationships.  Meyer and Pierce 
signified a willingness to identify broad categories of rights, other than property rights or 
rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights, for inclusion in due process.  Justice William 
Douglas, who wrote the Court’s opinion in Griswold, began articulating his 
understanding of privacy in earlier dissenting opinions.  Dissenting from a decision 
upholding the playing of transit radio programs in streetcars and buses,208 he stated that 
due process liberty must include “privacy . . . if it is to be a repository of freedom.  The 
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right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom.”  Privacy was closely 
interconnected with fundamental principles embedded within the First Amendment: 
Freedom of religion and freedom of speech guaranteed by 
the First Amendment give more than the privilege to 
worship, to write, to speak as one chooses; they give 
freedom not to do nor to act as the government chooses. 
The First Amendment in its respect for the conscience of 
the individual honors the sanctity of thought and belief. To 
think as one chooses, to believe what one wishes are 
important aspects of the constitutional right to be let 
alone.209 
 
Privacy was also intertwined with personal autonomy, as it: 
should include the right to pick and choose from competing 
entertainments, competing propaganda, competing political 
philosophies. If people are let alone in those choices, the 
right of privacy will pay dividends in character and 
integrity. The strength of our system is in the dignity, the 
resourcefulness, and the independence of our people. Our 
confidence is in their ability as individuals to make the 
wisest choice. That system cannot flourish if regimentation 
takes hold. The right of privacy, today violated, is a 
powerful deterrent to any one who would control men's 
minds. 
 
Douglas began with the premise that liberty was impossible without privacy.  He 
reasoned about the nature of this right, and what was essential to its protection.  Having 
fleshed out the kinds of limitations that must be imposed on government to secure 
privacy, Douglas moved to a more specific conclusion: “If liberty is to flourish, 
government should never be allowed to force people to listen to any radio program.”210 
 Douglas further developed privacy dissenting from the dismissal of a married 
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couple’s challenge to a prohibition on the use of contraceptives.211  Indicating he would 
have invalidated the law, Douglas stated: “‘Liberty’ is a conception that sometimes gains 
content from the emanations of other specific guarantees or from experience with the 
requirements of a free society.”212  Although Douglas believed that due process made the 
first Eight Amendments applicable against the states, he directly appealed to privacy as a 
necessary component of liberty, “implicit in a free society.”213  The law violated privacy, 
because enforcement would have entailed invasions of the “innermost sanctum of the 
home,” and an “inquiry into the relations between man and wife.”  The right of privacy, 
Douglas said, was “not drawn from the blue.  It emanates from the totality of the 
constitutional scheme under which we live.”  That constitutional scheme was to be 
contrasted with totalitarianism, which places all subcommunities under state control.  A 
system that prohibits the peacetime quartering of soldiers surely will not permit police 
investigation of marital relations.214  Douglas’s contrast of the American 
constitutionalism with totalitarianism suggested the ability to reason from the broad 
decision the American people made about the kind of society in which they wanted to 
live.  Americans chose to live in a free society, rather than in a totalitarian one.  Certain 
principles followed from that choice, including the right of privacy. 
 In a separate dissent, Harlan also based his opinion on privacy.  The law was “an 
intolerable and unjustifiable invasion of privacy in the conduct of the most intimate 
concerns of an individual's personal life.”215  Citing Chase’s opinion in Calder, Harlan 
argued that due process liberty protected rights that were fundamental, and belonged to 
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the citizens of all free governments.  The right to be let alone in one’s home was a core 
element of the privacy “basic to a free society.”  The home was vitally important because 
it served as the “seat of family life.”  Within that family life, it was “difficult to imagine 
what is more private or more intimate than a husband and wife's marital relations.”  The 
Connecticut law violated privacy because it authorized “the intrusion of the whole 
machinery of the criminal law into the very heart of marital privacy, requiring husband 
and wife to render account before a criminal tribunal of their uses of that intimacy.”216   
 The Court reached the merits of Connecticut’s birth control law in Griswold v. 
Connecticut (1965).217  With Douglas now announcing the Court’s opinion, he again 
argued that the marital relationship was a critical component of privacy, though he treated 
the right as emanating from specific provisions of the Bill of Rights.  The justices, 
Douglas contended, had to recognize certain non-explicit, penumbral rights whose 
protection was required to ensure adequate protection of explicit guarantees.  At the same 
time, Douglas suggested a basis for privacy, and the marital relation it protected, 
extending beyond the Bill of Rights, as he asserted that privacy was: 
older than the Bill of Rights-older than our political parties, 
older than our school system. Marriage is a coming 
together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and 
intimate to the degree of being sacred.218
 
 In a concurring opinion (joined by Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William 
Brennan), Justice Arthur Goldberg, who rejected Douglas’s view that due process applied 
the first Eight Amendments against the states, argued from the concept of liberty, which 
encompassed “personal rights that are fundamental,” and was not confined to enumerated 
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rights.  For overarching standards, Goldberg appealed to MRR formulations originated in 
the Court’s PDP jurisprudence.  The justices “must look to the ‘traditions and (collective) 
conscience of our people’ to determine whether a principle is ‘so rooted (there) . . . as to 
be ranked as fundamental,’”219 and to whether the right comprises one of those 
“fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and 
political institutions.”220  Goldberg also followed Douglas in deriving the content of 
liberty from specific textual provisions, “experience with the requirements of a free 
society,” and “the totality of the constitutional scheme under which we live.”221  Citing 
Meyer, Pierce, and Harlan’s Poe dissent, Goldberg renewed the argument that the home 
and the marital relation were central to privacy.  Reminiscent of reliance by earlier 
justices on the “spirit of the constitution,”222 Goldberg appealed to the “entire fabric of 
the Constitution and the purposes that clearly underlie its specific guarantees,” which, he 
said, “demonstrate[d] that the rights to marital privacy and to marry and raise a family are 
of similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically protected.”  The 
argument was buttressed by reference to the Ninth Amendment, which Goldberg saw as 
the Framers’ confirmation that not all rights deserving of constitutional protection were 
enumerated.  Moreover, as Douglas had highlighted the importance of the marital 
relationship by pointing to the ancient roots of the sacred marital relationship, Goldberg 
emphasized the importance of the family relationship, which was “as old and as 
fundamental as our entire civilization.”223  Also concurring, Harlan, also drew privacy out 
of due process liberty.  Quoting another landmark case from the Court’s PDP 
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jurisprudence, Harlan found that privacy was encompassed by the “basic values ‘implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty.’”224
 Given the differences in the opinions, Griswold left unclear whether privacy was 
based directly in due process liberty, or in emanations from Bill of Rights guarantees.  
Roe v. Wade (1973)225 clarified that privacy was rooted in due process liberty.  The Due 
Process Clause’s “guarantee of personal privacy” embraced “only personal rights that can 
be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”  Citing Meyer, 
Pierce, and Griswold, the Court (J. Harry Blackmun) stated that privacy reached 
“activities relating to marriage, procreation,” “contraception,” “family relationships,” 
“and child rearing and education.”226  Blackmun concluded that the “right of personal 
privacy includes the abortion decision,” stressing various kinds of harm that could result 
to women denied that choice.227  Though the right was not absolute, and Roe, and later 
decisions, grappled with the kinds of legislative restrictions that might be consistent with 
privacy,228 Roe established the important principle that due process encompassed a 
woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy. 
 A common thread running through Roe, and precedents upon which it rested, was 
the vital importance of protecting the home and marital relationship.  Indeed, these may 
be viewed as IMPs within the Court’s REP approach to privacy.  Without abandoning 
these IMPs, however, the Court’s privacy jurisprudence has increasingly stressed the 
importance of autonomy, which has emerged as an additional IMP, whose protection is 
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essential to privacy.  Even in Roe, the right at stake was not limited to the marital context,  
and Blackmun referred to the protected freedom in Roe as the “abortion decision.”  In 
reaffirming the core holding of Roe in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992), the opinion 
of the Court (by Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony M. Kennedy and David H. 
Souter) stated that the “Constitution places limits on a State's right to interfere with a 
person's most basic decisions about family and parenthood.”229  Highlighting elements 
from earlier cases sounding the theme of an individual’s decisionmaking, the opinion 
more fully articulated an understanding of privacy built on the notion that there were 
decisions, touching certain aspects of personal life and fundamental beliefs, that should 
be left up to the individual’s conscience: 
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal 
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, 
family relationships, child rearing, and education. Our 
cases recognize the right of the individual, married or 
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion 
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the 
decision whether to bear or beget a child.  Our precedents 
have respected the private realm of family life which the 
state cannot enter.  These matters, involving the most 
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a 
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, 
are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.230
 
The opinion placed this understanding of the connection between autonomy, dignity, and 
personhood at the center of their approach to privacy: 
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of 
the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters 
could not define the attributes of personhood were they 
formed under compulsion of the State. . . The destiny of the 
woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own 
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conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in 
society.231 
 
The rights at stake in Griswold, and later decisions extending rights relating to the use of 
contraceptives, had been protected because they “involve personal decisions concerning 
not only the meaning of procreation but also human responsibility and respect for it.”232
 The emphasis on autonomy was further developed in cases not involving 
procreation, such as Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), in which the majority upheld a Georgia 
statute criminalizing acts of sodomy.  In dissent (joined by Justices Thurgood Marshall, 
John Stevens, and Brennan), Blackmun stressed the importance to privacy of an 
individual’s autonomy over certain personal spheres of decisionmaking.  If the right to 
privacy “means anything,” it must encompass an individuals’ “choices about the most 
intimate aspects of their lives[.]”233  Blackmun perceived two categories of privacy cases.  
One recognized “a privacy interest with reference to certain places without regard for the 
particular activities in which the individuals who occupy them are engaged.”  The other 
category, at stake in Roe and Pierce, “recognized a privacy interest with reference to 
certain decisions that are properly for the individual to make.”  Bowers “implicates both 
the decisional and the spatial aspects of the right to privacy.”234  The spatial aspects were 
implicated because the defendant had been charged with conduct in the home.235  The 
decisional aspects were implicated because privacy was built on more than home and  
family.  It protected autonomy over certain decisions, “because they form so central a 
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part of an individual's life. ‘[T]he concept of privacy embodies the moral fact that a 
person belongs to himself and not others nor to society as a whole.’”236  Blackmun 
viewed privacy precedents as based on a similar understanding--the abortion decision 
was protected because “parenthood alters so dramatically an individual’s self-definition.”  
The freedom interfered with in Bowers fell within due process liberty, because of sexual 
intimacy’s critical role in an individual’s life: 
The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant 
way through their intimate sexual relationships with others 
suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be 
many “right” ways of conducting those relationships, and 
that much of the richness of a relationship will come from 
the freedom an individual has to choose the form and 
nature of these intensely personal bonds. . . The Court 
claims that its decision today merely refuses to recognize a 
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy; what 
the Court really has refused to recognize is the fundamental 
interest all individuals have in controlling the nature of 
their intimate associations with others.237
 
 When the Court overturned Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas (2003),238 the majority 
largely employed the understanding of privacy that Blackmun articulated in Bowers.  
Unlike Bowers, the law at issue in Lawrence criminalized certain sexual acts only when 
engaged in by persons of the same sex, but this difference did not alter the Court’s 
approach.  Kennedy’s opinion for the Court asserted that liberty “presumes an autonomy 
of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”  
While privacy traditionally protected the home, there were “other spheres of our lives and 
existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant presence.”  
Evoking Blackmun’s distinction in Bowers, Kennedy wrote that the law involved “liberty 
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of the person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions.”239  
Summarizing privacy’s roots, Kennedy characterized Roe as recognizing “the right of a 
woman to make certain fundamental decisions affecting her destiny.”240   Lawrence did 
not only concern the right to engage in specified acts.  It interfered with decisions of 
fundamental importance, and with an individual’s control over the most personal 
relationships.  The law “touch[ed] upon the most private human conduct, sexual 
behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.”  It interfered with a personal 
relationship that individuals were entitled to choose for themselves: 
[A]dults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the 
confines of their homes and their own private lives and still 
retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds 
overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, 
the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that 
is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution 
allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.241 
 
From these general principles, Kennedy reached more specific conclusions: 
The State cannot demean their [two mutually consenting 
adults choosing to engage in acts of sexual intimacy] 
existence or control their destiny by making their private 
sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due 
Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their 
conduct without intervention of the government.242  
 
 The extension of due process protection to privacy rights has not gone 
uncontested, and privacy remains a controversial area of jurisprudence.243  Some 
objections to the development of privacy are discussed in sec. G, which focuses 
especially on the disagreement in Lawrence over the use of practices, and other societal 
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indicators, in conjunction with UR.  The following section reenforces a point already 
suggested--that the Court employed a common framework in extending due process 
protection to rights of property, expression, and privacy. 
D. The Common Substantive Due Process Framework Protecting    
 Rights of Property, Expression, and Privacy 
 
 Notwithstanding obvious differences in the issue areas involved, the Court 
employed a similar overarching framework in extending due process protection to rights 
of property, expression, and privacy.  Each category of rights was considered 
indispensable to the Due Process Clause’s concept of liberty.  Certain core principles 
were essential to meaningful protection of that category of rights.  More specific 
applications followed from these general principles.  In the area of EDP, the justices 
reasoned from the sanctity of property to the principle that an individual had a sacred 
right to the fruits of labor.  The RTC and LOK followed.  With respect to expression, the 
freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association were found indispensable to liberty.   
In a free, constitutional democracy, the system of government must allow for peaceful 
change based on the will of the people, which requires open discussion about politics.  
From these essential principles, the justices could conclude, for example, that a law 
making it a crime simply to assemble for the purpose of discussing politics was not 
consistent with free government.244  The right to privacy, similarly, was born of the 
justices’ determination that certain principles were essential to the liberty, centering 
largely on the home and the family.  The justices extended their understanding of privacy 
to include a related core principle--that individuals must be allowed autonomy within the 
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sphere of decisions pertaining to highly personal matters, such as the choice of an 
intimate, sexual partner. 
 That the justices employed a similar approach across wide-ranging substantive 
areas is highlighted by opinions in which the justices discussed different categories of 
rights within the same framework.  In his dissenting opinion in Gilbert v. Minnesota 
(1920),245 for example, Justice Louis Brandeis compared the importance of property and 
expression.  While the majority upheld Gilbert’s conviction for protesting the draft, 
Brandeis, though resting his opinion on federalism grounds, took the occasion to  
articulate his views on the categories of rights protected by due process.  Noting that due 
process had been interpreted to encompass the RTC and LOK, Brandeis had “difficulty in 
believing” that it did not also include “liberty to teach, either in the privacy of the home 
or publicly, the doctrine of pacifism . . . I cannot believe that the liberty guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment includes only liberty to acquire and to enjoy property.”246  By 
1931, when Near v. Minnesota was handed down, the Court had included rights of 
expression in due process.  The Court spoke of speech and press in the same breath as 
LOK, noting that all of these rights were protected as “indispensable requirements of the 
liberty assured” by due process.247  In Grosjean v. American Press Co. (1936),248 the 
Court (Sutherland) described an approach spanning across property and expression, as 
well as PDP, based on the identification of rights fundamental to liberty.  Sutherland 
noted that, in the field of PDP, the search for fundamental rights had resulted in the 
finding that due process encompassed the right of an accused to the assistance of counsel 
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in a criminal trial.249  Speech and press, he observed, were “of the same fundamental 
character.”  Turning from PDP to EDP, Sutherland further supported the inclusion of 
speech and press within due process by citing Allgeyer’s affirmance that “‘liberty’ . . .  
embraces not only the right of a person to be free from physical restraint, but the right to 
be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties as well.”250
 The commonality of the underlying framework was also reflected in a prominent 
EDP case the following year--New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann (1932),251 in which the 
Court struck down an Oklahoma law allowing entrants into the business of supplying ice 
only where the need for an additional supply of the product could be demonstrated.  In 
finding that the law violated RTC, the Court stated: 
The principle is imbedded in our constitutional system that 
there are certain essentials of liberty with which the state is 
not entitled to dispense in the interest of experiments. This 
principle has been applied by this court in many cases.252
 
In support of that proposition, the Court cited, not only other cases involving EDP, but 
also cases involving the newly recognized due process rights of expression253 and 
privacy.254  The Court noted that, in Near: 
the theory of experimentation in censorship was not 
permitted to interfere with the fundamental doctrine of the 
freedom of the press.  The opportunity to apply one's labor 
and skill in an ordinary occupation with proper regard for 
all reasonable regulations is no less entitled to protection.255
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In Gilbert v. Minnesota (1920)256 Brandeis had argued that, if liberty included property 
rights, then it must also include expression.  Here, Sutherland argued in reverse.   
 During the 1920s and 1930s, then, while EDP still thrived, the justices began 
employing a similar universalistic framework to identify other categories of rights 
deserving of due process protection.  Of course, while the identification of the rights to be 
protected is a critical element of the Court’s jurisprudence, it is only a part.  Rights claims  
arise as challenges to exercises of governmental powers.  Rights are not absolute, and 
find themselves in collision with powers.  The following section (like ch. 2, C) discusses 
the Court’s universalistic reasoning with respect to governmental powers. 
E. Universal Reasoning about Inherent, Inalienable Governmental Powers 
 
 Chapter Two (sec. C) discussed the concept of inherent, inalienable governmental 
powers that played an important role in the Court’s Contract Clause jurisprudence.  
Universalistic reasoning with respect to governmental powers has also been important to 
the Court’s SDP jurisprudence.  While the justices had recognized the police powers 
before the Fourteenth Amendment,257 and spoken of them as inherent to sovereignty,258 
the Amendment gave the Court far more opportunities for the review of state actions.  In 
developing their due process jurisprudence, the justices framed the issue as whether 
challenged state actions constituted legitimate exercises of police powers.  Thus, the 
scope of police powers became a major topic of consideration.  While the justices often 
disagreed in reviewing specific exercises of police powers, they unanimously recognized, 
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from their earliest due process decisions, that police powers were based in universalistic 
sources.  In Slaughterhouse, the first case in which the Court considered the Amendment, 
Miller wrote that upon the police power: 
depends the security of social order, the life and health of 
the citizen, the comfort of an existence in a thickly 
populated community, the enjoyment of private and social 
life, and the beneficial use of property. ‘It extends,’ says 
another eminent judge, ‘to the protection of the lives, limbs, 
health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and the protection 
of all property within the State; . . . and persons and 
property are subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in 
order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity 
of the State. Of the perfect right of the legislature to do this 
no question ever was, or, upon acknowledged general 
principles, ever can be made, so far as natural persons are 
concerned.’259
 
Miller’s account of police powers stressed their indispensability, not to a particular 
community, but to the “security of social order,” and to the most elemental aspects of the 
public welfare.  Without them, the citizen’s health, comfort, property, and life could not 
be secured.  That individual safety and welfare depended upon subjection to regulation 
for their common good was suggestive of the universalistic aspects of social contract 
theory.  Miller was not citing the provisions of specific enacted text, but reasoning from 
the nature of society and government.  The dissenters did not question these propositions. 
 Four years later, the Court referred to police powers as the “powers of 
government inherent in every sovereignty,” finding their roots in social contract: 
When one becomes a member of society, he necessarily 
parts with some rights or privileges which, as an individual 
not affected by his relations to others, he might retain. ‘A 
body politic,’ as aptly defined in the preamble of the 
Constitution of Massachusetts, ‘is a social compact by 
which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and 
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each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be 
governed by certain laws for the common good.’. .  
 
[This] authorize[s] the establishment of laws requiring each 
citizen to so conduct himself, and so use his own property, 
as not unnecessarily to injure another. This is the very 
essence of government, and has found expression in the 
maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. From this 
source come the police powers . . . Under these powers the 
government regulates the conduct of its citizens one 
towards another, and the manner in which each shall use 
his own property, when such regulation becomes necessary 
for the public good.260
 
By viewing police powers as emanating from the concept of a social contract and the 
“very essence of government,” the Court grounded powers universalistically.  The precise 
scope of the police powers was open to controversy, but not their origin and 
indispensability.  In Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905),261 the Court upheld a law 
requiring adults to undergo smallpox vaccinations, stressing that due process liberty: 
does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all 
times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. 
There are manifold restraints to which every person is 
necessarily subject for the common good. On any other 
basis organized society could not exist with safety to its 
members. Society based on the rule that each one is a law 
unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder and 
anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under the 
operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each 
individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his 
person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be 
done to others. . .   
 
Powers were rooted in the requirements of a society’s survival: 
Upon the principle of self-defense, of paramount necessity, 
a community has the right to protect itself against an 
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epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its 
members.262
 
 By the late 1880s, the Court also adopted, in its due process jurisprudence, the 
understanding, initially articulated in the context of the Contract Clause, that police 
powers were inalienable.  Regardless of what the legislature, or even the people 
themselves wanted, the powers could not be bargained away.263  The inalienability of the 
powers was closely related with their universalistic bases.  If the powers were 
indispensable for the protection of life and property, and if the purpose of the social 
contract was to authorize them, then it followed that they could not be forfeited.  
F. The Development of a Hierarchical Approach to Rights 
 
 The justices during the EDP era acknowledged the tension between rights and 
powers, which were both grounded universalistically.  In Lochner, for example, since due 
process protected LOK, and this liberty was subject to police powers, the Court was faced 
with the question of “which of two powers or rights shall prevail,-the power of the state 
to legislate or the right of the individual to liberty of person and freedom of contract.”264  
In Jacobson, the Court stated that protected liberty was “only freedom from restraint 
under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by others. It is . . . 
liberty regulated by law.”265  Noting certain rights that all individuals enjoyed in a free, 
constitutional government, the Court stated: 
[I]n every well-ordered society charged with the duty of 
conserving the safety of its members the rights of the 
individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the 
pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint, to 
                                                 
262 197 U.S. at 26-27. 
263 Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 392 (1898); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 683 (1888); Mugler 
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669-70 (1887). 
264 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905). 
265 Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905). 
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be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the 
general public may demand.266
 
Liberty could not be understood in isolation.  All people were entitled to liberty, but in a 
free government, people subjected themselves to regulation to secure that liberty.  The 
implications of that subjection were far-reaching.  Individuals could even be conscripted 
and compelled “to risk the chance of being shot down” in the protection of the security of 
all.267  As the Court stated in Nebbia, rights and powers were not only “equally 
fundamental,”268 but also “always in collision,” since any exercise of private right had 
some effect on the public interest, and regulations imposed some restraint on liberty.269
 If rights are subject to exercises of the police powers enacted by legislatures, then 
how do rights act as constraints on legislatures?  How can the Court recognize the 
legislature’s authority to regulate for the common good, while still retaining meaningful 
constraints on legislative power?  As early as the 1880s, the justices employed an 
approach to due process framed around consideration of the end that a challenged 
regulation was aimed at furthering, and the means through which the regulation sought to 
further that end.270  The ends-means test was stated a number of ways, but the general 
formula required that, to survive due process review, the challenged law had to be aimed 
at a legitimate end, and the means adopted had to be reasonably related to that end.271  In 
                                                 
266 197 U.S. at 29. 
267 197 U.S. at 29. 
268 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1934). 
269 291 U.S. at 524-25. 
270 In Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887), for instance, the Court stated that if a law purportedly 
“enacted  to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial 
relation to those objects,” it must be invalidated. 
271 See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) (“If the laws passed are seen to have a 
reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the 
requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus 
officio.”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (“The established doctrine is that this liberty 
may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is 
arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state to effect.”); 
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itself, the articulated standard was lenient, requiring simply that a regulation have some 
relation to some legitimate purpose.  Due process review, nevertheless, operated as a 
meaningful constraint due to a set of traditional understandings about the scope of the 
police powers.  For example, regulations could not favor one class over another.  Thus, 
regulations could not be aimed at leveling the playing field between employers and 
employees on the assumption that employers enjoyed superior bargaining power.272  In 
addition, price and wage regulations were distinguished from other kinds of regulations.  
They could only be imposed in certain businesses “affected with a public interest.”273
 The Court, however, ultimately discarded these traditional understandings.  We 
saw earlier (ch. 2, C) that, in its Contact Clause jurisprudence, the Court adopted an 
evolutive approach to constitutional meanings.  It did so, as well, with respect to due 
process.  In a prominent case upholding a maximum hours law for miners, for example, 
the Court stated that “the law is, to a certain extent, a progressive science.”274  “[W]hile 
the cardinal principles of justice are immutable,” Brown wrote, “the methods by which 
justice is administered are subject to constant fluctuation.”275  The alterability of 
constitutional meanings had to be recognized, because public understandings about rights 
and the law shifted.  Brown pointed to examples of changes in public understandings 
                                                                                                                                                 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57-58 (1905) (“The mere assertion that the subject relates, though but in 
a remote degree, to the public health, does not necessarily render the enactment valid. The act must have a 
more direct relation, as a means to an end, and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an 
act can be held to be valid which interferes with the general right of an individual to be free in his person 
and in his power to contract in relation to his own labor..”). 
272 E.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see Gillman 1993. 
273 E.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876).  In upholding the challenged price regulation, the 
majority did not hold that all industries were subject to price regulations.  Rather, the majority held that the 
grain storage industry was “affected with a public interest,” and, thus, in a special category.  The dissenting 
justices argued that the majority’s definition of “affected with a public interest” was so broad that it 
effectively subjected all industries to price regulations.  See also Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1892); 
Tyson and Bro. United Theater Ticket Offices v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418 (1927). 
274 Holden v. Hardy ,169 U.S. 366, 385 (1898). 
275 169 U.S. at 387. 
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relating to rights.  Even before the Constitution’s enactment, the severity of the common 
law was mitigated, especially in the criminal realm, and the list of crimes punishable by 
death was substantially restricted.  Significant changes in the nineteenth century included 
the abolition of imprisonment for debt, and an expanded scope of economic 
independence of married women.  Linking the evolution of SDP and PDP, Brown also 
noted shifts in the realm of criminal procedure, such as the adoption of rules permitting 
parties to testify as witnesses, and the abolition by many states of the requirement that 
indictments be handed down by grand juries.  It was the nature of law to evolve.  In light 
of the changes that had already occurred, it was “impossible to suppose that they will not 
continue’ as the law was “forced to adapt itself to new conditions of society . . . as they 
arise.”276  Based on the relatively recent public recognition that certain classes of persons, 
especially those engaged in dangerous jobs, required special legal protections, the Court 
upheld Utah’s maximum hours provisions for coal mine workers.277  While contemporary 
observes might associate evolving constitutional meanings with the expansion of rights, 
during the EDP era, it facilitated the expansion of governmental powers. 
 Armed with an evolutive conception of constitutional meanings, a majority 
ultimately discarded the traditional understandings and distinctions that had given EDP 
bite.  The Court, for example, permitted legislatures to enact regulations with an eye 
towards rectifying the unequal bargaining power inherent in many industries between 
                                                 
276 169 U.S. at 388. 
277 Recognition of the need to allow for the evolution of constitutional meanings during the Lochner era 
was not limited to cases upholding government regulations.  In Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923), for 
example, in which a conservative majority struck down a D.C. minimum wage law applicable only to 
women, Sutherland wrote: “The liberty of the individual to do as he pleases, even in innocent matters, is 
not absolute. It must frequently yield to the common good, and the line beyond which the power of 
interference may not be pressed is neither definite nor unalterable, but may be made to move, within limits 
not well defined, with changing need and circumstance. Any attempt to fix a rigid boundary would be 
unwise as well as futile.” 261 U.S. 525, 561. 
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employers and employees.278  The Court also abandoned the notion that price and wage 
regulations could only be imposed upon businesses “affected with a public interest.”  
Such regulations no longer stood as a distinct category.279  At the same time, the Court 
adopted a broad understanding of the public interest, and granted great deference to 
legislatures in determining the means of pursuing it.280
 In the absence of traditional understandings that had given it force, EDP review 
no longer amounted to meaningful review.  By the late 1930s, EDP was abandoned.  The 
Court allowed EDP to collapse, because a majority of the justices no longer viewed 
property rights as special, as essential to liberty.  Hints of the impending demotion of 
property rights were apparent before the late 1930s.  In his dissenting opinion in Adkins 
(1923), Holmes captured the spirit of the coming shift when he wrote of the LOK: 
Contract is not specially mentioned in the text that we have 
to construe. It is merely an example of doing what you 
want to do, embodied in the word liberty. But pretty much 
all law consists in forbidding men to do some things that 
they want to do, and contract is no more exempt from law 
than other acts.281
 
LOK was built on the notion that certain property rights were essentially important to 
liberty.  If, as Holmes suggested, there was nothing special about the freedom of contract, 
and property rights more generally, then the foundation of EDP would be undercut.  In a 
                                                 
278 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
279 See, e.g.,  Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).  In upholding price regulations applicable to the 
milk industry, the majority stated the decision hinged neither on price regulations constituting a distinct 
category of regulation, nor on  the industry being “affected with a public interest.”  Rather: “It is clear that 
there is no closed class or category of businesses affected with a public interest, and the function of courts 
in the application of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is to determine in each case whether 
circumstances vindicate the challenged regulation as a reasonable exertion of governmental authority or 
condemn it as arbitrary or discriminatory. . .[T]here can be no doubt that upon proper occasion and by 
appropriate measures the state may regulate a business in any of its aspects, including the prices to be 
charged for the products or commodities it sells.” 291 U.S. at 537.  
280 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
281 Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 568 (1923) (Holmes, J. dissenting). 
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1934 case rejecting the traditional treatment of price controls as a distinct category of 
regulations, the majority similarly undermined the notion that freedom of contract or 
other property rights were sacred, or deserved special protection: 
[I]f, as must be conceded, the industry is subject to 
regulation in the public interest, what constitutional 
principle bars the state from correcting existing 
maladjustments by legislation touching prices? We think 
there is no such principle. The due process clause makes no 
mention of sales or of prices any more than it speaks of 
business or contracts or buildings or other incidents of 
property.282
 
In the 1937 case that delivered EDP its coup de grace (Sanders 2005, 473), the Court 
stated:  
The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract.  It 
speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty 
without due process of law. In prohibiting that deprivation, 
the Constitution does not recognize an absolute and 
uncontrollable liberty. Liberty in each of its phases has its 
history and connotation. But the liberty safeguarded is 
liberty in a social organization which requires the 
protection of law against the evils which menace the health, 
safety, morals, and welfare of the people. Liberty under the 
Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the restraints of 
due process, and regulation which is reasonable in relation 
to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the 
community is due process.283
 
 If the Court had adopted the same approach for all categories of rights, no 
meaningful SDP review would have remained.  If the standard of review requires merely 
that legislation have some relation to the public interest, and the determination of the 
public interest, and how to pursue it, are left almost entirely to the legislature’s discretion, 
almost any act will survive review.  EDP review had been made meaningful by a set of 
traditional understandings that the justices no longer considered binding.  Thus, the 
                                                 
282 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 531-32 (1934). 
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combination of evolutive interpretation and the deferential standard of review led to 
EDP’s demise.  The Court, however, did not apply the same approach to all categories of 
rights.  The evolutive approach had allowed for the demotion of property rights.  It also 
allowed for the ascension of other categories of rights to elevated status.  Sections B and 
C, above, discussed the expansion of SDP to include expression and privacy.  The 
remainder of this section discusses the Court’s use of universalistic reasoning to provide 
meaningful protection of these categories of rights by linking their elevated status with a 
more stringent form of ends-means testing. 
 In 1938, one year after abandoning EDP, the Court foreshadowed development of 
a hierarchical approach.  In U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., the Court applied the 
deferential rational relation test in upholding the challenged business regulation, but 
suggested that it might examine legislation more carefully when certain rights were 
affected, including expression.284  One year later, the Court indicated that legislation 
interfering with expression might not be justified simply by any legitimate purpose: 
Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of 
public convenience may well support regulation directed at 
other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such 
as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the 
maintenance of democratic institutions.285
 
The prevention of litter was a legitimate public purpose, but insufficient to justify a 
prohibition on the distribution of handbills, because the law interfered with rights of 
special status.  Similarly, in Thomas v. Collins (1945), overturning a contempt order that 
imposed punishment for soliciting members for labor unions, the Court stated: 
                                                 
284 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4. 
285 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).  In concurring and dissenting opinions, Holmes and 
Brandeis had earlier begun developing stricter review for acts interfering with fundamental rights of 
expression.  E.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams v. U.S., 
250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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The case confronts us again with the duty our system places 
on this Court to say where the individual's freedom ends 
and the State's power begins. Choice on that border, now as 
always delicate, is perhaps more so where the usual 
presumption supporting legislation is balanced by the 
preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the 
indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First 
Amendment. . . That priority gives these liberties a sanctity 
and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions. And it is 
the character of the right, not of the limitation, which 
determines what standard governs the choice.286
 
The Court’s more stringent form of review has crystallized into “strict scrutiny.”  To 
survive strict scrutiny, the challenged governmental action must serve a “compelling 
governmental purpose.”287  It must also be narrowly tailored to achieving that purpose, 
meaning that it must seek to minimize the degree of interference with specially protected 
rights.288  The Court continues to apply strict scrutiny in its adjudication of speech, press, 
assembly, religion, and association (Galloway 1988, 453 n. 16). 
 With respect to the right of privacy, too, a majority of the justices have applied a 
heightened level of scrutiny based on the fundamental nature of the right.289  Meyer and 
Pierce, which planted seeds of privacy’s development, hinted at strict scrutiny by noting 
an absence of emergency or extraordinary circumstances to justify the interference with 
                                                 
286 323 U.S. 516, 529-30; see also West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette  319 U.S. 624, 639 
(1943).  
287 See, e.g., Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) (“Where there is a significant encroachment 
upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is 
compelling.”). 
288 See e.g., Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, 489 U.S. 214, 222 (1989); Saia v. 
New York, 334 U.S. 558, 560-62 (1948). 
289 The Court has employed strict scrutiny outside of the due process context, as in claims under the Equal 
Protection Clause involving regulations that classify on the basis of race.  E.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
244, 270 (2003).  The Court has also at times employed standards of review that fall between the rational 
relation and strict scrutiny tests.  The contemporary approach to adjudicating equal protection claims 
involving gender classifications, for example, permits such classifications when the state offers an 
“exceedingly persuasive” justification, demonstrating that the challenged classification “serves important 
governmental objectives” and is “substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.”  U.S. v. 
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996). 
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fundamental rights.290  Later cases applied strict scrutiny when challenged acts infringed 
privacy.  In Roe, for example, the Court stated: 
Where certain ‘fundamental rights' are involved, the Court 
has held that regulation limiting these rights may be 
justified only by a ‘compelling state interest,’ and that 
legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express 
only the legitimate state interests at stake.  
 
In the recent abortion cases . . . courts have recognized 
these principles.291
 
 While strict scrutiny test did not fully take form until after EDP’s collapse, some 
justices had suggested elements of the approach in their EDP jurisprudence.  In 
prominent cases, such as Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923),292 Charles Wolff Packing 
v. Court of Industrial Relations of Kansas (1923),293 Tyson and Bro. United Theater 
Ticket Offices v. Banton (1927),294 and Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo (1936),295 
for example, majorities emphasized the importance of the right at stake, and linked the 
                                                 
290 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923). 
291 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973); see also Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); 
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Cases since Roe, beginning with Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992), have 
complicated analysis of abortion cases by introducing the notion that certain state regulations may be 
constitutional even though they have the “incidental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to 
procure an abortion,” as long as they do not “impose[] an undue burden on a woman's ability to make th[e] 
decision” of whether to have an abortion.  A majority recently upheld the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 
2003, which banned the use of a specific method of abortion in its later stages, on the grounds that it did not 
impose an undue burden on a woman’s right to make the decision of whether to continue her pregnancy.  
Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S.Ct. 1610 (2007).  The important point, for present purposes, is that, since Roe, 
the justices have never retreated from the position, originating in the fundamental importance of a woman’s 
right to choose, that: “Before viability, a State may not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate 
decision to terminate her pregnancy.”  Carhart, 127 S.Ct. at 1627.  Casey’s “undue burden” standard 
applies only to regulations that do not prevent a woman from making the decision.  The Court has never 
said that anything less than a compelling governmental purpose could justify a state in banning all 
abortions before viability.  Indeed, the Carhart standard could be interpreted as stricter than strict scrutiny.  
While the Court often states that rights are not absolute, the abortion line of cases suggests that states may 
never ban abortions before viability.
292 261 U.S. 525, 546. 
293 262 U.S. 522, 534. 
294 273 U. S. 418, 429. 
295 298 U.S. 587, 610-11. 
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fundamental nature of these rights with an approach to adjudication that placed a heavy 
burden on the state to demonstrate exceptional circumstances justifying the infringement 
of such rights.  The failure of strict scrutiny to gain traction in the Court’s EDP 
jurisprudence was a result of a majority of the justices ultimately determining that 
property rights were not as fundamental or essential as were other categories of rights.  At 
the same time, the application of strict scrutiny in the areas of expression and privacy was 
a result of the Court’s determination that these rights were fundamental and essential.296
 The development of a hierarchical approach to rights, together with the demotion 
of property, and ascension of other rights categories, represented fundamental change in 
constitutional meanings, as the Court recognized within a short period after EDP’s 
demise.297  As the next section observes, the use of an evolutive approach, which has 
been critical to the Court’s jurisprudence, has been contested and remains controversial in 
the contemporary Court’s SDP jurisprudence.  Focusing largely on a recent landmark 
case concerning privacy rights, the section discusses the majority’s use of an evolutive, 
universalistic approach, and the dissenters’ advocacy of a tradition-based approach.  The 
disagreement is especially significant in light of difficulties raised by the majority’s use 
of practices, and other societal indicators, as part of its evolutive analysis.   
G. Lawrence v. Texas (2003) and the Debate over Emerging Rights 
 Lawrence v. Texas (2003)298 serves as a useful focus, because it captures critical 
fault lines in the contemporary Court concerning approaches that allow for the evolution 
                                                 
296 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (“We do not sit as a super-legislature to 
determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or 
social conditions. This law, however, operates directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife and 
their physician's role in one aspect of that relation.”). 
297 E.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624. (1943).
298 539 U.S. 558. 
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of constititonal meanings (“ECM,” for brevity).  The case involved a challenge to a state 
law prohibiting certain sexual acts between persons of the same sex.  The majority 
(Kennedy) found that an individual’s choice of partner in an intimate, sexual relationship 
fell within the liberty protected by due process, and that the Texas statute violated that 
liberty.  He could not plausibly have rooted the decision in traditional understandings.  
Rather, Kennedy argued that the meanings of constitutional rights evolve: 
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses 
of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment 
known the components of liberty in its manifold 
possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did 
not presume to have this insight. They knew times can 
blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that 
laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only 
to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every 
generation can invoke its principles in their own search for 
greater freedom.299
 
The approach emphasized that the Fourteenth Amendment’s reference to “liberty” was 
intentionally vague.  The general concept “endures,” but successive generations may, and 
should, apply the concept differently “in their own search for greater freedom.”  
 Kennedy’s reasoning evoked earlier uses of ECM.  It was noted (sec. F), for 
example, that the Court used an ECM approach in Holden v. Hardy (1898).300  Brown 
argued that, in interpreting the Constitution, justices had to acknowledge shifts in public 
understandings about rights and the law.  In Lawrence, Kennedy, too, stressed that 
fundamental beliefs vary from one generation to the next.  He also followed key elements 
of an approach outlined by the second Harlan in his Poe dissent, which was largely 
adopted by justices in other prominent cases.  Harlan wrote that justices should approach: 
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the text which is the only commission for our power not in 
a literalistic way, as if we had a tax statute before us, but as 
the basic charter of our society, setting out in spare but 
meaningful terms the principles of government.301
 
Since neither text, nor history leading up to the Constitution’s ratification provided clear 
answers, justices confronted the challenge of “giving meaning” to constitutional rights.302  
This entailed examining a “particular provision's larger context,” including its “history 
and purposes[.]”303  Analysis could not be limited to the literal meaning of the text, but 
had to also draw on “the rational purposes, historical roots, and subsequent developments 
of the relevant provisions.”304  Harlan cited Weems v. U.S. (1910), a seminal Eighth 
Amendment case (discussed in ch. 6) for the proposition that, “a principle, to be vital, 
must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.”305  With 
respect to the ban on the use of contraceptives challenged in Poe, Harlan found that it 
violated a principle embedded within liberty--“privacy against arbitrary official 
intrusion.”  This principle could not be limited to the traditional emphasis on protection 
against physical invasions;  it was better understood to protect, not the home as a physical 
location, but the home as the “seat of family life,” of individual lives whose privacy was 
fundamental, and worthy of protection.306  Although the specific right at stake in Poe had 
not previously been recognized, Harlan employed an interpretive approach that allowed 
the meaning of constitutional provisions to evolve, as they brought within their protection 
rights falling within a principle embodied by the text. 
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 Dissenting in Michael H. v. Gerald D. (1989), another case examining the scope 
of due process privacy, Brennan (joined by Marshall and Blackmun), like Harlan in Poe, 
and Kennedy in Lawrence, stressed that the Due Process Clause contained “broad and 
majestic terms.”  Liberty was “among the ‘[g]reat [constitutional] concepts ... purposely 
left to gather meaning from experience.... [T]hey relate to the whole domain of social and 
economic fact, and the statesmen who founded this Nation knew too well that only a 
stagnant society remains unchanged.’”307  O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter employed the 
essence of Harlan’s approach in Casey.  In their opinion delivering the Court’s opinion, 
they endorsed Brennan’s ECM approach from Michael H.  Due process embodied the 
broad principle that there was “a realm of personal liberty which the government may not 
enter.”  “Neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of States at the time of the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,” the justices said, “marks the outer limits of the 
substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects.”308  The opinion 
quoted extensively from Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Poe, noting that the Court in 
Griswold had adopted Harlan’s understanding of constitutional rights as evolving. 
 It was noted (sec. C) that Lawrence continued the Court’s universalistic approach 
to SDP, drawing out the meaning of privacy as an essential component of liberty.  The 
majority’s approach, then, was both universalistic and evolutive.  The use of an evolutive, 
universalistic approach raises difficult questions.  On what basis may justices determine 
how the meaning of rights changes?  If constitutional meanings are not bound by history, 
then it follows that history alone cannot determine how meanings change.  If the justices 
rely on their own universalistic reasoning alone, they are subject to the familiar 
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objections regarding the exercise of excessive judicial discretion.  In Lawrence, Kennedy 
sought guidance from practices, which, in itself was not remarkable.309  The intriguing 
aspect of Kennedy’s opinion was the assertion: 
[W]e think that our laws and traditions in the past half 
century are of most relevance here. These references show 
an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial 
protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their 
private lives in matters pertaining to sex.310
 
Kennedy supported his assertion of an emerging awareness with references to three kinds 
of sources.  First, he cited the opinion of an association of legal experts.  The American 
Law Institute’s Model Penal Code of 1955 recommended against laws criminalizing 
consensual sexual acts conducted in private.  Second, Kennedy cited international 
sources.  In England, a committee advising Parliament in 1957 recommended the 
abolition of laws criminalizing sexual acts between persons of the same sex, and 
Parliament substantially acted upon the recommendations.  Additionally, in the early 
1980s, the European Court of Human Rights invalidated a law of Northern Ireland 
prohibiting sexual acts between persons of the same sex.  Third, Kennedy considered 
American state practices.  Of the twenty-five states that had criminalized acts of sodomy, 
by the time of the Lawrence decision, only thirteen had continued to do so, and only four 
of these continued to enforce those laws against homosexuals. 
 Dissenting in Lawrence, Scalia (joined by C.J. Justice William H. Rehnquist and 
J. Clarence Thomas), rejected Kennedy’s use of ECM, and his conception of an 
“emerging awareness.”  Scalia argued that, under the Court’s SDP jurisprudence, a 
critical question was whether to apply strict scrutiny.  Strict scrutiny applied only when 
                                                 
309 Like citation of precedent within a common law system, judicial reliance on longstanding, or existing  
practices is common and expected. Turner 2004, 1-2. 
310 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-72 (2003). 
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the challenged act implicated fundamental rights.  Rights qualified as fundamental only if 
they were not only implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, but also “deeply rooted in 
this Nation's history and tradition.”311  For Scalia, historical pedigree was an 
indispensable requirement.  Kennedy’s description of an “emerging awareness” was 
beside the point.  By definition, an emerging awareness was not “deeply rooted in this 
Nation's history and tradition.”  Recent state actions could not birth new rights.  
Kennedy’s international sources were doubly irrelevant.  Not only were they recent, but 
they were non-American.  Proper fundamental rights analysis looked only to “this 
Nation’s history and tradition.”312  The Court “should not impose foreign moods, fads, or 
fashions on Americans.”313  With no fundamental right at stake, Scalia would have found 
that the Texas law satisfied the deferential rational relation test.314
 The use of ECM has long been controversial.  In the West Coast Hotel decision 
that signaled EDP’s demise, the majority recognized significant evolution in 
constitutional understandings due, in part, to changed economic circumstances.  
Opposing the majority’s use of ECM, the four-person minority argued that “the meaning 
of the Constitution does not change with the ebb and flow of economic events”315 and 
protested that: “The judicial function is that of interpretation; it does not include the 
                                                 
311 539 U.S. at 593 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
312 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
313 539 U.S. at 598 (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 n. 123 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial 
of certiorari)). 
314 Scalia noted that the majority also seemed to apply the rational relation test, giving rise to confusion 
over the Court’s approach, since Kennedy’s discussion of the liberty interests at stake suggested that the 
majority would consider the Texas law with heightened scrutiny.  Unlike the majority, Scalia would have 
found the rational relation test satisfied, since the Texas law expressed moral disapproval of certain forms 
of sexual behavior. 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Kennedy, in contrast, noting that the Texas 
statute did not involve minors, public conduct, prostitution, or situations of coercion, concluded that the law 
“furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the 
individual.” 539 U.S. at 578. 
315 West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 402 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting). 
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power of amendment under the guise of interpretation.”316  In one of the Court’s most 
important decisions expanding privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut (1965),317 Black (joined 
by J. Potter Stewart) protested the majority’s ECM: 
I realize that many good and able men have eloquently 
spoken and written, sometimes in rhapsodical strains, about 
the duty of this Court to keep the Constitution in tune with 
the times. The idea is that the Constitution must be changed 
from time to time and that this Court is charged with a duty 
to make those changes. For myself, I must with all 
deference reject that philosophy. The Constitution makers 
knew the need for change and provided for it. Amendments 
suggested by the people's elected representatives can be 
submitted to the people or their selected agents for 
ratification. That method of change was good for our 
Fathers, and being somewhat oldfashioned I must add it is 
good enough for me.318
 
Similarly, in his dissenting opinion in Roe, Rehnquist objected to the majority’s deviation 
from historical rights understandings, stressing that “[t]here apparently was no question 
concerning the validity of [statutes prohibiting abortions] when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was adopted.”319
 ECM lies at the heart of conceptual difficulties concerning the use of UR.  On the 
one hand, the argument for ECM is powerful.  The Constitution is meant to endure 
indefinitely and contains extremely broad terms, such as due process “liberty.”  American 
history demonstrates that economic and social conditions change dramatically, as do 
basic tenets of public philosophy.  The formal amendment procedures are unwieldy and 
may be inadequate for addressing changes relevant to constitutional meanings.320  The 
                                                 
316 300 U.S. at 404 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting). 
317 381 U.S. 479. 
318 381 U.S. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting). 
319 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 177 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
320 Since the Bill of Rights there have been at most seventeen amendments. (Doubt is cast over the validity 
of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, limiting Congress’s ability to raise its own compensation, due to the 
long period of time that elapsed between its introduction and ratification.) 
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ECM used by Brown, the second Harlan, Kennedy, and other justices, provides a 
combination of fixedness and alterability that accommodates the use of UR.  The 
reasoning is framed as textual interpretation, not as extra-constitutional reasoning.  
Kennedy in Lawrence was interpreting due process liberty.  A distinction is drawn 
between the fixedness of the broad principles embodied in the text, and evolving 
understandings about their meaning within an ever-changing societal context.  In 
recognizing changes in constitutional meanings, the justices may reason about what is 
most essential to the protection of the core concepts and principles woven into the 
Constitution’s fabric. 
 The use of ECM, however, is also subject to criticism, and raises difficult 
questions.  One of the purposes of a written constitution is to fix certain understandings, 
in order to restrain future lawmakers.  If only extremely broad concepts are fixed, the 
nature of the remaining restraints is not clear.  Even if the justices do not purport to 
engage in extra-constitutional reasoning, the use of ECM opens justices to similar 
objections.  The broad concepts that the justices update with universalistic reasoning are 
vague and contested, and, some argue, leave justices with sizeable discretion. 
 The difficulties raised by the use of ECM are highlighted when we consider the 
sources for discerning changed meanings.  As noted, if the justices rely exclusively on 
UR, they are subject to charges of exercising unfettered discretion,321 but to which other 
                                                 
321 The justices have recognized concerns over the excessiveness of their own discretion since their earliest 
constitutional cases, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 398-99 (1798) (Iredell, J.), and it remains a major 
concern today.  In the Bowers majority opinion that Lawrence overturned, for example, White wrote: “Nor 
are we inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority to discover new fundamental rights 
imbedded in the Due Process Clause. The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when 
it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of 
the Constitution.” Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986).  See also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 
491 U.S. 110, 127 n. 6 (1989); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173-74 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 513 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting)  (“I do not believe that we are 
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sources may they refer?  Reliance on legislative trends may offer the appearance of 
greater objectivity, as one may count the number of states that have adopted this or that 
rule.  But the Constitution is supposed to restrain legislatures.  If legislative trends, in 
themselves, are self-justifying, then the Constitution ceases to act as an effective 
constraint on legislative actions. 
 Kennedy’s discussion of an “emerging awareness” referred to the actions of 
American state legislatures, foreign legislative and adjudicative bodies, and professional 
organizations, but did not explain why these sources were relevant to discerning changes 
in constitutional meanings.  Universalistic reasoning about the requirements of liberty 
was central to the decision.  The reference to apparently objective sources may be seen as 
providing insulation from criticism that the justices’ opinions are overly subjective.  
Without an explanation of the relevance of these sources, however, there is a risk of 
undermining the Constitution as a restraint on lawmakers that is independent of the 
lawmakers’ will (discussed further in ch. 7, F). 
 We will see in the following chapters that the tensions discussed here, and the 
difficulties associated with ECM, also emerge in other areas of the Court’s jurisprudence.  
                                                                                                                                                 
granted power by the Due Process Clause or any other constitutional provision or provisions to measure 
constitutionality by our belief that legislation is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or accomplishes no 
justifiable purpose, or is offensive to our own notions of ‘civilized standards of conduct.' Such an appraisal 
of the wisdom of legislation is an attribute of the power to make laws, not of the power to interpret them. 
The use by federal courts of such a formula or doctrine or whatnot to veto federal or state laws simply takes 
away from Congress and States the power to make laws based on their own judgment of fairness and 
wisdom and transfers that power to this Court for ultimate determination-a power which was specifically 
denied to federal courts by the convention that framed the Constitution.”); Loan Association v. Topeka, 87 
U.S. 655, 669 (1874) (Clifford, J., dissenting) (“Courts cannot nullify an act of the State legislature on the 
vague ground that they think it opposed to a general latent spirit supposed to pervade or underlie the 
constitution, where neither the terms nor the implications of the instrument disclose any such restriction.  
Such a power is denied to the courts, because to concede it would be to make the courts sovereign over 
both the constitution and the people, and convert the government into a judicial despotism.”).  In cases in 
which the Court has invalidated laws on SDP grounds, majority justices have often been at pains to make 
reassurances that the justices were not simply exercising unrestrained discretion.  See, e.g., Moore v. East 
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 Though procedural and substantive due process are based in the same 
constitutional provision, the Court’s jurisprudence in these two areas covers very 
different issue areas.  Within the Court’s PDP jurisprudence, this chapter focuses 
especially on questions concerning the applicability against the states of certain rights of 
criminal procedure, such as the right to a jury trial, and the right to counsel.  As noted, the 
Bill of Rights was long understood as applicable only against the federal government.  
With the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, litigants argued that specific Bill of 
Rights provisions applied against states through that Amendment.322  Litigants also 
sometimes challenged state actions on the strength of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause alone.  The Court’s treatment of due process challenges to state criminal 
procedures may be divided into three time periods.  Section A discusses the late 
nineteenth century to the early 1930s, a period during which the Court did not invalidate 
state criminal procedures on due process grounds, but developed an evolutive, 
universalistic approach that it would later use (as discussed in sec. B) to examine, and 
sometimes invalidate state procedures, on a case-by-case basis.  Section C discusses the 
“selective incorporation” approach, which the Court adopted in 1961. 
A. Early Procedural Due Process--the Use of a Universal,  
 Evolutive Approach, While Rejecting Challenges to State Procedures 
  
 Although the chapter focuses on the Fourteenth Amendment, it is useful to begin 
with the tradition-based “settled usages” approach that the Court adopted in its first major 
decision addressing due process, though the case was decided under the Fifth 
Amendment.  At issue in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. 
                                                 
322 As with substantive due process, early on, both the Privileges and Immunities and Due Process Clauses 
were commonly appealed to as vehicles for the application of the Bill of Rights against the states, but, in 
the long run, only the due process argument remained important.   
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(1855)323 was the federal government’s use of a summary procedure (without a judicial 
hearing), to recover from a customs collector who allegedly owed money to the United 
States.  The collector objected that his due process rights were violated because he was 
not afforded the usual procedural protections of a judicial hearing.  Since the government 
indisputably acted in accordance with procedures established by congressional 
legislation, the justices were faced with the question of whether the procedure provided 
by Congress satisfied the requirements of due process.  First, the Court definitively 
answered a threshold question.  Due process acted as a restraint on the legislature.  It did 
not require merely that the executive and judicial branches comply with applicable law.  
This threshold determination confronted the justices with the challenge of identifying 
standards for distinguishing valid from invalid procedures.  On what grounds was the 
Court to determine whether procedures enacted by Congress satisfied due process? 
 The Court turned to history for guidance.  If a procedure had roots in English 
common law, and had been maintained in this country since colonial times, then it 
satisfied due process: 
[W]e must look to those settled usages and modes of 
proceeding existing in the common and statute law of 
England, before the emigration of our ancestors, and which 
are shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and 
political condition by having been acted on by them after 
the settlement of this country.324
 
The Court upheld the summary procedures that had been applied against the collector, 
because there was a history, dating back to before independence, of using summary 
procedures for the collection of debts from receivers of the revenues.  Under this “settled 
                                                 
323 59 U.S. 272. 
324 59 U.S. at 277. 
 133
usages” test, historical pedigree was sufficient for constitutionality, though the decision 
did not say whether it was also necessary. 
 The Court rebuffed the earliest due process challenges brought under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, whether or not based on specific provisions of the Bill of 
Rights.325  While these early cases did not describe in detail the Court’s approach, the 
justices clearly did not adopt purely historical standards.  Instead, the Court suggested 
that due process entailed certain essential requirements.  Kennard v. Louisiana (1875),326 
for example, concerned a challenge to the state procedures by which a judge was 
removed from office.  In holding the procedures adequate, the Court observed that the 
removed judge “not only had the right to be heard, but he was in fact heard, both in the 
court in which the proceedings were originally instituted, and, upon his appeal, in the 
highest court of the State.”327  Rather than examining whether the challenged procedures 
had a basis in longstanding practices, the Court emphasized that the procedures provided 
certain elements which, the opinion implied, were critical to due process. 
 Two years later, in rejecting procedural and other challenges to a tax assessment 
on real property, a unanimous Court (Miller), citing Kennard stated: 
[I]t is not possible to hold that a party has, without due 
process of law, been deprived of his property, when, as 
regards the issues affecting it, he has, by the laws of the 
State, a fair trial in a court of justice, according to the 
modes of proceeding applicable to such a case.328  
 
The language suggested a “fair trial” as a guiding principle in assessing due process.  In a 
more specific examination of the challenged procedures, Miller observed that, before the 
                                                 
325 E.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1877); 
Kennard v. Louisiana, 92 U.S. 480 (1875); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875). 
326 92 U.S. 480. 
327 92 U.S. at 483. 
328 Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 105 (1877). 
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assessment could be made final, owners were afforded personal service of notice, an 
opportunity to object, and a full and fair hearing.  “If this be not due process of law,” 
Miller wrote, “then the words can have no definite meaning as used in the 
Constitution.”329  As in Kennard, the decision did not rest on an historical inquiry.  
Rather, the Court implied that certain requirements, such as notice, and an opportunity to 
be heard, were essential to due process. 
 Kennard and Davidson suggested that history might not be the only standard.  In 
Hurtado (1884),330 the Court explicitly adopted an evolutive approach to PDP.  The case 
concerned a right set forth in the Bill of Rights--the Fifth Amendment’s grand jury 
requirement: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . .”  The defendant was 
convicted of murder, after being charged by information, without a grand jury.  By 
dispensing with the grand jury, the state departed from a procedure with deep historical 
roots in American law.  The Court (J. Stanley Matthews) stated that due process allowed 
for the development of new procedures.  The settled usages test from Murray’s Lessee 
meant only that historical pedigree validated a procedure.  It did not mean that only 
procedures with historical pedigree qualified as due process: 
[T]o hold that [a longstanding history] is essential to due 
process of law, would be to deny every quality of the law 
but its age, and to render it incapable of progress or 
improvement. It would be to stamp upon our jurisprudence 
the unchangeableness attributed to the laws of the Medes 
and Persians.331
 
                                                 
329 96 U.S. at 105-06. 
330 110 U.S. 516. 
331 110 U.S. at 529. 
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It “would be all the more singular and surprising” to allow only traditional procedures “in 
this quick and active age,” when one considered “the progressive development of legal 
ideas and institutions in England,” and how much understandings about rights had 
evolved since the Magna Carta.332  Procedures considered acceptable in twelfth-century 
England would be considered barbaric today.  The ordeal of water, if failed, led to the 
loss of the defendant’s right hand and foot, followed by exile.  Those who passed were 
exiled regardless.  Grand juries at one time did not hear witnesses, but made charges on 
reputation and general suspicion.  Given the extent of change in beliefs:  
it is better not to go too far back into antiquity for the best 
securities for our ‘ancient liberties.’ It is more consonant to 
the true philosophy of our historical legal institutions to say 
that the spirit of personal liberty and individual right, which 
they embodied, was preserved and developed by a 
progressive growth and wise adaptation to new 
circumstances and situations of the forms and processes 
found fit to give, from time to time, new expression and 
greater effect to modern ideas of self-government.333 
 
The Constitution “was made for an undefined and expanding future.”  Constitutional 
meanings must not be too rigidly tied to American traditions, because, while it was true 
that the Constitution “was ordained . . . by descendants of Englishmen, who inherited the 
traditions of the English law and history,” the Constitution was made “for a people 
gathered, and to be gathered, from many nations and of many tongues.”  Matthews 
seemed to equate due process of law with justice: 
[W]hile we take just pride in the principles and institutions 
of the common law, we are not to forget that in lands where 
other systems of jurisprudence prevail, the ideas and 
processes of civil justice are also not unknown.  Due 
process of law, in spite of the absolutism of continental 
governments, is not alien to that Code which survived the 
                                                 
332 110 U.S. at 529. 
333 110 U.S. at 530. 
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Roman empire as the foundation of modern civilization in 
Europe. 
 
He referred to the Magna Carta as a “broad charter of public right and law,” and implied 
that the Constitution should be viewed that way, open to “the best ideas of all systems 
and of every age.”  The common law drew: 
its inspiration from every fountain of justice, [and] we are 
not to assume that the sources of its supply have been 
exhausted. On the contrary, we should expect that the new 
and various experiences of our own situation and system 
will mould and shape it into new and not useful forms.334
 
 Hurtado’s implications were more far-reaching than it acknowledged.  In Hurtado 
itself, ECM was used to allow a procedure despite its lack of historical pedigree.  The 
reasoning, however, equally supported the use of ECM to adopt new restrictions on 
legislatures.  Matthews’s historical examples of shifts in legal understandings included 
changes in the direction of expanded rights.  The discussion laid the groundwork for 
acceptance of the notion that even procedures that once had the status of “settled usages” 
might later be invalidated as inconsistent with fundamental rights and the basic 
requirements of due process.335
 ECM throws off the yoke of history.  But which standards take its place?  In 
Hurtado, Matthews turned to a variety of USEs.  He quoted Loan Association v. Topeka 
(1874) (ch. 3, A(1)) for the proposition that there were “rights in every free government 
beyond the control of the state. . . A government which recognized no such rights . . . is 
after all but a despotism.”336  Any procedure that “preserves these principles of liberty 
                                                 
334 110 U.S. at 530-31. 
335 In the area of SDP, too, ECM was initially used to loosen traditional restrictions on government.  E.g., 
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898). 
336 Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 536-37 (quoting Loan Association v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 662 (1874)). 
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and justice, must be held to be due process of law.”337  Due process served as a bulwark 
“against any arbitrary legislation,” and guaranteed, “not particular forms of procedure, 
but the very substance of individual rights to life, liberty, and property.”338  Asserting an 
MRR formulation that has been widely used, Matthews stated that due process required 
states to operate “within the limits of those fundamental principles of liberty and justice 
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.” 
 From these USEs, Matthews derived IMPs.  Conformity with the requirements of 
law included that, to be valid, legislation had to be general, and “not a special rule for a 
particular person or a particular case.”  A valid law “hears before it condemns, . . . 
proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial.”339  Matthews also echoed 
IMPs the Court had applied in its SDP340 and Contract Clause jurisprudence,341 stating 
that the requirements of law also prohibited “acts of confiscation,” and “acts directly 
transferring one man's estate to another.”342  Applying these principles, the Court upheld 
the defendant’s conviction, concluding that charging the defendant by information did not 
violate his fundamental rights. 
 In the decades following Hurtado, a majority continued to apply the basic 
elements of the approach that it outlined, including the determination that legislatures 
were not bound by historical practices, and the reliance on USEs to determine which 
departures from historical practices satisfied the requirements of due process.  In Brown 
v. New Jersey (1899), for example, citing Hurtado, the Court (J. David Brewer) 
                                                 
337 110 U.S. at 537. 
338 110 U.S. at 532. 
339 110 U.S. at 535. 
340 E.g., Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 102 (1877); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 
166 U.S. 226, 236-37 (1897). 
341 E.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 135 (1810). 
342 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 536 (1884). 
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confirmed that a state was “not tied down by any provision of the Federal Constitution to 
the practice and procedure which existed at the common law,” and that it “may avail 
itself of the wisdom gathered by the experience of the century to make such changes as 
may be necessary.”343  The defendant challenged the “struck jury” procedures (regarding 
the number of peremptory challenges allowed to the prosecution and defense), which the 
state followed in his murder trial.  While the Court conceded that these struck jury 
procedures had not historically been used in murder trials, traditional practice was not 
decisive.  Instead, the Court held that states could depart from the common law, as long 
as “no fundamental right of the defendant is trespassed upon.”344  The inquiry was not 
simply whether the challenged procedure had a historical pedigree, but whether it was 
“fair and reasonable,” and consistent with “principles of liberty and justice.”  Within this 
frame of inquiry, however, the Court did not ignore history.  Observing that the common 
law had deemed the struck jury acceptable for lesser offenses, Brewer reasoned that it 
“could hardly be deemed essentially bad when applied to other offenses.”345  In 
determining the procedure’s fairness, Brewer extracted its core purpose, which was to 
select an impartial jury.  Since the procedures afforded the defendant a reasonable 
opportunity to discern the potential jurors’ qualifications, and to guard against the 
inclusion of jurors with biases, he could not object that the impaneling was unfair. 
 In West v. Louisiana (1904),346 too, the Court confronted a challenge to the state’s 
departure from common law.  The defendant argued that the admission of a deposition at 
                                                 
343 175 U.S. 172, 175. 
344 175 U.S. at 175; see also Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 605 (1900) (allowing an eight-member jury in 
a criminal case, although it departed from the twelve-member jury traditionally used at common law, 
because it did not “work a denial of fundamental rights.”). 
345 175 U.S. at 176. 
346 194 U.S. 258. 
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trial violated due process.347  The admission appeared not to fall within common law 
procedures, because depositions traditionally were considered admissible only under 
specified circumstances, none of which applied.348  The Court held the procedure was not 
necessarily invalid even if it departed from common law.  Citing Hurtado, Brown, and 
Holden,349 the Court recognized that states were entitled to alter common law.  The 
standard was not history, but whether procedures were reasonable under the 
circumstances, or deprived the defendant of a “fundamental and absolutely all-important 
right.”  The defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine at the deposition.  Common 
law clearly allowed admission where the witness was unavailable for certain reasons.  
Observing that the admission constituted only “a slight extension of the rule of the 
common law,” and not a change of “fundamental character,” the Court found that the 
deposition’s admission was not unfair, and, therefore, did not violate due process.350  
 Twining v. New Jersey (1908)351 presented the question of whether the states were 
bound by a specific Bill of Rights protection--the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against 
self-incrimination: “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself.”  The Court did not consider the privilege’s long history of observance 
binding, declining to accept that “the procedure of the first half of the seventeenth 
century would be fastened upon the American jurisprudence like a straight jacket, only to 
be unloosed by constitutional amendment.”352  Again, needing a standard beyond history, 
                                                 
347 The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him,” but, since the Court considered that Amendment applicable only against the federal government, the 
analysis was limited to whether the admission of the deposition violated the Fourteenth Amendment.   
348 Common law allowed admission of a deposition for a witness’s inability to testify due to death, poor 
health, or the defendant’s interference, but the witness in West had simply left the state.   
349 Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898). 
350 West, 194 U.S. at 263-64. 
351 211 U.S. 78. 
352 211 U.S. at 101. 
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the Court looked to USEs.  Justice William H. Moody cited Holden for the proposition 
that: “There are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of 
free government which no member of the Union may disregard.”353  In deciding whether 
a specific right fell within due process, the question was whether it represented: 
a fundamental principle of liberty and justice which inheres 
in the very idea of free government and is the inalienable 
right of a citizen of such a government?354
 
The Court had to determine whether the privilege against self-incrimination was “an 
immutable principle of justice which is the inalienable possession of every citizen of a 
free government.”355  Employing an MRR formulation from Hurtado, Moody stated that, 
in exercising their “inherent and reserved powers,”--i.e., the police powers--the states 
were free to adopt a diversity of practices, provided that those powers were “exerted 
within the limits of those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the 
base of all our civil and political institutions.”356  Having set forth USEs, Moody 
identified as IMPs the requirements that trials be conducted by a court with jurisdiction, 
that affected parties be afforded notice of the proceedings, and an opportunity to be 
heard, and that courts act “not arbitrarily, but in conformity with a general law, upon 
evidence.”357  Highlighting the interrelation between PDP and SDP jurisprudence, Moody 
also referred to the “inviolability of private property.”358
 Though history was not the ultimate standard, the Court did refer to history in 
applying USEs to the question of whether states were bound by the privilege.  In 
                                                 
353 211 U.S. at 102 (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898)). 
354 211 U.S. at 106. 
355 211 U.S. at 113; see also Turpin v. Lemon, 187 U.S. 51 (1902).  In Turpin, the Court stated that, in 
evaluating West Virginia’s procedures for selling property upon the owner’s failure to pay taxes, it was 
necessary to consider whether the procedures were “in conformity with natural justice.” 187 U.S. at 57. 
356 211 U.S. at 102. 
357 211 U.S. at 111. 
358 211 U.S. at 113. 
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conducting its historical analysis, the Court combined universalistic and particularistic 
elements, by drawing a distinction between rights that were merely “secured by specific 
constitutional safeguards,” and those that enjoyed “a sanctity above and before 
constitutions themselves.”359  The fact that a  practice had been followed historically was 
not, in itself, decisive.  A practice followed only because it was thought “just and useful,” 
or had been “proved by experience to be expedient” did not carry much weight.  What 
did carry weight was a practice that had been maintained specifically because it was 
believed to be required by universalistic principles.  Moody asked whether the practice 
had been upheld because it was considered to be an “unchangeable principle of universal 
justice,” or one “ranked among the fundamental and inalienable rights of mankind,” or 
one without which freedom, liberty, and justice could not exist.360  Inclusion in the 
Constitution, alone, did not answer the question of whether a practice had been thought 
required by universalistic standards.  In Twining, the defendant was seeking the 
protection of a right explicitly protected by the Bill of Rights, but the Court concluded 
that it was not protected by due process.  Moody’s historical examination covered: (1) 
pre-Constitutional America; (2) “the great instruments in which we are accustomed to 
look for the declaration of the fundamental rights”;361 and (3) the practices of the 
individual states.  He also looked beyond American law, observing that: 
The wisdom of the [privilege against self-incrimination] 
has never been universally assented to since the days of 
Bentham, many doubt it to-day . . . It has no place in the 
jurisprudence of civilized and free countries outside the 
domain of the common law . . .362
 
                                                 
359 211 U.S. at 113. 
360 211 U.S. at 107, 113. 
361 211 U.S. at 107. 
362 211 U.S. at 113. 
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The absence of uniformity, and the presence of doubt, were counted against the 
privilege’s status as a fundamental right.  In sum, Moody found that the weight of 
evidence indicated that the privilege had not been widely understood as embodying a 
fundamental principle that was indispensable to the protection of liberty.   
 At the time Twining was handed down, the Court had yet to invalidate a state 
criminal procedure under the Fourteenth Amendment (Roche 1964, 129), having rejected 
arguments that due process encompassed the right to a jury trial in a civil case,363 the 
right to a twelve-member jury trial in a criminal case,364 and the right in criminal cases to 
be charged by the presentment or indictment of a grand jury.365  Through these decisions, 
however, the Court developed an approach that left the door open for later Courts to find 
state procedures violated due process.  Within the REP framework, the initial inquiry was 
whether challenged procedures accorded with USEs, such as the fundamental 
requirements of a free government, and the indispensable elements of liberty and justice.  
From these USEs, the justices identified IMPs, such as the requirements that: laws act in 
a general, and not arbitrary manner; criminal defendants be given notice and an 
opportunity to be heard; verdicts be rendered only after trial.  More specific applications 
of these principles were worked out on a case-by-case basis.  Though the overarching 
standard was universalistic, the justices did refer to history, though its precise role was 
not always clear.  In a number of cases, including Hurtado, Brown, and West, the Court 
emphasized that a challenged procedure was only a minor extension of a procedure 
approved at common law.  Twining looked to history for guidance as to whether the right 
in question was fundamental. 
                                                 
363 Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875). 
364 Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900). 
365 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). 
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 Although the cases described showed a remarkable degree of consensus (in each 
of them, either the Court was unanimous or Harlan was the lone dissenter), Harlan 
emerged during this period as an important critic of the Court’s evolutive, universalistic 
approach.  Like Iredell (ch. 2, A), Harlan’s approach was consistent with the Delegative 
Model, with its emphasis on constitutional text and tradition.  Unlike the majority, Harlan 
viewed history as decisive.  In Hurtado,366 for example, Harlan considered the grand jury 
requirement binding on the states.  He opposed the majority’s approach, which allowed 
modifications to historical practices if the justices found them to be consistent with 
fundamental principles.  In Maxwell v. Dow (1900), the majority held that a state’s use of 
an eight-member criminal jury did not violate due process (even though the Sixth 
Amendment was understood as guaranteeing a twelve-member jury in the federal 
context).  In dissent, Harlan renewed his argument against ECM, endorsing the settled 
usages test from Murray’s Lessee.  For Harlan, the test meant, not only that procedures 
with historical pedigree were valid, but also that procedures lacking it were invalid.  He 
rejected the majority’s distinction in Twining between rights merely secured by the 
Constitution, and principles believed so fundamental that they did not depend on 
constitutional enactment for their existence.  For Harlan, inclusion in the Constitution 
was the critical indication of a right’s importance.  Constitutional rights represented: 
guaranties of life and liberty that English-speaking people 
have for centuries regarded as vital to personal security, 
and which the men of the revolutionary period universally 
claimed as the birthright of freemen.367
 
Harlan did not view any of the Bill of Rights protections as rules merely thought 
expedient.  To the contrary: “To say of any people that they do not enjoy those privileges 
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367 Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 617 (1900) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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and immunities [protected in the Bill of Rights] is to say that they do not enjoy real 
freedom.”368  Allowing departures from these protections, as they were understood by the 
Founding generation, would be to allow for the dilution of precious rights.  In a similar 
vein, in support of his position in his Twining dissent that the Fourteenth Amendment 
encompassed the privilege against self-incrimination, Harlan stated: 
[W]hen the present government of the United States was 
established it was the belief of all liberty-loving men in 
America that real, genuine freedom could not exist in any 
country that recognized the power of government to compel 
persons accused of crime to be witnesses against 
themselves. And it is not too much to say that the wise men 
who laid the foundations of our constitutional government 
would have stood aghast at the suggestion that immunity 
from self-incrimination was not among the essential, 
fundamental principles of English law.369
 
Although the Court had not yet employed it, Harlan anticipated and rejected the concept 
of selective incorporation, by which the justices might decide that some Bill of Rights 
provisions merited Fourteenth Amendment protection while others did not.370  The 
Constitution protected the right to a criminal jury trial, and that right had been historically 
understood as guaranteeing a twelve-member jury.  If the American people wanted to 
alter that requirement, they could do so by amending the Constitution.  The justices had 
no authority to alter the Constitution’s meaning, or to selectively enforce its mandates.  
 Harlan, then, favored an approach to due process that was markedly distinct from 
that of the majority.  It would be an over-simplification, however, to suggest that Harlan 
looked to history while the majority looked to universalistic principles.  The two were 
necessarily interconnected.  Disagreement concerned the nature of the interconnection.  
                                                 
368 176 U.S. at 615 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
369 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 118 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
370 176 U.S. at 616-17 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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The majority constructed its framework around USEs, and viewed history as a useful 
starting point in conducting their fundamentally universalistic inquiry.  The historical 
analysis was not, in itself, determinative.  In one case, the justices might find the 
traditional common law rules indispensable, while in another they might allow 
modifications.  In making such distinctions, the majority justices referred to standards 
transcending the practices that happened to be in force at a particular time in a particular 
place.  In contrast, Harlan saw the Constitution as an unalterable guide to due process.  
All Bill of Rights protections applied against the states.  Harlan was wedded to the 
decisions about rights that the Framers had made by including them in the Constitution.  
At the same time, Harlan emphasized that the Framers considered these rights as essential 
to liberty.  For Harlan, the best way to pursue law in conformity with USEs was through 
history--through strict adherence to the Framers’ directives. 
B. The Court Employs the Universal, Evolutive Framework 
 to Invalidate State Procedures, on a Case-by Case Basis 
 
 Powell v. Alabama (1932)371 was the first case in which the Court used its 
fundamental rights framework to invalidate state procedures.  In that case, a number of 
defendants, young black males, challenged their rape convictions (a capital crime) on the 
grounds that they had been denied the right to a counsel.  The facts of the case were 
egregious.  They were tried within a community so intensely hostile to them, for racial 
reasons, that they frequently had to be accompanied by military guard.  The colloquy 
between the trial judge and the appointed counsel suggested an appallingly casual attitude 
towards ensuring that the defendants received adequate assistance.  The issue before the 
Court was the trial judge’s handling of the defendants’ access to legal advice.  The Court 
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employed the REP framework described in the previous section, which included the 
identification of notice and a hearing as IMPs.  The question could be framed, then, as 
whether the right to acquire counsel was essential to the right to a hearing.  The Court 
(Sutherland) found that it was: “The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little 
avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.”372  Even the most 
educated defendants required legal advice at every step of the proceedings.  Without 
advice, even defendants with a strong defense would be in danger of conviction.  The 
danger would greater for defendants, like those in Powell, who were not highly educated.  
Therefore, it would be a denial of due process to arbitrarily deny a defendant the 
opportunity to retain counsel.  Considering the facts of the case (including the 
defendants’ youth and lack of education, the hostile community in which they found 
themselves, and the difficulty of communication with their friends and families), 
Sutherland concluded that the trial judge’s management of the trial violated due process.  
He went further.  Under the circumstances, the defendants’ need for counsel was so 
pressing that the judge’s failure to ensure the appointment of effective counsel also 
violated due process.  In a capital case, where the defendants were uneducated and in dire 
need of legal assistance, a right to appointed counsel followed as “a logical corollary 
from the constitutional right to be heard by counsel.”373  The opinion stressed the facts of 
the case, and did not state that due process required the appointment of counsel in every 
criminal case in which defendants were unable to retain counsel for themselves. 
 Sutherland also briefly considered practices, historical and contemporary.  First, 
under the settled usages test, Sutherland observed that there was no longstanding history 
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of denying defendants the right to counsel.  To the contrary, American law had always 
afforded defendants the right to aid of counsel.  The right, therefore, could not be denied 
on historical grounds.  With respect to contemporary practice, Sutherland also observed 
that the federal government, as well as all of the states, required a trial judge in cases 
involving serious crimes to appoint counsel where the defendant could not retain counsel.  
“A rule adopted with such unanimous accord reflects, if it does not establish,” said 
Sutherland, “the inherent right to have counsel appointed at least in cases like the present, 
and lends convincing support to the conclusion we have reached as to the fundamental 
nature of that right.”374  Like earlier opinions, the analysis combined UR with analysis of 
historical and present practices.  Uniformity of practice was cited as evidence supporting 
the right’s universalistic status. 
 While Powell might be considered to have left some ambiguity concerning the 
extent to which its holding hinged on the circumstances (Smith 1985, 77; Easterbrook 
1982, 106), the opinion strongly suggested its conclusion was dependent on the facts.  
Indeed, for nearly the next three decades, a majority of the Court employed an approach 
that employed USEs on a case-by-case approach, emphasizing the importance of 
circumstances.  Due process did not guarantee a list of accepted procedures, but treatment 
in conformity with USEs.  The Court used a variety of formulations in articulating the 
universalistic standards by which cases were to be adjudged.  Each individual was 
entitled to “fundamental justice,” and rights “basic to our free society.”375  A principle of 
due process was binding on states if it expressed an “immutable principle of justice,” 376 
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 148
or was “dictated by natural, inherent, and fundamental principles of fairness.”377  When a 
defendant challenged the manner in which a trial was conducted, the question was 
whether the “trial is offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and 
right.378  The justices asked whether the state procedures employed were “repugnant to 
the conscience of mankind,”379 or to “the universal sense of justice.”380  If a party 
protested the failure of the state to provide a given procedural right, the justices inquired 
whether, if the procedure were abolished, liberty or a fair and enlightened system of 
justice would still be possible.381  As in other time periods and issue areas, the Court also 
employed MRR formulations, such as whether a challenged state procedure “offends 
some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be 
ranked as fundamental,”382 or whether the procedure at issue violated those “fundamental 
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political 
institutions.”383  One of the most commonly used formulations was first articulated in 
Palko v. Connecticut (1937), in which the Court inquired whether the asserted right was 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”384  In his opinion for the Court in Palko, 
Justice Benjamin Cardozo perhaps best captured the universalistic spirit of the Court’s 
approach, stating it was “dictated by a study and appreciation of the meaning, the 
essential implications, of liberty itself.”385  Cardozo indicated that the same universalistic 
framework applied in SDP and PDP cases.  The Court’s decision to apply the freedoms of 
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speech and press against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment was a result of the 
same overarching analysis as its decision to require the assistance of counsel in Powell--
the rights at stake were essential to liberty.386
 The case-by-case approach enabled the Court to avoid issuing rigid rules.  In 
evaluating due process challenges, the justices were guided, not by whether a specific 
rule was technically violated, but, rather, by whether, in the totality of the circumstances, 
the process provided was fair and just.  Due process, a majority of the justices 
maintained, “conveys neither formal nor fixed nor narrow requirements.”387  It was 
critical to avoid “the tyranny of labels,” which was “a fertile source of perversion in 
constitutional theory.”388  Compliance with a given rule might be necessary to justice on 
one set of facts, but unnecessary on another.  Rules adopted “under the pressure” of 
“particular situations” might prompt the framing of a rules that would turn out to be 
irrelevant to justice in different situations.  As Cardozo wrote: 
Due process of law requires that the proceedings shall be 
fair, but fairness is a relative, not an absolute, concept. It is 
fairness with reference to particular conditions or particular 
results. .  What is fair in one set of circumstances may be 
an act of tyranny in others.389
 
 Snyder v. Massachusetts (1939), Betts v Brady (1942), and Palko are good 
examples of the Court’s universalistic, case-by-case approach during this period.  In 
Snyder, the trial judge had denied the defendant’s request to be present while the jury was 
taken to a viewing of the crime scene.  The Court declined to hold that due process 
always entitled a defendant to be present during a viewing.  Instead, the Court examined 
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the circumstances, noting that the defendant’s counsel had been permitted to attend the 
viewing, and that the defendant disputed neither the location shown to the jurors, nor 
anything stated to jurors.  The critical requirement was that the defendant be ensured an 
opportunity to defend.  The defendant had failed to show how his absence from the 
viewing impeded that opportunity, or led to injustice.390  Under the specific 
circumstances, the defendant’s inability to attend the viewing did not deprive him of a 
fundamentally fair trial, though the Court did not rule out the possibility that, under 
different circumstances, a defendant’s inability to attend a viewing would violate due 
process. 
 Similarly, in Betts,391 the Court focused on the overall fairness and justice of the 
trial.  Like Powell, Betts concerned the right to appointed counsel.  The defendant, 
indicted for robbery and unable financially to hire his own counsel, requested the 
appointment of counsel.  The trial judge denied the request, since the applicable law 
provided for the appointment of counsel only in rape and murder cases, leaving the 
defendant to handle his own defense at trial.  The Court held that due process did not 
invariably require the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants.  The trial was 
relatively uncomplicated (turning on the veracity of witnesses supporting an alibi), and 
the defendant demonstrated familiarity with criminal procedure and facility in conducting 
the defense.  Under the circumstances, the denial of appointed counsel did not result in a 
fundamentally unfair trial.  The different outcomes in Powell and Betts turned on the 
different circumstances of the two cases.  
                                                 
390 See also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 54 (1947) (“For a state to require testimony from an 
accused is not necessarily a breach of a state's obligation to give a fair trial. Therefore, we must examine 
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 Palko also involved a due process challenge based on a Bill of Rights provision--
the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy prohibition:392  The defendant had been 
convicted of second-degree murder in the first trial.  A second trial was conducted, 
however, after the government successfully appealed from the verdict, as authorized by a 
Connecticut statute permitting the government to take appeals in criminal cases.  In the 
second trial, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder.  In the federal context, 
the Court previously had held that defendants could not be tried a second time on the 
government’s motion.  The Court, however, declined to apply the federal rule.  The state 
was not using multiple prosecutions to harass the defendant.  Since the defendant could 
have appealed, the state was merely asserting a “reciprocal privilege,” and attempting to 
achieve an error-free trial.  Accordingly, Cardozo found: “There is here no seismic 
innovation. The edifice of justice stands, its symmetry, to many, greater than before.”393
 Within the Court’s universalistic framework, IMPs operated as more specific 
expressions of USEs, viewed as lying at the heart of what fundamental fairness required.  
They included a competent court with jurisdiction, notice, and an opportunity to be heard.  
If they were violated, so, too, was the Constitution.  In Powell, for example, the 
defendants were effectively deprived of their right to be heard.  Consequently, their right 
to due process was violated.  By contrast, in Snyder, since the defendant’s inability to 
attend the viewing did not deprive him of his opportunity to be heard, no due process 
violation occurred.  As Cardozo explained in Snyder, certain privileges, such as the right 
to be heard in one’s defense, are “so obviously fundamental” that they can not 
constitutionally be disregarded.  A defendant who has been deprived of this right “has 
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lost something indispensable,” independent of any analysis of its effect on the result.394  
The “harmless error” approach did not extend to these essential elements of due process: 
The law . . . is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant 
charged with crime whatever forms of procedure are of the 
essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so 
fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial 
that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men 
will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however crushing 
may be the pressure of incriminating proof.395
 
 As in the period before Powell, the Court continued to recognize ECM.  Since it 
was “of the very nature of a free society to advance in its standards of what is deemed 
reasonable and right,” due process had to be viewed as a “living principle, and its 
meaning could not be confined within a permanent catalogue of what may at a given time 
be deemed the limits or the essentials of fundamental rights.”396  And, as in the earlier 
period, the Court, at the same time, found a role for historical analysis.  In line with the 
spirit of Murray’s Lessee, and with the Court’s use of common law in cases like Brown 
(1899) and West v. Louisiana (1904), the justices seemed to view longstanding practice 
as strong, though not dispositive, support for the validity of a given procedure.  In 
Snyder, for example, in discussing the trial court’s facilitation of an out-of-court viewing 
of evidence by the jury, Cardozo noted that this was a practice with a long history, and 
one adopted almost uniformly by the states.397
 The justices also seemed to view a lack of uniformity in historical and 
contemporary practice as evidence against a procedure being binding upon the states.  
That reasonable people could disagree over a procedure suggested it was not essential to 
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fairness and justice.  In Wolf v. Colorado (1949),398 for example, the Court considered 
whether due process required states to apply the exclusionary rule (preventing admission 
at trial of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment).  The Court had held 
thirty-five years earlier that the rule applied in federal court.399  In Wolf, the Court held 
that a principle “basic to a free society” lay at “the core of the Fourth Amendment”--“the 
security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police.”  Employing the 
prevailing universalistic framework, the Court found that this principle was applicable 
against the states, not because it was part of the Fourth Amendment, but because it was 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”400  Nevertheless, the Court (Frankfurter) held 
the rule did not bind states.  Frankfurter pointed to the lack of uniformity among the 
states with respect to enforcement of the exclusionary rule.  Before Weeks, only one of 
twenty-seven states had applied the exclusionary rule, and even after Weeks, a substantial 
majority still rejected it (by a count of 31-16).  The important point for the majority was 
not that there was a trend towards greater enforcement of the rule, but that significant 
disagreement remained.  Frankfurter did not limit his survey of practices to the United 
States.  He noted that, since Weeks, a number of jurisdictions within the United Kingdom 
had rejected the rule.  Finding that “most of the English-speaking world” did not consider 
the exclusionary rule as essential to the protection of the right against arbitrary police 
intrusion, Frankfurter wrote, “we must hesitate to treat this remedy as an essential 
ingredient of the right.”401  The possibility, and reality, of disagreement among 
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reasonable people militated against a finding that the rule rose to the level of a 
fundamental right: 
As a matter of inherent reason, one would suppose this to 
be an issue to which men with complete devotion to the 
protection of the right of privacy might give different 
answers.402
 
 In Betts v. Brady (1942),403 too, the Court (J. Owen Roberts) looked to history and 
practice as aids in applying USEs:  
Is the furnishing of counsel in all cases whatever dictated 
by natural, inherent, and fundamental principles of 
fairness? The answer to the question may be found in the 
common understanding of those who have lived under the 
Anglo-American system of law.404
 
In examining whether the right to appointed counsel “expresses a rule so fundamental 
and essential to a fair trial, and so, to due process of law, that it is made obligatory upon 
the states by the Fourteenth Amendment,” the Court found “relevant data” in the  
“constitutional and statutory provisions subsisting in the colonies and the states prior to 
the inclusion of the Bill of Rights in the national Constitution, and in the constitutional, 
legislative, and judicial history of the states to the present date.”  These sources, Roberts 
said, were the “most authoritative . . . for ascertaining the considered judgment of the 
citizens of the states upon the question.”405  Roberts’s examination of the sources did not 
show a uniform view in favor of providing counsel to all indigent defendants.  At 
common law, for example, the right to counsel had required only recognition of the 
defendant’s own counsel, not the appointment of counsel, and the original state 
constitutions reflected a good deal of diversity on the question.  In conducting the 
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historical analysis, Roberts employed a distinction similar to Moody’s in Twining.  The 
relevant inquiry was not how widely the right to counsel was afforded, but how widely it 
was considered essential to fairness.  Since the justices were probing the essential nature 
of a right, the most pertinent evidence was found in practices adhered to out of a belief 
that they were mandated by the basic requirements of justice.  Thus, Roberts, noted that, 
while some of the original states provided counsel, a number did so by statute, rather than 
by constitutional provisions.  Similarly, a substantial number of states at the time of the 
Betts decision provided counsel, but, again, many did so by way of statutory provisions, 
rather than through constitutional guarantees.  From his historical investigation, Roberts 
concluded that: 
in the great majority of the states, it has been the considered 
judgment of the people, their representatives and their 
courts that appointment of counsel is not a fundamental 
right, essential to a fair trial. On the contrary, the matter has 
generally been deemed one of legislative policy. In the light 
of this evidence we are unable to say that the concept of 
due process incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment 
obligates the states, whatever may be their own views, to 
furnish counsel in every such case.406
 
The absence of a consensus on the notion that appointed counsel was a fundamental right 
supported the Court’s finding that the right was not required by due process. 
 Even dissenting opinions of the justices themselves could be cited as evidence for 
the possibility of reasonable disagreement as to the essential nature of a right.  In a 1904 
case, Kepner v. U.S.,407 the Court had held that the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy 
provision was violated, not only when the state brought a new and independent second 
case against a defendant for the same alleged crime, but also when the state brought a 
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retrial of the same case upon its own motion.  In Palko, interpreting the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court declined to apply the Kepner rule against the states.  In support of 
the Court’s holding, Cardozo pointed to the dissenting opinion in Kepner, endorsed by 
three justices, as evidence that “right-minded men could reasonably believe” that by 
arguing for a state’s authority to retry a defendant on the prosecution’s motion, “they 
were not favoring a practice repugnant to the conscience of mankind.”408
 While many justices viewed disagreement over the essential nature of a right as 
evidence against a right’s fundamental status, it did not necessarily follow that 
widespread observance of a right brought it within due process.  In Adamson v. 
California (1947),409 the defendant challenged the state law that allowed the prosecution 
to use his failure to testify against him at trial.  The Court (J. Stanley Reed) conceded that 
the general rule among the states was to prohibit comment by the prosecution on the 
failure of a defendant to testify, but, nevertheless, concluded that states were free to 
depart from that practice.  The decision ultimately did not turn on the prevalence of the 
practice, but on the majority’s own reasoning about the nature of the right.  Although 
California was one of only a few states that permitted comment on a defendant’s failure 
to testify, it did so within narrow confines.  The state’s policy did not provide for any 
presumptions as to facts or guilt based on the failure to testify, but simply allowed the 
jury to draw inferences from undisputed facts.  The policy did not deprive the defendant 
of an essential element of due process, such as the right to be heard.  If a defendant chose 
not to contradict inculpatory evidence, it was fair and reasonable for the prosecution to 
incorporate this fact into its case.  Thus, while the justices looked to history and practice 
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as evidence bearing on whether a right was fundamental, USEs were the Court’s 
touchstone, not the accounting of practices in itself. 
 Since the due process framework was built around USEs, and the avoidance of 
rigid rules, the Court, during this period, declined to treat specific Bill of Rights 
provisions as binding on the states.410  There might be rights included within due process 
that were also included in the Bill of Rights, but inclusion in the Bill of Rights was 
neither sufficient nor necessary for Fourteenth Amendment protection.  Moreover, even if 
the Court did uphold a right that also happened to be included within the Bill of Rights, it 
did not apply the right as a rigid rule, but, rather, evaluated each claim on case by case 
basis.  Thus, in Powell, the Court found that the defendant’s right to the assistance of 
counsel required the trial judge to appoint counsel, but, on different facts in Betts, found 
that the appointment of counsel was unnecessary.  While many due process challenges 
suggested associations with Bill of Rights provisions, the Court at times addressed claims 
that did not fall as easily into an analysis drawing on analogies to explicitly protected 
constitutional rights.411  The significant point here, however, is that whether a due process 
claim could be framed in terms of any specific Bill of Rights protections was, strictly 
speaking, irrelevant.  The approach, not surprisingly, led to substantial differences 
between the rights available in the federal and state contexts. 
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 While it was not until Mapp v. Ohio (1961)412 that a majority adopted selective 
incorporation, a number of justices advocated a different approach well before that time.  
Black was one of the most important critics of the Court’s case-by-case, universalistic 
approach.  As noted (ch. 3, G), Black opposed ECM.  Indeed, like the first Harlan, Black 
also advocated a version of the Delegative Model.  He argued that the Fourteenth 
Amendment made the entire Bill of Rights applicable against the states, and that the 
scope of due process was limited to the contents of the Bill of Rights.  Black’s position 
did not rest on his own analysis of what was essential to freedom or implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty.  Rather, it rested on his view of the intent of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Framers.413  The Court’s approach assumed the justices were: 
endowed by the Constitution with boundless power under 
‘natural law’ periodically to expand and contract 
constitutional standards to conform to the Court’s 
conception of what at a particular time constitutes ‘civilized 
decency’ and ‘fundamental principles of liberty and 
justice.’414
  
Citing Iredell’s opinion in Calder,415 Black argued that the majority’s approach suffered 
from a fatal defect--natural law provided no authority upon which the justices were 
entitled to act.416  Within the American constitutional system, the government was “one 
of limited powers,” and the Court’s authority was derived from, and circumscribed by, 
the Constitution.417  Nothing in the document bestowed upon the Court the authority to 
strike down governmental acts deemed unreasonable.418  The lack of authority was 
related to another problem in the Court’s natural law approach--its indeterminacy.  
                                                 
412 367 U.S. 643. 
413 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
414 332 U.S. at 69 (Black, J., dissenting). 
415 332 U.S. at 91 n. 18 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
416 332 U.S. at 70 (Black, J., dissenting). 
417 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 383 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting). 
418 Rochin v. CA, 342 U.S. 165, 176 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting). 
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Without direction from the text, natural law was “entirely too speculative.”419  As an 
evaluative standard, asking whether a right was among the “immutable and fundamental 
principles of justices” provided inadequate guidance.  Black’s argument was highly 
evocative of Iredell, who had criticized the use of “natural justice” by “speculative 
jurists.”420   
 For Black, the indeterminacy of natural law was associated with the exercise of 
excessive judicial discretion.  While there was always a risk that judicial interpretations 
would inappropriately contract or expand the text’s original purposes, the natural law 
approach exacerbated the risk.  Excessive judicial discretion threatened the rule of law in 
a democratic society in which the “Constitution entrusts” the role of policymaking “to the 
legislative representatives of the people.”  Under the Court’s approach, judges were free 
to “roam at will in the limitless area of their own beliefs as to reasonableness and actually 
select policies.”421  Rather than serving as a proper means of enforcing constitutional 
mandates, the natural law formula was itself a violation of the Constitution “in that it 
subtly conveys to courts, at the expense of legislatures, ultimate power over public 
policies in fields where no specific provision of the Constitution limits legislative 
power.”422  Black observed, too, that the risk of improper interpretation ran in both 
directions.  The justices might enforce limitations on legislatures where none existed, and 
also might fail to enforce clearly established limitations.  Thus, Black objected that the 
                                                 
419 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 90 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
420 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 398 (1798). 
421 Adamson, 332 U.S. at 92 (Black, J., dissenting). 
422 332 U.S. at 95 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
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Court had nullified Bill of Rights protections, and, at the same time, expressed concerns 
over the Court’s meddling in “the future economic affairs of this country.”423
 Black’s approach enabled justices to proceed “within clearly marked 
constitutional boundaries [and] seek to execute policies written into the Constitution.”424  
In contrast, the Court’s evolutive approach reflected the majority’s impression of the Bill 
of Rights as an “outworn 18th Century strait jacket” some of whose provisions amounted 
to “outdated abstractions.”  Black acknowledged that the Bill of Rights was “designed to 
meet ancient evils,” but argued that the basic problems it addressed were “the same kind 
of human evils that have emerged from century to century wherever excessive power is 
sought by the few at the expense of the many.”  In Black’s judgment: 
the people of no nation can lose their liberty so long as a 
Bill of Rights like ours survives and its basic purposes are 
conscientiously interpreted, enforced and respected so as to 
afford continuous protection against old, as well as new, 
devices and practices which might thwart those purposes.425
 
Viewing text as the critical standard, Black rejected the notion that the judges should 
recognize changes in constitutional meanings.  The proper means of changing the 
Constitution was through amendments enacted by the people, not by judicial fiat.  
“[F]aithful adherence to the specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights,” Black asserted, 
“insures a more permanent protection of individual liberty than that which can be 
afforded by the nebulous standards” endorsed by a majority of the justices.426
 Black’s arguments were striking similar to Harlan’s.  Both were ultimately 
interested in universalistic ends (protecting against the “human evils that have emerged . . 
                                                 
423 Rochin v. CA, 342 U.S. 165, 177 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting). 
424 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 91-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
425 332 U.S. at 89 (1947). 
426 Rochin, 342 U.S. at 175 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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. wherever excessive power is sought”), but believed that justices best furthered them 
through particularistic means (strict enforcement of enacted law).  By eschewing appeals 
to open-ended universalistic standards, Black’s method promised to limit judicial 
discretion.  A consequence of Black’s approach (which Black did not regret) was that it 
closed off possibilities for recognizing limitations on government that enjoyed 
widespread acceptance though not mentioned in the text,427 or for recognizing changes in 
constitutional meanings based on evolving public morality. 
 Some of Black’s colleagues agreed with one element of his position (application 
of the entire Bill of Rights against states) while disagreeing with another (limitation of 
due process to Bill of Rights protections).  In Adamson, for example, Murphy (joined by 
J. Wiley Rutledge) wrote that, while in “substantial agreement” with Black, he did not 
agree that the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections was: 
entirely and necessarily limited by the Bill of Rights. 
Occasions may arise where a proceeding falls so far short 
of conforming to fundamental standards of procedure as to 
warrant constitutional condemnation in terms of a lack of 
due process despite the absence of a specific provision in 
the Bill of Rights.428
 
Douglas, too, while joining in Black’s Adamson dissent, elsewhere made clear that he 
endorsed a “total incorporation plus” approach--due process included the entire Bill of 
Rights, but was not limited to it.429  The distinction between “total incorporation” and 
“total incorporation plus” sometimes implied different results.  In In Re Winship 
                                                 
427 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that due process mandated the “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” burden of proof in criminal cases).  
428 Adamson, 332 U.S. at 124 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
429 See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Though I believe that ‘due 
process' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment includes all of the first eight Amendments, I do not think it 
is restricted and confined to them.”).
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(1970),430 for example, Douglas joined the majority’s holding that due process 
encompassed the right to be convicted only upon a verdict issued in accordance with the 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” burden of proof.  In dissent, Black rejected the right’s 
constitutional status, arguing that it had no basis in the text. 
 The fault line in the Court during this period is reflected in the persistent debate 
between Black and Frankfurter, a forceful opponent of Black’s total incorporation 
position, and powerful advocate of both UR and ECM.  Since Black viewed the entire 
Bill of Rights as binding on the states, he did not distinguish the provisions in terms of 
importance.  In contrast, Frankfurter distinguished between Bill of Rights provisions that 
were “enduring reflections of experience with human nature,” and those that merely 
“express the restricted views of Eighteenth-Century England regarding the best methods 
for the ascertainment of facts.”431  The Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-
incrimination, for example, “was written into the Federal Bill of Rights . . . [f]or 
historical reasons.”  Judges should not be “imprisoned in what are merely legal forms 
even though they have the sanction of the Eighteenth Century.”  Allowing the states 
leeway was critical to honoring the requirements of federalism.  If the Court adopted 
Black’s approach, the result would be to “tear up by the roots much of the fabric of law in 
the several States, and would deprive the States of opportunity for reforms in legal 
process designed for extending the area of freedom.”  At the same time, the Bill of Rights 
did not exhaust the scope of due process.  To limit due process to the Bill of Rights 
                                                 
430 397 U.S. 358. 
431 Adamson, 332 U.S. at 63 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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would be to “assume that no other abuses would reveal themselves in the course of time 
than those which had become manifest in 1791.”432
 Frankfurter also rejected selective incorporation, the approach later adopted by 
the Court, under which the justices would select a subset of Bill of Rights provisions for 
inclusion in due process.  Total incorporation, while not the correct approach, at least had 
the virtue of limiting judicial discretion.  Selective incorporation was incoherent.  If the 
justices were going to select a subset of Bill of Rights provisions, then what was the 
relevance of whether a given right appeared in the first Eight Amendments?  The justices 
would need an independent standard to distinguish between Bill of Rights provisions.  
The Court’s universalistic, evolutive approach properly recognized that the scope of due 
process could not be captured by a static list of rules  It allowed for an expansive 
understanding of fundamental justice. 
 Black had derisively referred to the Court’s approach as a “natural law theory” 
that afforded justices excessive discretion.  Frankfurter countered that the Court’s 
approach did not “imply that the judges are wholly at large.  The judicial judgment in 
applying the Due Process Clause must move within the limits of accepted notions of 
justice and is not to be based upon the idiosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment.”433  
“Even though the concept of due process of law is not final and fixed,” Frankfurter 
argued, in interpreting due process, the judges were constrained by limits “derived from 
considerations that are fused in the whole nature of our judicial process.”  These 
constraints were “deeply rooted in reason and in the compelling traditions of the legal 
profession.”  Judges were not to draw on their “merely personal and private notions,” but, 
                                                 
432 332 U.S. at 66-67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
433 Adamson, 332 U.S. at 67-68 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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rather, to engage in a “ disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of science, on a 
balanced order of facts exactly and fairly stated, on the detached consideration of 
conflicting claims.”434  To be sure, it was imperative that, in doing so, the justices 
employed “the habit of self-discipline and self-criticism, incertitude that one's own views 
are incontestable and alert tolerance toward views not shared,” but fulfillment of the 
judicial role always imposed these responsibilities.  Moreover, while Frankfurter’s 
approach did not view history in itself as determinative, it did find meaningful guidance 
in judicial precedent and in the “heritage of the past, with its great lessons of how 
liberties are won and how they are lost.”435  Against the charges of excessive judicial 
discretion, Frankfurter argued that the Court’s approach provided surer guidance than 
selective incorporation: 
In the history of thought ‘natural law’ has a much longer 
and much better founded meaning and justification than 
such subjective selection of the first eight Amendments for 
incorporation into the Fourteenth.436
 
 As discussed in the following section, the approach that the Court adopted in the 
1960s, and that still reigns, was neither Black’s total incorporation, nor the 
Palko/Twining approach defended by Frankfurter, but selective incorporation.  
Frankfurter retired shortly after selective incorporation’s ascendance, but other justices, 
including the second Harlan, mounted similar objections. 
C. The Ascendance of Selective Incorporation 
 
 Frankfurter had maintained that those who argued for the incorporation of Bill of 
Rights provisions really were seeking selective incorporation, since they surely would not 
                                                 
434 Rochin, 342 U.S. at 170-72. 
435 Adamson, 332 U.S. at 65-66 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
436 332 U.S. at 65 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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impose on the states the Fifth Amendment’s grand jury requirement or the Seventh 
Amendment’s civil jury trial requirements on the states.437  In the early 1960s, beginning 
with Mapp v. Ohio (1961),438 a majority of the Court explicitly adopted selective 
incorporation.  The approach retained similarities with the Palko/Twining  approach that 
had reigned in the previous decades.  It did not assume that due process encompassed the 
entire Bill of Rights.  This meant that that the approach required some evaluative 
standard, outside the Bill of Rights, as a basis for selection.  The framework that the 
Court used retained a universalistic element.  In determining whether a provision applied 
against states, the justices inquired whether the right was one “fundamental and essential 
to a fair trial,”439 or whether the due process challenge involved a fundamental right that 
was “essential for preventing miscarriages of justice and for assuring that fair trials are 
provided for all defendants.”440  In Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), the Court overturned 
Betts v. Brady (1942), but stated that it was employing a similar overarching standard of 
evaluation.  In the Gideon Court’s view, the Betts majority had properly inquired whether 
the right of an indigent criminal defendant to appointed counsel was “fundamental and 
essential to a fair trial.” (The Gideon Court, however, considered the role that counsel 
plays in criminal defense generally, and decided that a fair trial could not be assured 
without ensuring that an indigent defendant would have the benefit of counsel.) 
 In significant ways, however, selective incorporation departed from 
Palko/Twining.  Under selective incorporation, the justices placed more weight on 
whether a specific protection was included within the Bill of Rights.  To be sure, 
                                                 
437 The assessment proved accurate; these two provisions have never been applied against the states. 
438 367 U.S. 643. 
439 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963) (quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 465 (1942)). 
440 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-58 (1968); see also Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965); 
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). 
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inclusion in the Bill of Rights was not necessarily irrelevant in the earlier cases.  But the 
significance of inclusion in the Bill of Rights was diminished by the distinction between 
constitutional provisions that were viewed merely as historical preferences, and those that 
expressed enduring, universalistic truths.441  In the era of selective incorporation, the 
Court “increasingly looked to the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights to determine 
whether a state criminal trial was conducted with due process of law.”442  Under selective 
incorporation , by 1969, the Court had “incorporated” through the Fourteenth 
Amendment almost the entire Bill of Rights.  The Fifth Amendment’s grand jury 
requirement remains the only rule of criminal procedure in the first Eight Amendments 
not incorporated (Katner 2005, 398 n. 2).443  In practice, selective incorporation placed so 
much weight on inclusion in the Bill of Rights that it amounted to a heavy presumption. 
 The difference between Palko/Twining and selective incorporation, however, runs 
deeper.  Making a list of incorporated provisions only has meaning under selective 
incorporation.  Under Palko/Twining, even if a right were potentially fundamental to a 
fair trial, it might not be under the circumstances.  As discussed, in Powell, the right to 
appointed counsel was indispensable, but not in Betts.  The unit of analysis was the 
fairness of  a specific trial.  By contrast, under selective incorporation, the unit of analysis 
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was a Bill of Rights provision.444  The question was not whether the right, as applied in 
the specific case, but as a rule, was essential to fairness.445  Selective incorporation 
represented a shift from a case-by-case to a rule-based approach.446
 The significance of this shift was heightened by another element of selective 
incorporation (referred to here as “unitary” application).  Once the Court incorporated a 
Bill of Rights provision, it also applied against the states all of the Court’s previous 
rulings interpreting that provision in the federal context.447  By applying its existing (and 
continually developing) federal jurisprudence in the state context, the Court was 
determining that, with respect to incorporated provisions, all levels of government within 
the United States would be subject to the same Bill of Rights protections.  The 
implications of the unitary approach were visible in Mapp.448  As discussed (sec. B) in 
Wolf v. Colorado (1949), the Court had held that the core principle of the Fourth 
Amendment--“the security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police”--fell 
within due process.449  Under Palko/Twining, however, this did not mean that the Fourth 
Amendment was incorporated, or that states were bound by the Court’s decisions 
                                                 
444 The unit of analysis was a specific provision, not the entire Amendment.  The Sixth Amendment’s right 
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interpreting the Amendment in the federal context.  The exclusionary rule applied against 
the federal government, but not against states.  Selective incorporation’s unitary approach 
eliminated the possibility of this kind of differential application.  Once the Amendment 
was incorporated, the rule came with it.  The Court refused to apply a “watered-down” 
version of the Bill of Rights against the states.  “It would be incongruous,” the Court said, 
“to have different standards determine the validity of a claim . . .  depending on whether 
the claim was asserted in a state or federal court. Therefore, the same standards must 
[apply] in either a federal or state proceeding is justified.”450
 By the late 1960s, selective incorporation entailed an additional modification of 
Palko/Twining.  The universalistic frame of inquiry under Palko/Twining asked whether 
one could imagine any system dedicated to freedom, liberty, and justice, that did not 
protect the right at issue.  The majority in the 1960s expressed dissatisfaction with that 
framing of the question.  Due process challenges did not occur in a vacuum.  They 
occurred within a state’s existing legal system.  Any number of familiar American 
procedures might not be indispensable to justice in the abstract.  One might be able to 
conjure a differently organized system that safeguarded liberty without the procedures.  
Yet, within an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty, constructed upon common-law 
assumptions and practices, the procedures might, nevertheless, be essential to liberty.  As 
Justice Byron White observed, “state criminal processes are not imaginary and theoretical 
schemes but actual systems bearing virtually every characteristic of the common-law 
system that has been developing contemporaneously in England and in this country.” It 
was “easy to imagine,” for example, a “criminal process which was fair and equitable” 
that did not provide the right to a jury trial.  Such a process “would make use of 
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alternative guarantees and protections which would serve the purposes that the jury 
serves in the English and American systems.”  But no American states had constructed 
such a process.  Within the American context in which the states operated, then, the right 
to a jury trial (along with the exclusionary rule, the privilege against self-incrimination, 
and other incorporated protections), was essential to liberty, and, consequently, binding 
upon the states.  The inquiry under selective incorporation was, not whether the right at 
issue was “fundamental to fairness in every criminal system that might be imagined,” but 
whether it was “fundamental in the context of the criminal processes maintained by the 
American States,451 or “fundamental to the American scheme of justice.”452   
 The Court’s adoption of selective incorporation was not unanimous.  The second 
Harlan emerged as one of its important critics.  He engaged Black’s total incorporation 
position on its own terms, rejecting Black’s assertion that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Framers had intended to make the entire Bill of Rights applicable against the states.  In 
Harlan’s view, the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment: 
did not suppose that the Nation would always be limited to 
mid-19th century conceptions of ‘liberty’ and ‘due process 
of law’ but that the increasing experience and evolving 
conscience of the American people would add new 
‘intermediate premises.’453
 
Echoing Frankfurter, Harlan charged that selective incorporation was incoherent.  Total 
incorporation at least had the virtue of internal consistency; it was based in the intent of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Framers.  Selective incorporation purported to be based on 
whether a specific rights provision was essential to liberty within the American scheme 
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of justice.  The Court did not follow through on that that approach, however.  Under the 
Court’s unitary doctrine, the Court applied against the states all interpretations of the Bill 
of Rights from the federal context.  But the justices did not seek to establish that each of  
the federal interpretations was fundamental to the American scheme of justice.454  
Dissenting in Duncan v. Louisiana (1968), in which the Court held that the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee of a criminal jury trial applied against the states on the same 
terms as it did in the federal context, Harlan protested: 
The requirement of trial by jury in federal criminal cases 
has given rise to numerous subsidiary questions respecting 
the exact scope and content of the right. It surely cannot be 
that every answer the Court has given, or will give, to such 
a question is attributable to the Founders; or even that every 
rule announced carries equal conviction of this Court; still 
less can it be that every such subprinciple is equally 
fundamental to ordered liberty.455
 
 Harlan also criticized the Court for offering no principled rationale for the unitary 
approach, and for failing to respect imperatives of federalism.  The Court had asserted in 
conclusory fashion that it would be “incongruous” to have different standards in state and 
federal courts.  The charge of incongruity missed the point.  There was not supposed to 
be congruity between the federal and state governments,456 which were subject to 
different constitutional commands.  With respect to the federal government, a specific 
Bill of Rights provision represented a “particular command, having its setting in a pre-
existing legal context on which both interpreting decisions and enabling statutes must at 
least build.”457  Against the states, the Court applied, not the “specific substantive 
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commands” of the Bill of Rights, but “the flexible contours” of due process, in which the 
Court’s scope of review is “restricted to a determination of whether the prosecution was 
Constitutionally fair.”458  The incongruity built into the system reflected the “frequently 
wide disparity between the legitimate interests of the States and of the Federal 
Government, the divergent problems that they face, and the significantly different 
consequences of their actions.”459  Respect for federalism required, not only appreciation 
of the differences between the state and national governments, but also “due recognition 
of constitutional tolerance for state experimentation and disparity.”460  The result of the 
unitary policy was “compelled uniformity . . . achieved either by encroachment on the 
States' sovereign powers or by dilution in federal law enforcement of the specific 
protections found in the Bill of Rights.”461   
 Harlan, like Frankfurter, advocated the evolutive, universalistic approach that the 
Court had employed in cases like Hurtado,462 Holden,463 and Palko.464  Harlan’s use of a 
different approach than the majority did not always lead him to a different result,465 but 
often it did.466  The significance of Harlan’s ECM can be seen, for example, in his dissent 
from the Court’s incorporation of the Sixth Amendment’s right to a criminal jury trial.  
Harlan argued that, originally, jury trial was a bulwark against a “tyrannous judiciary,” 
but that purpose had lost its relevance, since Americans “no longer live in a medieval or 
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colonial society.  Judges enforce laws enacted by democratic decision, not by regal fiat. 
They are elected by the people or appointed by the people's elected officials, and are 
responsible not to a distant monarch alone but to reviewing courts, including this one.”467  
Harlan did not ignore history, but its role was subordinate to USEs.  The inclusion of a 
protection in the Bill of Rights, while not decisive, might serve as evidence of which 
rights had traditionally been considered to be of fundamental importance,468 and “of the 
content Americans find in the term ‘liberty’ and of American standards of fundamental 
fairness.”469
 By the time Black retired in 1971, he had seen his total incorporation approach 
nearly adopted in practice, though not in theory.  While continuing to advocate total 
incorporation, he was willing to support selective incorporation, expressing his 
satisfaction at seeing so many Bill of Rights protections come within the scope of due 
process.  He also continued to express disagreement with the approach advocated by 
Harlan, which, in Black’s characterization, treated due process as: 
prescribing no specific and clearly ascertainable 
constitutional command that judges must obey in 
interpreting the Constitution, but rather as leaving judges 
free to decide at any particular time whether a particular 
rule or judicial formulation embodies an ‘immutable 
principl(e) of free government’ or is ‘implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty,’ or whether certain conduct 
‘shocks the judge's conscience’ or runs counter to some 
other similar, undefined and undefinable standard. 
 
In Harlan’s hands, Black charged, due process was “a phrase with no permanent 
meaning, but one which is found to shift from time to time in accordance with judges' 
predilections and understandings of what is best for the country.”  Interpreting due 
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468 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 22 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
469 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 180 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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process via an evaluation of “fundamental fairness,” or similarly vague standards 
“depends entirely on the particular judge's idea of ethics and morals instead of requiring 
him to depend on the boundaries fixed by the written words of the Constitution.”  Black 
could not accept that the Constitution granted such “unconfined power,” given that its 
fundamental purpose was “to limit governmental power.”470  Black’s position was the 
reverse of Harlan’s.  Black believed that the Fourteenth Amendment included the entire 
Bill of Rights, and nothing more, while Harlan believed that it did not include the entire 
of Bill of Rights, but reached beyond the lines demarcated by the first Eight 
Amendments.  Black worried about the implications of both of these differences between 
the two jurists.  On the one hand, under Harlan’s approach, citizens of the states would 
not enjoy the vital protections of the Bill of Rights.  Harlan’s appeal for state diversity 
and experimentation did not move Black, who rejected the notion that the states should 
be free to experiment with the Bill of Rights.  At the same time, Black worried that 
Harlan’s approach gave judges too much room for interfering with state policies based on 
their own personal preferences.  Harlan’s approach was self-contradictory.  On the one 
hand, it espoused providing the states with great leeway to pursue their own diverse 
policies, but, at the same time, afforded judges nearly limitless power to strike down state 
policies of which they did not approve.471
 Notwithstanding the protests of Harlan and, at various times, a number of other 
justices,472 however, the Court has never retreated from the unitary approach.  By 
                                                 
470 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 168-69 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). 
471 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 170-71 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). 
472 For example, Frankfurter and Whittaker joined Harlan’s dissent in Mapp, Clark joined his dissent in 
Malloy, and Stewart joined his concurrence in Pointer.  See also Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) 
(Powell, J., concurring); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring). 
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1969,473 with the exception of the grand jury requirement, all of the criminal procedure 
provisions in the Bill of Rights had been incorporated through selective incorporation, 
and, since that time, the Court has made no changes to the overall list of which provisions 
are included in due process (Wildenthal 2000, 1055).  It appears now to be well-settled 
law that the criminal procedure protections in the Bill of Rights, once incorporated, apply 
to the federal and state governments on the same terms (Dripps 2005, 130). 
 As in other areas, the Court has struggled in its PDP jurisprudence with the proper 
relationship between universalistic and particularistic bases.  The Murray’s Lessee settled 
usages test relied heavily on history, but the Court soon made clear that history alone 
would not be decisive.  Public attitudes about law and rights had changed in the past and 
were sure to do so in the future.  The adoption of ECM recognized that constitutional 
meanings had to be allowed to adapt to these changes.  Yet, surely not all departures from 
historical rights understandings can be approved, or else the Constitution would cease to 
be any restraint at all.  But if history is not determinative, then on what basis may the 
Court decide which innovations are valid and which are not?  The majority, as in other 
areas discussed, developed an approach that was both evolutive and universalistic.  The 
Court’s framework was built around USEs, such as the requirements of liberty, fairness, 
and justice.  The Palko/Twining approach enabled the justices to evaluate procedures on a 
case-by-case basis for their compliance with USEs.  The combination of broad, 
universalistic standards, and a case-by-case approach allowed for a substantial amount of 
diversity of requirements depending on the specific context and circumstances; federal 
and state cases could be treated differently. 
                                                 
473 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
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 As we also have seen in other areas, however, the use of an evolutive, 
universalistic approach was not unanimous.  It was attacked by some justices as too 
indefinite, and, therefore, allowing for the exercise of excessive judicial discretion.  Black 
and the first Harlan, for example, both advanced versions of the Delegative Model, 
arguing that the best way to pursue the Framers’ universalistic ends was through 
faithfulness to the particularistic commands of text and history.  
 The selective incorporation approach adopted by the Court in the 1960s in some 
ways addresses the concerns of Palko/Twining’s critics.  The presumption in favor of 
incorporating Bill of Rights provisions places more weight on text, and the unitary 
doctrine reduces the room for variation and diversity by opting for uniform applications 
between federal and state governments.  Overall, the approach appears to rely more 
heavily on particularistic commands, and to reduce the scope for judicial discretion.  It 
does not, however, turn itself over entirely to particularistic bases.  It is not the total 
incorporation that Black and the first Harlan advocated.  At bottom, selective 
incorporation remains guided by universalistic standards, reflecting the critical 
importance of ECM and its close connection with UR.  The justices have needed to retain 
the flexibility to depart from history at times, as in their refusal to apply the grand jury 
requirement against the states.  Once room is allowed for departure from history, some 
other touchstone is required.  Selective incorporation continues to look to universalistic 
standards to make distinctions between rights that have strong support from 
particularistic sources.  As noted, in the late 1960s, the Court announced that it would 
inquire whether procedures were indispensable to the American scheme of justice.  This 
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inquiry modified, but did not repudiate, reliance on universalistic standards.  The shift 
placed a greater emphasis on context in evaluating the essential nature of rights. 
 The next chapter examines how the Court has addressed questions concerning the 
applicability of constitutional protections in overseas territories.  While very different in 
the scope of its practical consequences, the questions were conceptually similar to the 
PDP issues discussed in this chapter.  The justices had to decide to what extent the Bill of 
Rights applied in a context other than the one for which it was originally written.  As we 
will see, the Court’s response was complicated by similar tensions, and similar fault lines 
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 In 1898, through the treaty ending the Spanish-American War, the United States 
acquired territories in the Pacific Ocean and Caribbean Sea, including Puerto Rico and 
the Philippines (Carter 2001, 317).  The acquisitions raised the issue of the extent to 
which the residents of these territories enjoyed constitutional protections (Roche 1963-
64, 134).  The constitutional provision granting Congress authority over the territories 
(Art, IV, § 3) states: 
The Congress shall have the Power to dispose of and make 
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory 
or other Property belonging to the United States; and 
nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to 
Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any 
particular State.  
 
Neither Article IV, nor any other provision, addresses the Constitution’s applicability.474
A. The Insular Cases 
 The Court confronted the Constitution’s applicability in the newly acquired 
overseas territories in a series of cases from the early 1900s through the early 1920s.  
Downes v. Bidwell (1901)475 was among the earliest and most significant476 of these 
Insular Cases, as they have come to be known.477  The issue in Downes was the 
                                                 
474 The question of the Constitution’s applicability in the territories is part of a broader set of questions 
concerning the scope of the Constitution’s applicability.  Applicability is clearest with respect to U.S. 
citizens residing in one of the states.  Neuman 1991, 915.  On the other end of the spectrum lies non-
citizens outside of the United States, where appeals to the Constitution’s protections would be weakest, and 
the Bill of Rights would ordinarily not apply.  Soltero 2001, 26-27.  The Court has confronted a wide range 
of issues where, for various reasons, the scope of applicability was at issue.  Examples include non-citizens 
residing within the United States (E.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)); Native Americans born 
members of tribes recognized by the U.S. Government (E.g., Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884)); and non-
military dependents of members of the U.S. military, accused of committing crimes in foreign countries 
(E.g., Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956); Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956)).  A growing debate 
concerns applicability to non-citizens residing in foreign countries who are affected by actions of the U.S. 
Government.  Neuman 1991, 911.  While there is overlap in the problems raised by these questions, this 
chapter focuses specifically on the issue of the applicability within overseas U.S. territories. 
475 182 U.S. 244. 
476 See Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 600 n. 30 (1976).  
477 The decisions commonly counted among the Insular Cases include: Dooley v. U.S., 182 U.S. 222 
(1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Hawaii v. 
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constitutionality of tariffs that Congress had imposed on oranges imported from Puerto 
Rico.  The tariffs were challenged on the grounds that they violated Art. 1, § 8 of the 
Constitution, which provides that “all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform 
throughout the United States.”  A 5-4 majority held that, although Puerto Rico was not a 
foreign country,478 it also was not a part of the United States for purposes of Art. 1, § 8, 
and, consequently, the tariff was not unconstitutional.  While the immediate issue in 
Downes concerned the tariff, the justices treated the case as raising the broader question 
of the Constitution’s applicability within the newly acquired territories. 
 The Court had ruled on the applicability of certain constitutional rights within 
territories that were destined to become states.  In some of these decisions, the Court had 
indicated that Bill of Rights protections applied.  The force of these decisions, however, 
was unclear.  Congressional legislation typically had provided explicitly for the 
applicability of certain constitutional rights, or of the entire Constitution.  As a result, 
when an opinion stated that a constitutional right applied in a territory, it was not clear 
whether the right would have applied in the absence of congressional legislation to that 
effect.  In Webster v. Reid (1850),479 for example, the Court invalidated legislation 
adopted by the territory of Iowa eliminating jury trials for certain civil actions.  In doing 
so, the Court referred both to the Seventh Amendment (which guarantees jury trials for 
suits where the amount in controversy exceeds twenty dollars), and to congressional 
legislation that provided for jury trials in the territory.  Almost fifty years later, and four 
                                                                                                                                                 
Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Dorr v. U.S., 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Rasmussen v. U.S., 197 U.S. 516 
(1905); Dowdell v. U.S., 221 U.S. 325 (1911); Ocampo v. U.S., 234 U.S. 91 (1914); Balzac v. U.S., 258 
U.S. 298 (1922). 
478 In De Lima v. Bidwell (1901),478 the Court had held that, due to the peace treaty with Spain, Puerto Rico 
could not be considered a foreign country for purposes of a tariff; that is, the United States could not collect 
customs duties on merchandise arriving from Puerto Rico, as it could with respect to foreign countries. 
479 52 U.S. 437.
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years before the first of the Insular Cases, in Amer. Pub. Co. v. Fisher (1897), the Court 
acknowledged that the ambiguity in Webster  pervaded the Court’s jurisprudence on the 
subject.480  In Amer. Pub. Co., the Court overturned a law in the Utah territory allowing 
for non-unanimous decisions in jury trials.  The Court, as in Webster, referred to the 
Seventh Amendment, in addition to the organic act that had explicitly made the 
Constitution applicable in the territory, and subsequent legislation providing for the right 
of trial by jury in common law suits.  Thus, the ambiguity remained.  Other decisions 
spoke of Congress as being bound by the First481 and Eighth482 Amendments in its 
governance of the Utah territory, but the import of these opinions, too, was muddied by 
organic acts explicitly extending the Constitution’s protection.  Nevertheless, language in 
some of the pre-Insular Cases decisions strongly suggested that constitutional protections 
applied regardless of congressional legislation.  In Thompson v. Utah (1898),483 for 
example, the Court considered it “no longer an open question” that “the provisions of the 
constitution of the United States relating to the right of trial by jury in suits at common 
law apply to the territories of the United States,” and stated: “It is equally beyond 
question that the provisions of the national constitution relating to trials by jury for 
crimes and to criminal prosecutions apply to the territories of the United States.”484
                                                 
480 166 U.S. 464, 466  (“[T]he invalidity may have been adjudged by reason of the conflict with 
congressional legislation.”).
481 Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
482 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
483 170 U.S. 343.  In Thompson, the defendant had been tried by the state of Utah for a crime that the 
defendant had allegedly committed in Utah before it became a state.  The Court held that the state of Utah 
had violated the prohibition on ex post facto laws (Art. 1, § 10) when it provided a criminal jury of only 
eight members (which the Court viewed as contradicting the Sixth Amendment’s right to a criminal jury 
trial), since the defendant had been entitled to a twelve-member jury under the Sixth Amendment’s 
guarantee of a criminal jury trial, while Utah was still a territory.  See also Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U. S. 
15, 44 (1885) (“The personal and civil rights of the inhabitants of the territories are secured  to them, as to 
other citizens, by the principles of constitutional liberty, which restrain all the agencies of government.”). 
484 170 U.S. at 347. 
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 In the absence of congressional legislation making the Constitution applicable in 
Puerto Rico, the Downes Court confronted the question of whether the Constitution 
applied ex propio vigore (of its own force) in the territories.  The justices’ multiple 
opinions presented contrasting approaches. (In addition to Brown’s opinion announcing 
the judgment of the Court, White issued a concurring opinion, and C.J. Melvill Fuller and 
Harlan issued dissenting opinions).  Brown asserted that, generally speaking, the 
Constitution did not apply ex propio vigore.485  The Constitution’s applicability fell 
within congressional discretion.  His interpretation of the relevant law was that Congress 
had not intended to extend the Constitution’s reach to Puerto Rico. 
 Brown stressed the differences that might exist between Americans and the people 
living in overseas territories.  A territory might be populated by “alien races, differing 
from us in religion, customs, laws, methods of taxation, and modes of thought,”486  and 
residents of the territory might be “foreign . . . to our habits, traditions, and modes of 
life.”487  In addition, conditions in a newly acquired territory might entail “differences of 
soil, climate, and production.”488  As a result of these differences, “the administration of 
government and justice, according to Anglo-Saxon principles, may for a time be 
impossible,”489 and the consequences of trying immediately to impose the Constitution’s 
limitations might be “extremely serious.”490  If the Court held the Constitution 
automatically applicable, it might have been “fatal to the development of . . . the 
                                                 
485 Brown denied that the earlier decisions established the Constitution’s applicability in the territories.  In 
his view, they rested on the existence of legislation explicitly extending the Constitution.  Even if language 
in some of the earlier opinions suggested that the Constitution applied in the territories ex propio vigore, 
this was merely dicta. 182 U.S. at 258-59.  
486 182 U.S. at 287. 
487 182 U.S. at 279-80. 
488 182 U.S. at 282. 
489 182 U.S. at 287. 
490 182 U.S. at 289. 
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American empire,”491 as Congress would likely have considered further annexations 
infeasible.  On the other hand, if leeway were afforded in the short term, then, in the long 
run, “ultimately our own theories may be carried out, and the blessings of a free 
government under the Constitution extended”.492
 Brown’s opinion, however, also indicated, drawing on UR, that elements of the 
Constitution might apply of their own force (though this portion of the opinion was 
hedged with tentative language).493  He noted, for example, a distinction between “natural 
rights enforced in the Constitution by prohibitions against interference with them,” on the 
one hand, and “artificial or remedial rights which are peculiar to our own system of 
jurisprudence,” on the other.  The former rights were “indispensable to a free 
government,” and included the freedoms of religion, speech, and press; due process of 
law and access to courts of justice; equal protection of the laws; and “immunities from 
unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as cruel and unusual punishments.”  Artificial 
or remedial rights, on the other hand, included “the rights to citizenship, to suffrage . . .  
and to the particular methods of procedure pointed out in the Constitution, which are 
peculiar to Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, and some of which have already been held by the 
states to be unnecessary to the proper protection of individuals.”  Brown again referenced 
natural or inherent principles in stating: 
There are certain principles of natural justice inherent in the 
Anglo-Saxon character, which need no expression in 
constitutions or statutes to give them effect or to secure 
dependencies against legislation manifestly hostile to their 
real interests.494
                                                 
491 182 U.S. at 286. 
492 182 U.S. at 287. 
493 Brown explicitly stated that the Court was leaving open the extent to which the Bill of Rights might 
apply in the territories ex propio vigore. 
494 182 U.S. at 180.  
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 Brown’s discussion of Taney’s opinion in Scott v. Sandford (1957)495 also 
suggested that Congress was bound by the requirements of due process in governing the 
territories.  In Scott, Taney had argued that, since slaves were property, Congress could 
not constitutionally prohibit settlers from bringing their slaves into the territories.  While 
noting that historical events since Scott had undermined its precedential import, Brown 
professed agreement with Taney on one point.  If, as Taney believed, slaves were 
property, Taney would have been correct in concluding that Congress could not 
constitutionally have prevented people from bringing slaves into the territories, for: 
If the assumption be true that slaves are indistinguishable 
from other property, the inference from the Dred Scott 
Case is irresistible that Congress had no power to prohibit 
their introduction into a territory. It would scarcely be 
insisted that Congress could with one hand invite settlers to 
locate in the territories of the United States, and with the 
other deny them the right to take their property and 
belongings with them. The two are so inseparable from 
each other that one could scarcely be granted and the other 
withheld without an exercise of arbitrary power 
inconsistent with the underlying principles of a free 
government. It might indeed be claimed with great 
plausibility that such a law would amount to a deprivation 
of property within the 14th Amendment.496
 
Brown also appeared to be referring to the automatic application of due process 
requirements when he stated that, even before Congress determined whether the 
Constitution applied in a territory: 
it does not follow that in the meantime, awaiting that 
decision, the people are in the matter of personal rights 
unprotected by the provisions of our Constitution and 
subject to the merely arbitrary control of Congress. Even if 
regarded as aliens, they are entitled under the principles of 
                                                 
495 60 U.S. 393. 
496 Downes, 182 U.S. at 274-75. 
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the Constitution to be protected in life, liberty, and 
property.497
 
 White’s concurring opinion (joined by Justices Joseph McKenna and George 
Shiras) advocated an approach based on a distinction between incorporated and 
unincorporated territories.498  Under White’s theory of incorporation, the extent of 
constitutional applicability in a territory hinged on the nature of its legal relationship with 
the United States.  If the territory was “incorporated” as an integral part of the United 
States, then the entire Constitution applied ex propio vigore.  If the territory was 
“unincorporated,”--that is, if it were “foreign to the United States in a domestic sense,” or 
“merely appurtenant [to the United States] as a possession”--then the entire Constitution 
did not apply ex propio vigore.  A territory’s incorporation was within congressional 
discretion.  The Court’s role was to discern congressional intent, as expressed through the 
treaty by which the United States acquired the territory, or subsequent legislation.  White 
found Congress did not intend to incorporate Puerto Rico.499  
 White’s approach was substantially distinct from Brown’s in that it would apply 
the entire Constitution ex propio vigore to an incorporated territory.  The approach White 
advocated for unincorporated territories, however, shared similarities with the approach 
Brown’s articulated for all territories.  In support of his argument that the Constitution 
did not automatically apply in unincorporated territories, White, like Brown, pointed to 
the diversity of conditions that might make application of the Constitution impractical.  
The people of a newly acquired territory might be “utterly unfit for American citizenship 
                                                 
497 182 U.S. at 283. Almost ninety years later, the Court cited Brown’s opinion for the proposition that due 
process was binding in the territories regardless of congressional legislation.  See Examining Bd. v. Flores 
de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 600 (1976). 
498 Justice Horace Gray provided the fifth vote for upholding the tariffs at issue in Downes; in his 
concurring opinion, he stressed that the question of the Constitution’s applicability in the territories was 
political in nature, and ought to be left to the political branches of the government. 
499 182 U.S. at 341-42 (White, J., concurring). 
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and totally incapable of bearing their proportionate burden of the national expense.”500  
The argument brought to mind Brown’s concern over the impracticality of applying the 
Constitution in places populated with “alien races, differing from us in religion, customs, 
laws, methods of taxation, and modes of thought.”501
 Also, like Brown, White suggested, employing UR, that Congress might be 
subject to certain restrictions regardless of congressional legislation.  There might be 
“inherent, although unexpressed, principles which are the basis of all free government 
which cannot be with impunity transcended,”  and “restrictions of so fundamental a 
nature that they cannot be transgressed, although not expressed in so many words in the 
Constitution.”502  White further stated that Congress could not “destroy the liberties of the 
people of Porto Rico by exercising in their regard powers against freedom and justice 
which the Constitution has absolutely denied.”503   
 Fuller’s dissenting opinion (joined by Brewer, Peckham, and Harlan) adopted the 
position that the entire Constitution applied in the territories ex propio vigore.  Rejecting 
White’s theory of incorporation, Fuller argued that the Constitution applied anywhere 
that the United States exercised sovereignty.  He interpreted Webster v. Reid,504 
Thompson v. Utah,505 and other precedents as supporting this position, and found 
unacceptable the notion that “if an organized and settled province of another sovereignty 
is acquired by the United States, Congress has the power to keep it, like a disembodied 
shade, in an intermediate state of ambiguous existence for an indefinite period.”  While a 
                                                 
500 182 U.S. at 307-11 (White, J., concurring). 
501 182 U.S. at 287 (White, J., concurring). 
502 182 U.S. at 291 (White, J. concurring). 
503 182 U.S. at 298 (White, J. concurring). 
504 52 U.S. 437. 
505 170 U.S. 343. 
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number of justices, at different times, have advocated full constitutional applicability in 
the territories, including four concurring justices in an opinion almost eighty years 
later,506 the position has never gained a majority (Carter 2001, 319). 
 Harlan wrote a separate dissent, more fully articulating the reasoning behind his 
position.  In explaining why he believed that the Constitution applied everywhere the 
United States exercised sovereignty, Harlan focused principally, not on precedent, text, or 
practical consequences, but, rather, on the basic kind of government to which the 
American people were devoted.  He approached the Constitution, not simply as a 
conglomeration of specific provisions, but as the manifestation of the American people’s 
fundamental commitments, finding guidance in the document’s “spirit and genius.”507  As 
noted, Brown and White referred to natural rights.  Harlan did not reject their existence, 
but disagreed over the relationship between natural rights and the Constitution.  The 
Framers, having seen the colonists’ suffering at the hands of the Crown, wished to 
construct a governmental system that would protect “the privileges that inhere in liberty,” 
and “the inherent rights of freemen.”  But the Framers had not been willing to entrust the 
protection of natural principles of justice to such vague notions.  They believed that “the 
only safe guaranty against governmental oppression was to withhold or restrict the power 
to oppress,” and this was accomplished through the enactment of a written constitution as 
the supreme law of the land: 
The glory of our American system is that it was created by 
a written constitution which protects the people against the 
exercise of arbitrary, unlimited power, and the limits of 
which instrument may not be passed by the government it 
                                                 
506 Brennan’s concurring opinion in Torres v. Com. of Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465  (1979) (joined by 
Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun), appeared to endorse full application of the Constitution in the 
territories. 
507 182 U.S. 380 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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created, or by any branch of it, or even by the people who 
ordained it, except by amendment or change of its 
provisions. 
 
Harlan contrasted American government with systems of government “unrestrained by 
written constitutions,” which he characterized as “[m]onarchical and despotic.” Citing 
Marbury v. Madison,508 Harlan renewed Marshall’s argument that the purpose of a 
written constitution was to maintain a government with limited powers, and that this 
purpose would be nullified if constitutional limitations were not enforced.  Therefore, 
Harlan argued, “No higher duty rests upon this court than to exert its full authority to 
prevent all violation of the principles of the Constitution.” 
 For Harlan, then, the commitment of the American people to a written 
constitution represented a basic choice to live within a governmental system restrained by 
a fundamental law, not one subject to the oppressions occasioned by the exercise of 
arbitrary power.  The Court’s notion that, with respect to certain places under U.S. 
sovereignty, Congress could ignore constitutional limitations, was “wholly inconsistent” 
with the kind of government to which the American people were committed.  
Withholding constitutional protections from the Puerto Rican people would undermine 
the basic philosophy of American constitutionalism.  It would be “an evil day for 
American liberty,” Harlan wrote, “if the theory of a government outside of the supreme 
law of the land finds lodgment in our constitutional jurisprudence.”509  For similar 
reasons, Harlan also could not accept Brown’s argument that differences in “religion, 
customs, laws, methods of taxation, and modes of thought” required flexibility with 
respect to the Constitution’s applicability.  The American people had made the 
                                                 
508 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803). 
509 182 U.S. at 380-82 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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Constitution the supreme law of the land “at all times,” and it became applicable 
immediately upon the acquisition of new territory: 
The Constitution is supreme over every foot of territory, 
wherever situated, under the jurisdiction of the United 
States, and its full operation cannot be stayed by any 
branch of the government in order to meet what some may 
suppose to be extraordinary emergencies. 
 
The document was “not to be obeyed or disobeyed as the circumstances of a particular 
crisis in our history may suggest the one or the other course to be pursued.”  
Constitutional provisions could not be “ignored under special or embarrassing 
circumstances.”  In short, for Harlan, the “meaning of the Constitution” could not 
“depend upon accidental circumstances.”510
 The same justices lined up in the majority and dissent in Hawaii v. Mankichi 
(1903),511 the next major case after Downes addressing the applicability of constitutional 
rights in overseas territories.  The issue differed from Downes in two important ways.  
First, the Newlands resolution--the 1898 joint resolution of Congress annexing Hawaii 
and making it a U.S. territory--provided that existing laws in the Hawaiian islands would 
remain in force, so long as they were not “contrary to the Constitution of the United 
States.”  Second, the governmental action challenged in Mankichi involved Bill of Rights 
protections--the Fifth Amendment’s grand jury requirement, and the Sixth Amendment’s 
right to a criminal jury trial.  By an act of Congress in June 1900, Hawaii was formally 
incorporated into the United States, and provisions were made for the use of grand and 
petit juries, requiring unanimous verdicts for conviction.  However, between annexation 
                                                 
510 182 U.S. at 384-85 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
511 190 U.S. 197. 
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in 1898 and incorporation in 1900, the defendant had been charged without a grand jury, 
and convicted of manslaughter by a 9-3 jury verdict. 
 Brown, who again wrote the Court’s opinion, applied the same approach he did in 
Downes, viewing the case as turning on congressional intent.  The relevant legislation 
provided that existing Hawaiian legislation was invalid if “contrary to the Constitution of 
the United States.”  If that language were interpreted literally, Brown conceded, the 
defendant’s conviction would be invalid, since the procedures afforded the defendant 
were in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.512  Brown concluded, however, 
that, in adopting the Newlands Resolution, Congress had not intended to immediately 
abolish all criminal procedures in effect within Hawaii.  In discerning congressional 
intent, Brown hit many of the same notes that he had in Downes, notwithstanding the 
distinct legal context in Hawaii occasioned by the Newlands Resolution.  He stressed the 
impracticality of imposing the full panoply of constitutional protections in a place where 
they would be “unfamiliar to a large number of their inhabitants, and for which no 
previous preparation had been made.”  The inability of the new U.S. territory to comply 
immediately with all of the Constitution’s protections would lead to “disastrous” 
consequences if the Court were to interpret the Newlands Resolution literally.  Congress 
must not have intended to interfere with the existing criminal procedures in Hawaii, 
where to do so would threaten peace and order. 
 Brown also evoked portions of his Downes opinion in stating that only the 
constitutional rights “fundamental in their nature” took immediate effect.  Under this 
standard, “most, if not all, the privileges and immunities contained in the Bill of Rights of 
                                                 
512 190 U.S. at 212.  At the time, the Sixth Amendment was understood as requiring unanimous verdicts for 
criminal convictions. 
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the Constitution were intended to apply from the moment of annexation,” including, for 
example the “just compensation” requirement and the due process of law.  But the rights 
at stake in Mankichi were not fundamental.  They concerned “merely a method of 
procedure which sixty years of practice had shown to be suited to the conditions of the 
islands, and well calculated to conserve the rights of their citizens to their lives, their 
property, and their well being.”513
 Concurring, White (joined only by McKenna) continued to employ his theory of 
incorporation.  Concluding that Hawaii was unincorporated during the period  between 
annexation and formal incorporation, he believed that the only applicable limitations 
during that period were the “fundamental provisions of the Constitution.”514  The 
Newlands Resolution simply confirmed that the territory could not violate fundamental 
constitutional provisions.  The pivotal question, then, was whether the Fifth Amendment 
grand jury requirement and the Sixth Amendment right to a criminal jury trial were 
fundamental.  Here, White cited opinions from the Court’s PDP jurisprudence.  During 
this same time period (as discussed in ch. 4, B) the Court held that only fundamental 
rights, indispensable to a free government, fell within due process.  White cited Hurtado 
(1884),515 which held due process did not include the grand jury requirement, and 
Maxwell v. Dow (1900),516 which held that due process did not include the right to a 
criminal jury trial.  Based on these and other precedents, White considered it “not an 
                                                 
513 190 U.S. at 217. 
514 190 U.S. at 221 (White, J., concurring). 
515  Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516. 
516 176 U.S. 581. 
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open question that the provisions of the Constitution as to grand and petit juries were not 
applicable” in Hawaii while it remained an unincorporated territory.517
 In dissent, Fuller (joined again by Harlan, Brewer, and Peckham) rejected the 
majority’s interpretation of the Newlands Resolution, arguing that its plain meaning was 
to extend the entire Constitution.  More fundamentally, Fuller reiterated that the entire 
Constitution applied of its own force.  He added that, even employing the majority’s 
standard, the grand jury requirement and right to a jury trial qualified as fundamental. 
 Harlan’s dissent again asserted that the Constitution “speak[s] with commanding 
authority to all who exercise power under its sanction.”  Congress was, at all times and in 
all places, subject to constitutional restrictions, since it “came into existence, and exists, 
only by virtue of the Constitution.”518  Applicability in the territories followed from the 
American people’s choice to live under a system that subjected government to the 
restrictions of a written charter.  The majority’s view placed Congress above the 
Constitution, and made the will of Congress the supreme law with respect to certain 
jurisdictions.  It “assumes the possession by Congress of power quite as omnipotent as 
that possessed by the English Parliament,” and allows for the “exercise of absolute, 
arbitrary legislative power.519  Adopting the majority’s approach would indicate that: 
this country had left the old ways of the fathers, as defined 
by a written constitution, and entered upon a new way, in 
following which the American people will lose sight of, or 
become indifferent to, principles which had been supposed 
to be essential to real liberty.520
 
                                                 
517 Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 220 (1903). 
518 190 U.S. at 236 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
519 190 U.S. at 236 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
520 190 U.S. at 239-40 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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Indicating his opposition to the majority’s use of ECM and UR, as he had in PDP 
opinions (ch. 4, B.),521 Harlan rejected the notion that it was the judiciary’s role to adapt 
the Constitution’s meaning to the “apparent necessities of the hour, or the apparent 
majority of the people, at a particular time,”522 or to determine which of the 
Constitution’s provisions applied due to their fundamental nature.523
 The year following Mankichi, for the first time,524 the majority adopted White’s 
doctrine of incorporation.  Dorr v. U.S. (1904)525 presented the Court with another 
opportunity to consider the applicability of the right to a criminal jury trial in one of the 
newly acquired overseas territories--the Philippines.  The defendant had been charged 
with criminal libel under territorial law, which made no provisions for jury trials.  The 
Court (Day ) found that the Philippines was an unincorporated territory.  Consequently, 
only fundamental constitutional rights applied of their own force, and the right to a 
criminal jury trial did not qualify as a fundamental right.  Day renewed arguments made 
by majority justices in previous Insular Cases to support the proposition that the entire 
Constitution could not be made applicable in unincorporated territories.  Again, a central 
theme was the potential differences between the American people and the “the needs or 
capacities of the people” in overseas territories.  The United States might acquire 
territories where the local residents were “savages,” and where “a system of trial [was] 
unknown to them and unsuited to their needs.”  It might, therefore, be impossible to 
“carry[] into practice” the jury trial requirement.  Under such circumstances, attempting 
                                                 
521 E.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900); Hurtado v. 
California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). 
522 Mankichi, 190 U.S. at 241 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
523 190 U.S. at 246-47 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
524 See Torres v. Com. of Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 469 (1979); Carter 2001, 319. 
525 195 U.S. 138. 
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to immediately impose all of the Constitution’s requirements might “work injustice and 
provoke disturbance rather than to aid the orderly administration of justice.”526
 At the same time, Day endorsed the fundamental rights approach to identifying 
the constitutional limitations that applied ex propio vigore.  Day noted that Brown and 
White had indicated support for the approach in Downes, and approvingly cited the 
Court’s statement in The Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
U.S. (1890) that: 
Doubtless congress, in legislating for the territories, would 
be subject to those fundamental limitations in favor of 
personal rights which are formulated in the constitution and 
its amendments; but these limitations would exist rather by 
inference and the general spirit of the constitution from 
which congress derives all its powers, than by any express 
and direct application of its provisions.527
 
Day further cited the Court’s finding in Mankichi that, while many of the Bill of Rights 
provisions might well apply of their own force in the territories, this could not be said of 
the right to a criminal jury trial, which was not “fundamental in [its] nature,” but, rather, 
“concern[ed] merely a method of procedure” that had been found to be locally useful.528
 The Court’s approach to determining the Constitution’s applicability in 
unincorporated territories was similar to its due process framework.  In both areas, the 
inquiry focused on whether the right at issue was essential to freedom.  The Court asked 
whether fairness, liberty, and justice could be secured without affording the right in 
question.  In Dorr, White considered the Spanish civil law system used in the Philippines, 
and concluded that, even without the right to a criminal jury trial, it was possible that “a 
                                                 
526 195 U.S. at 148. 
527 195 U.S. at 146 (quoting The Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United 
States, 136 U.S. 1, 43-44 (1890)). 
528 195 U.S. at 144-45 (quoting Mankichi, 190 U.S. at 217-18). 
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method of fair and orderly trial prevails.”529  It “cannot be successfully maintained,” Day 
wrote, that the system in force in the Philippines: 
does not give an adequate and efficient method of 
protecting the rights of the accused as well as executing the 
criminal law by judicial proceedings which give full 
opportunity to be heard by competent tribunals before 
judgment can be pronounced.530
 
Day, here, was guided by IMPs the Court had identified in its PDP jurisprudence--a court 
with jurisdiction, and the opportunity to be heard in one’s own defense.  The legal system 
in the Philippines preserved these elements which were indispensable to justice.  By 
contrast, the right to a jury trial was inessential, and could be eliminated without violating 
the defendant’s fundamental rights. 
 Harlan’s dissent in Dorr also reflected the tight connection between the Insular 
Cases and the Court’s PDP jurisprudence.531  Noting that he had already set forth his 
views on grand and petit juries, he cited, not only his opinions from the Insular Cases, 
but also his dissenting opinions in Hurtado and Maxwell.  In Mankichi, White had relied 
on the majority opinions in the same two cases to support his view that the rights to grand 
and petit juries were not fundamental.  Thus, the axes of disagreement in the Court’s PDP 
jurisprudence also appeared in the Insular Cases.  In both contexts, a majority held that 
only fundamental rights applied, over Harlan’s protest that the entire Constitution applied 
with full and equal force in all U.S. jurisdictions. 
                                                 
529 Dorr v. U.S., 195 U.S. 138, 148 (1904). 
530 195 U.S. at 146. 
531 Harlan was the lone dissenter in Dorr.  The other dissenters in Downes and Mankichi had not changed 
their views, but, in Dorr, considered themselves bound by the Court’s ruling in Mankichi.  
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 The Court’s adoption of White’s incorporation approach was confirmed in later 
decisions.  In Rasmussen v. U.S. (1905),532 for instance, the Court held that the Sixth 
Amendment’s right to a jury trial applied in Alaska, because the territory was 
incorporated.533  In Balzac v. U.S. (1922),534 the Court unanimously reaffirmed the 
doctrine of incorporation.  The Sixth and Seventh Amendment provisions relating to jury 
trials did not apply in Puerto Rico, an unincorporated territory, because they did not 
qualify as fundamental rights.535  In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice William Taft 
echoed a familiar theme in stressing that the “jury system needs citizens trained to the 
exercise of the responsibilities of jurors,” and could not easily be implemented where the 
citizens were not so trained.  Since Puerto Rico remained an unincorporated territory, 
Congress was within its authority to conclude that  
a people like the Filipinos, or the Porto Ricans, trained to a 
complete judicial system which knows no juries, living in 
compact and ancient communities, with definitely formed 
customs and political conceptions, should be permitted 
themselves to determine how far they wish to adopt this 
institution of Anglo-Saxon origin, and when.536  
 
At the same time, confirming earlier suggestions, the Court included the due process of 
law among those fundamental constitutional limitations that applied ex propio vigore.537
 
                                                 
532 197 U.S. 516. 
533 On that basis, the Court invalidated a law for the territory of Alaska that provided for juries of only six 
members in jury trials involving misdemeanors, since the Sixth Amendment was understood as 
gauranteeing juries of twelve members.  Brown concurred, basing his decision on an interpretation of the 
governing treaty, and renewing his opposition to White’s approach.  As Rasmussen and later cases made 
clear, White had won the battle over the framework of analysis in determining the territorial scope of the 
Constitution’s applicability.  Harlan concurred, reiterating his disapproval of the Court’s approach. 
534 258 U.S. 298. 
535 See also Ocampo v. U.S., 234 U.S. 91 (1914) (Fifth Amendment grand jury requirement did not apply in 
the Philippines, since it was an unincorporated territory, and the requirement was not fundamental). 
536 Balzac v. U.S., 258 U.S. 298 (310) (1922). 
537 258 U.S. at 312-13 (“The guaranties of certain fundamental personal rights declared in the Constitution, 
as, for instance, that no person could be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, 
had from the beginning full application in the Philippines and Porto Rico.”).
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B. Post-Insular Cases 
 Since Balzac, the Court has been relatively inactive in its jurisprudence 
concerning the scope of the Constitution’s applicability in unincorporated territories.538  
The doctrine of incorporation has not been overturned, though some justices have 
expressed dissatisfaction with it (Carter 2001, 320).  In one of the most important 
decisions since the Insular Cases, Torres v. Com. of Puerto Rico (1979),539 the Court 
unanimously held that the Fourth Amendment’s immunity from unreasonable searches 
and seizures applied in Puerto Rico (still deemed an unincorporated territory).  The 
decision invalidated legislation enacted by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in 1975, 
which authorized searches by the police of the luggage of any person entering the 
Commonwealth from the United States.  In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice 
Warren Burger approvingly described the doctrine of incorporation.  Like majority 
justices in the Insular Cases, Burger expressed concern that immediate imposition of the 
entire Constitution in all territories “would create such severe practical difficulties under 
certain circumstances as to prohibit the United States from exercising its constitutional 
power to occupy and acquire new lands,” and that the attempt to impose the entire 
Constitution might lead to injustice.540  At the same time, Burger acknowledged that the 
Court had held some constitutional provisions applicable of their own force, including 
freedom of speech and due process.541
                                                 
538 This relative inactivity may be due, in part, to the extension, through congressional legislation, of certain 
constitutional protections in unincorporated territories, such as Puerto Rico. Soltero 2001, 28. 
539 442 U.S. 465. 
540 442 U.S. at 469. 
541 See also Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 599-600 (1976); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson 
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 668-69 n. 5 (1974).  In these cases, the Court made clear that due process 
applied, but found it unnecessary to determine whether it applied via the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, or the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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 Burger’s analysis in Torres stressed the relevant circumstances in Puerto Rico.  
He inquired whether the imposition of the Fourth Amendment immunity would likely 
lead to the compromise of national interests or security, or to unfairness.  In conducting 
that inquiry, Burger looked to insights that could be gleaned from Puerto Rico’s 
experience to date, and placed great weight on congressional legislation, stating: 
Both Congress' implicit determinations in this respect and 
long experience establish that the Fourth Amendment's 
restrictions on searches and seizures may be applied to 
Puerto Rico without danger to national interests or risk of 
unfairness.542
 
Burger noted that, between 1917 and 1952, Congress had extended “equivalent personal 
rights” in Puerto Rico, and that Puerto Rico itself had chosen to include the language of 
the Fourth Amendment in its own constitution.   
 While concurring in the result, Brennan (joined by Stewart, Marshall, and 
Blackmun), rejected Burger’s approach.  He appeared to endorse the approach advocated 
by Harlan--that the entire Constitution applied of its own force in all territories.  Brennan 
considered the Insular Cases as valid, at best, “in the particular historical context in 
which they were decided.”  He also quoted a 1957 opinion which had stated, with respect 
to the Insular Cases, that: 
[N]either the cases nor their reasoning should be given any 
further expansion. The concept that the Bill of Rights and 
other constitutional protections against arbitrary 
government are inoperative when they become 
inconvenient or when expediency dictates otherwise is a 
very dangerous doctrine and if allowed to flourish would 
destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and undermine 
the basis of our government.543 
 
                                                 
542 Torres v. Com. of Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 470 (1979). 
543 Torres, 442 U.S. at 476 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957)). 
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Marshall later characterized Brennan’s concurring opinion in Torres as expressing “the 
view that all provisions of the Bill of Rights apply to Puerto Rico.”544
 Brennan’s concurring opinion in Torres indicated that, while the Court has 
retained the same basic approach since the Insular Cases, the justices have continued to 
disagree over the applicability of the Constitution in the territories.  Indeed, in the 1957 
decision that Brennan cited in Torres--Reid v. Covert--a plurality of four justices seemed 
to express dissatisfaction with the Insular Cases.  Reid itself did not concern the 
applicability of the Constitution in the territories.  At issue was the availability of certain 
constitutional protections to dependents of American military personnel, who were tried 
overseas by U.S. military courts for offenses allegedly committed in locations outside the 
United States.  The Court held that the right to a jury trial was applicable under these 
circumstances.  For present purposes, the relevant aspect of the case was that, in his 
plurality opinion announcing the judgment of the Court, Black (joined by Warren, 
Brennan, and Douglas) criticized the approach the Court employed in the Insular Cases.  
Black saw the issue in Reid as part of a broader question concerning the applicability of 
the Constitution when the U.S. Government “acts outside the continental United States.”  
Regarding the fundamental rights approach articulated in the Insular Cases, Black wrote: 
we can find no warrant, in logic or otherwise, for picking 
and choosing among the remarkable collection of ‘Thou 
shalt nots' which were explicitly fastened on all 
departments and agencies of the Federal Government by 
the Constitution and its Amendments.545
Given the differences in the issues involved, however, it was not necessary for the Court 
to overrule the Insular Cases to reach the decision in Reid.  Rather, Black argued that the 
                                                 
544 Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 653-54 (1980). 
545 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 8 (1957). 
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Insular Cases could be distinguished, since, unlike Reid, which concerned the subjection 
of American civilians to military jurisdiction, the Insular Cases “involved the power of 
Congress to provide rules and regulations to govern temporarily territories with wholly 
dissimilar traditions and institutions.”546  Strong dissatisfaction with the doctrine of 
incorporation was also expressed by Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion in Harris 
v. Rosario (1980).547  There, Marshall asserted that “the present validity of [the Insular 
Cases] is questionable.”   
 Notwithstanding expressions by certain justices at various times of dissatisfaction 
with the Insular Cases, a majority of the justices has never indicated that the Insular 
Cases and their doctrine of incorporation have been rejected.  Indeed, in Verdugo-
Urquidez v. U.S. (1990),548 which, like Reid, did not itself involve the territories, a 
majority of the Court made clear that the Insular Cases were still good law.  The issue 
before the Court was whether the protection of the Fourth Amendment was available to a 
Mexican citizen whose home in Mexico had been searched by Mexican police in 
cooperation with United States D.E.A. agents.  In his opinion for the Court, holding that 
the Fourth Amendment did not apply in those circumstances, Rehnquist cited the Insular 
Cases broadly for the proposition that “not every constitutional provision applies to 
governmental activity even where the United States has sovereign power.”  Removing 
any doubt of the majority’s view of the continued validity of the Insular Cases, he wrote 
that “it is not open to us in light of the Insular Cases to endorse the view that every 
constitutional provision applies wherever the United States Government exercises its 
                                                 
546 Reid, 354 U.S. at 14. 
547 446 U.S. 651, 653. 
548 494 U.S. 259. 
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power.”549  Citing a range of Insular Cases, Rehnquist summarized the extant doctrines 
they had established, referring to an unincorporated territory as “one not clearly destined 
for statehood,” and reaffirming (if Torres had introduced any doubt) that “[o]nly 
‘fundamental’ constitutional rights are guaranteed to inhabitants of those territories.”550
 In the Court’s due process jurisprudence, it confronted the applicability of the Bill 
of Rights in the states.  In the Insular Cases, the Court confronted the applicability of the 
Bill of Rights in overseas territories.  As in the due process context, the Court adopted a 
universalistic approach, inquiring into the fundamental nature of the rights in question.  
The approach determined that certain rights were so essential to liberty and justice that 
they applied of their own force.  At the same time, it stressed the importance of allowing 
for diversity and variance based on context.  In this respect, the Court’s approach struck 
similar notes to the ECM approach applied in the due process context.  Universalistic 
principles set inherent limitations on government, but the justices recognized the need for 
flexibility arising from divergent circumstances.551  As in the due process context, the 
universalistic framework was not unanimously approved by the justices.  Indeed, the fault 
line between the justices in PDP largely reproduced itself in the Insular Cases, with a 
number of justices citing opinions from the due process context in their opinions in the 
Insular Cases.  As in PDP, Harlan was the most forceful opponent of the Court’s 
universalistic approach.  And, as in Harlan’s PDP dissents, he objected to distinctions 
                                                 
549 Kennedy echoed the theme in his concurrence: “the Insular Cases do stand for an important proposition, 
one which seems to me a wise and necessary gloss on our Constitution. The proposition is, of course, not 
that the Constitution ‘does not apply’ overseas, but that there are provisions in the Constitution which do 
not necessarily apply in all circumstances in every foreign place.”  Verdugo-Urquidez v. United States, 494 
U.S. 259, 277 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting  Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., 
concurring)). 
550 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 268-69. 
551 The Insular Cases, however, did involve a type of contextual variation that did not arise in the due 
process context, regarding characteristics of the governed. 
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between constitutional protections on the basis of their relative importance.  For Harlan, 
inclusion in the Constitution was the critical consideration that should guide the justices.  
Harlan’s judicial philosophy sought particularistic bases for judicial action.  He could not 
accept the Constitution’s partial applicability.  In reasoning about the Constitution’s 
applicability, with little text or history available for guidance, Harlan found a 
particularistic basis for constitutional applicability in the basic choice of the American 
people to live in a society governed by a written constitution.  He reasoned from that 
expression of will; it was not consistent with the form of government selected to permit 
the government to exercise unrestrained power. 
 During the time period of the Insular Cases, then, the Court’s jurisprudence, 
including axes of disagreement, were largely similar in the due process and territorial 
arenas.  In the due process context, we saw that a majority eventually adopted an 
approach that placed a greater emphasis on particularistic bases.  Although the Court has 
been less active in the territorial context, Burger’s opinion in Torres moved in a similar 
direction; the heightened emphasis on political acts--congressional intent, and the intent 
of the people living in Puerto Rico--suggested a greater role for particularistic 
considerations.  The opinion also reflected continuing disagreement, with the four 
concurring justices apparently endorsing the total incorporation approach that Harlan had 
advocated in the early twentieth century. 
 The next chapter addresses a topic in which the Court has been active in recent 
decades--the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.  The issue as 
recently presented has not concerned the applicability of the Clause, but the proper 
approach to determining its meaning.  Despite the significant difference in the nature of 
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the substantive topic, we will again see that the Court’s jurisprudence, and disagreements 
between the justices, have revolved considerably around questions about the proper role 











Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
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 The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”  The Court’s 
jurisprudence interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause (“CUPC”) brings 
to the forefront questions raised by evolutive, universalistic approaches, with respect to 
the appropriate sources for guidance in discerning how rights meanings change.  Section 
A discusses the Court’s earliest decisions on CUPC.  These decisions, while not as 
detailed in their reasoning as later cases, suggested a role for the examination of prevalent 
practices, and an approach appealing to general principles, and not purely to history.  
Section B discusses a number of cases, beginning with Weems v. U.S. (1910), in which 
the Court adopted an evolutive, universalistic approach to CUPC.  Section C focuses on 
decisions since Furman v. Georgia (1972), in which the justices have wrestled with the 
proper role of UR, and the relationship between practices, and other societal indicators, 
and changes in constitutional meanings. 
A. Early Universality in Cruel and Unusual Punishments Jurisprudence 
 
 The Court’s earliest CUPC decisions, all rejecting defendants’ constitutional 
challenges, provide less insight into the Court’s reasoning than did Weems (1910) and 
later cases.  One reason is that some of the early cases concerned challenges to state 
actions.  The Court did not indicate until the late 1940s that the Eighth Amendment 
applied against the states.552  Thus, the basis of some nineteenth-century decisions was 
ambiguous.  The inapplicability of the Eighth Amendment, alone, was enough to defeat 
CUPC challenges to state actions.  Nevertheless, the opinions at times offered insights 
into the justices’ understandings.  Pervear v. Massachusetts (1866)553 appears to have 
                                                 
552 State of La. ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947). 
553 72 U.S. 475. 
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been the first case in which the Court considered a CUPC challenge.554  Pervear, 
convicted of selling intoxicating liquors without a license, was sentenced to a $50 fine, 
and three months’ imprisonment at hard labor.  The Court rejected Pervear’s argument 
that the punishment was excessive, noting that the state’s approach to enforcing laws 
against intemperance was the “usual mode adopted in many, perhaps, all of the States.”555  
The short opinion foreshadowed the Court’s later reliance on prevailing practices.556
 Twelve years later, in Wilkerson v. Utah (1878),557 the Court again referred to 
prevalent practices.558  The defendant, sentenced to death by shooting on a murder 
conviction in the Utah territory (where the Eighth Amendment applied by statute), 
objected to the method of execution.  The Court (Clifford) indicated that CUPC banned 
“punishments of torture” and “unnecessary cruelty,” including a number of practices that 
had long ago been used in England, such as beheading, quartering, public dissection, and 
burning alive.559 (This much has never been disputed; controversy has focused on what 
else CUPC prohibits.)  In rejecting the CUPC challenge, Clifford focused on existing 
practices.  Execution by shooting was the common method for soldiers convicted of 
military offenses, and was permitted by customs of war, and the laws of other countries.  
 Another twelve years later, in In re Kemmler (1890),560 the Court introduced 
USEs into its CUPC jurisprudence.561  Like Wilkerson, Kemmler concerned a challenge 
to a method of execution--the recently created electric chair.  The Court (Fuller) stated 
                                                 
554 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 264 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
555 Pervear, 72 U.S. at 480. 
556 The Court held the Amendment inapplicable to states, but explained the claim lacked merit in any event.  
557 99 U.S. 130. 
558 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 276-77 (Brennan, J., concurring) (characterizing the decision as upholding the 
challenged practice because it was commonly employed at the time). 
559 Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 136. 
560 136 U.S. 436. 
561 As in Pervear, the Court held CUPC inapplicable to states, but also found the claim without merit.   
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that the death penalty was not cruel in itself.  “Cruel” implied “something inhuman and 
barbarous--something more than the mere extinguishment of life.”562  As a standard of 
evaluation, inhumanity is universalistic, in that it transcends the preferences or practices 
of a particular place and time.   
 In an influential563 dissenting opinion in O'Neil v. Vermont (1892),564 Field 
(joined by Harlan and Brewer) also employed USEs. (The majority did not reach the 
merits, holding CUPC inapplicable to states.)  The defendant, convicted of selling 
intoxicating liquors, was sentenced to over $6,000 in fines, and over fifty years’ 
imprisonment if the fines were not timely paid.  The punishment for each individual sale 
was light, but the defendant was sentenced cumulatively on 307 separate counts.  Field 
argued that CUPC’s was not limited to torturous punishments.  A punishment, though not 
cruel in itself, could violate the prohibition if it was “greatly disproportioned to the 
offenses charged.”  “The whole inhibition,” Field asserted, was “against that which is 
excessive.”  Analogizing to punishing a person separately for each drop in a glass of 
liquor, Field contended that the cumulative sentence was excessive.  In expressing his 
objections to the defendant’s sentence, Field, like the Court in Kemmler, employed 
universalistic language.  The sentence “was greatly beyond anything required by any 
humane law for the offenses.” Given the nature of offense and punishment, it was “hard 
to believe that any man of right feeling and heart can refrain from shuddering. . . The 
judgment of mankind would be that the punishment was not only an unusual, but a cruel, 
                                                 
562 136 U.S. at 447. 
563 See, e.g., Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349, 371 (1910); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249 (1972) 
(Douglas, J., concurring). 
564 144 U.S. 323. 
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one, and a cry of horror would rise from every civilized and Christian community of the 
country against it.”565
 In showing that the sentence was inhumanely disproportionate, Field referred to 
existing practices.  He pointed to the disparity between the defendant’s sentence and  
sentencing practices for other crimes, and for the same crime in other jurisdictions.  The 
defendant’s sentence was more severe than what he would have received for burglary or 
highway robbery, and was six times more severe than what he would have received for 
manslaughter, forgery, or perjury.  Moreover, Field could not find any instance in a U.S. 
jurisdiction of a defendant receiving as severe a sentence for the same crime.566  
B. Weems (1910), Resweber (1947),  and Trop (1958): Adoption of an 
 Evolutive, Universal Approach to Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
 
 In Weems v. U.S. (1910),567 for the first time, the Court invalidated a sentence 
prescribed by a legislature on CUPC grounds.568  The defendant had been convicted in 
the Philippines (then, a U.S. territory)569 under a statute criminalizing the use of false 
documents by government officials.  The statute provided a minimum sentence of twelve 
years’ confinement.  The form of confinement, known as cadena temporal, entailed the 
wearing of chains on the ankles and wrists, and hard and painful labor.  Following the 
term of imprisonment, the sentence included a substantial continuing loss of civil rights, 
and subjection to surveillance.  The minimum sentence was mandatory, even if the 
defendant had no intention of defrauding the government, or securing personal gain.  The 
                                                 
565 144 U.S. at 340 (Field, J., dissenting). 
566 144 U.S. at 338-39 (Field, J., dissenting).  Eleven years after O’Neil, the Court, while upholding the 
challenged sentence, seemed to leave the door open for considering proportionality in CUPC cases.  
Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126, 135-36 (1903). 
567 217 U.S. 349. 
568 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 325 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).  
569 The Court considered itself to be interpreting CUPC, because the case arose under a provision of the 
territorial constitution of the Philippines containing similar language. 
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defendant in Weems was sentenced to fifteen years, but the Court treated the statute’s 
twelve-year minimum as the subject of analysis.  The majority’s opinion (McKenna) 
introduced ECM into the Court’s CUPC jurisprudence, using reasoning similar to 
reasoning the Court has used in adopting ECM in other issue areas.  Constitutions, 
McKenna argued, were intended to endure indefinitely, and thus, must survive 
unforeseeable changes.  If constitutional provisions were to be effective over time, their 
application must not be limited to evils known at the time of enactment.  The Framers 
understood that future legislatures might abuse their power over criminal laws by 
devising new punishments that were cruel.  CUPC was not “intended to prohibit only 
practices like the Stuarts', or to prevent only an exact repetition of history.”  More 
broadly, noting other parts of the Constitution whose meaning had evolved substantially 
(including the Fourteenth Amendment), McKenna argued that constitutional provisions 
had to be understood as embodying general principles, whose application evolved with 
changing conditions: 
Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions 
and purposes. Therefore a principle, to be vital, must be 
capable of wider application than the mischief which gave 
it birth. . . [Constitutions] are not ephemeral enactments, 
designed to meet passing occasions. . . The future is their 
care, and provision for events of good and bad tendencies 
of which no prophecy can be made. In the application of a 
constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of 
what has been, but of what may be. Under any other rule a 
constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it 
would be deficient in efficacy and power. Its general 
principles would have little value, and be converted by 
precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights 
declared in words might be lost in reality.570
 
                                                 
570 Weems, 217 U.S. at 373. 
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CUPC “may be . . . progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire 
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.”571  This oft-quoted 
passage linked ECM with USEs (“humane justice”).  McKenna also employed 
universalistic language in basing the opinion on the “precept of justice that punishment 
for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense.”572  In considering 
proportionality, McKenna investigated existing practices, including laws from a variety 
of jurisdictions in the United States, and in the Philippines.  Individuals convicted of far 
more serious crimes (such as conspiracy to destroy the government by force, and some 
degrees of homicide) received less severe sentences than the defendant in Weems.  
McKenna’s landmark opinion relied on a combination of ECM, UR, “public opinion,” 
and existing practices, raising difficult questions still with today’s Court concerning the 
proper relationship between these elements.   
 In dissent, White advocated a more restrictive view of CUPC, suggesting, in 
opposition to the Court’s ECM, that the Clause: 
forbids only . . . inflicting unnecessary bodily suffering 
through a resort to inhuman methods for causing bodily 
torture, like or which are of the nature of the cruel methods 
of bodily torture which had been made use of prior to the 
Bill of Rights of 1689, and against the recurrence of which 
the word ‘cruel’ was used in that instrument.573  
 
 Like Wilkerson and Kemmler, State of La. ex rel. Francis v. Resweber (1947)574 
concerned the manner of execution.  The defendant survived the state’s attempt to 
execute him due to the electric chair’s malfunction, and objected to re-scheduling of the 
execution on CUPC grounds.  The Court, 5-4, upheld the re-scheduling.  In his opinion 
                                                 
571 217 U.S. at 378. 
572 217 U.S. at 367. 
573 217 U.S. at 409 (White, J., dissenting). 
574 329 U.S. 459. 
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for a four-person plurality, Reed (joined by C.J. Frederick Vinson, and Justices Robert 
Jackson and Black), who assumed without deciding the Eighth Amendment’s 
applicability, wrote: “The traditional humanity of modern Anglo-American law forbids 
the infliction of unnecessary pain in the execution of the death sentence.”575  The MRR 
phrase “traditional humanity” blended the universalistic standard of humanity with that 
standard’s historical role within a particular system of law.  For the plurality, the 
accidental nature of the chair’s malfunction was critical.  The state had not intended to 
cause unnecessary pain. 
 In his concurring opinion, providing the majority’s fifth vote, Frankfurter did not 
assume the Eighth Amendment’s applicability.  He applied the same universalistic, 
evolutive approach that he applied to claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause (ch. 4, C).  He could not find that re-scheduling the execution was 
“repugnant to the conscience of mankind,”576 nor that it offended “a principle of justice 
“rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people.”577  Dissenting, Justice Harold 
Burton (joined by Murphy, Rutledge, and Douglas) also employed a universalistic 
formulation, maintaining that CUPC was violated by methods of execution that “shock[] 
the most fundamental instincts of civilized man.”578  He would have remanded the case to 
the state courts.  More information was needed, such as the extent of the defendant’s 
suffering during the attempted execution. 
                                                 
575 329 U.S. at 463. 
576 329 U.S. at 470 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 
(1934)). 
577 329 U.S. at 471 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937)). 
578 329 U.S. at 473 (Burton, J., dissenting). 
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 In Trop v. Dulles (1958),579 the justices offered the most in-depth consideration of 
CUPC since Weems, reaffirming and elaborating on tenets of McKenna’s opinion, 
including the reliance on UR, ECM, and existing practices. Trop, a native-born American 
citizen convicted by a court-martial of wartime desertion while serving in French 
Morocco during the Second World War, was deprived of citizenship as part of his 
sentence.  The Court, 5-4, invalidated the sentence.  Warren wrote the opinion for a four-
person plurality (joined by Justices Charles Whittaker, Black, and Douglas), with 
Brennan providing the fifth vote on non-CUPC grounds.580  Introducing a USE that has 
remained part of the Court’s jurisprudence, he stated: “The basic concept underlying the 
Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.”581  The Amendment imposed 
a “basic prohibition against inhuman treatment,”582 and mandated that the state’s “power 
to punish . . . [must] be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.” 
 Citing Weems, Warren also confirmed CUPC’s evolutive nature, noting that its 
words “are not precise,” and that “their scope is not static.”  In Weems, McKenna had 
written that the Amendment’s meaning “may be . . . progressive, and is not fastened to 
the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a 
humane justice.”583  Warren wrote that the Amendment “must draw its meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”584  Like 
McKenna’s language, Warren’s oft-quoted reference to “evolving standards of decency” 
indicated a link between USEs, ECM, and public attitudes.  Also like McKenna, Warren 
                                                 
579 356 U.S. 86. 
580 Brennan concluded that the statute providing the punishment at issue in Trop fell outside of Congress’s 
legislative powers. 
581 356 U.S. at 100. 
582 356 U.S. at 101 n. 32. 
583 217 U.S. at 378. 
584 Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01. 
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examined existing practices in a variety of jurisdictions.  He noted that the sentence 
entailed the possibility of banishment, which was a “fate universally decried by civilized 
people.”  Statelessness was “a condition deplored in the international community of 
democracies,” and there was “virtual unanimity” among the “civilized nations of the 
world” that a condition of statelessness should not be imposed as punishment.  He cited a 
United Nations study showing that, of the eighty-four countries surveyed, only two 
prescribed denationalization as a punishment for desertion.  He conceded that several 
countries imposed expatriation where their nationals had engaged in conduct in 
derogation of native allegiance, but stressed that even these statutes generally limited 
their applicability to naturalized citizens.585   The sentence subjected Trop “to a fate 
forbidden by the principle of civilized treatment guaranteed by the Eighth 
Amendment,”586 and was “offensive to cardinal principles for which the Constitution 
stands.”  The conclusion did not follow only from investigation of international practices.  
Warren also conducted his own consideration of the nature of the punishment itself.  The 
punishment was cruel because it amounted to a “total destruction of the individual’s 
status in organized society,” and, thus, left an individual with no rights, and utterly at the 
mercy of the governing authorities of whatever place in which he happened to find 
himself.  This condition, which subjected “the individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear 
and distress,” was “a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for 
the individual the political existence that was centuries in the development.”587  
                                                 
585 356 U.S. at 102-03. 
586 356 U.S. at 99. 
587 356 U.S. at 101-02. 
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 The dissenters accepted the principal tenets of Warren’s approach,588 including 
reliance on USEs and international practices.  Frankfurter (joined by Justices Tom Clark, 
Burton, and Harlan) spoke of CUPC as embodying “enlightened concepts of humane 
justice,”589 and cited U.N. documents in considering the practices of “civilized 
nations.”590  The dissenters, however, reached a different result based on, among other 
things,591 a different interpretation of the evidence of international practices.592
C. Furman (1972) to the Present 
 
 In recent decades, the justices have clashed repeatedly over the use of UR, ECM, 
and the proper role of various societal indicators in discerning changes in CUPC’s 
application.  Many of the clashes have occurred in cases concerning the constitutionality 
of the death penalty. As discussed below, in Furman v. Georgia (1972), the Court 
invalidated death penalty statutes based on their arbitrary application, leaving open the 
opportunity for states to enact new legislation seeking to address the justices’ concerns.  
Within four years, the Court ruled on two different types of responses to Furman.  The 
Court upheld Georgia’s legislation providing greater guidance to those authorized to 
make the sentencing decision, and invalidated North Carolina’s mandatory death penalty 
statute.  The Court has not wavered from the determination that the death penalty is not 
inherently violative of CUPC.  It has, however, considered many challenges based on the 
death penalty’s disproportionality as punishment for certain crimes, and its 
                                                 
588 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 327 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that the dissenters 
adopted the same basic analytical approach as the plurality). 
589 356 U.S. at 127 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
590 356 U.S. at 126 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
591 Frankfurter also argued that the deprivation of Trop’s citizenship was not punishment for Eighth 
Amendment purposes. 
592 The plurality and dissenting opinions both noted laws in a number of countries imposing loss of 
citizenship on naturalized citizens as punishment for certain crimes.  The plurality minimized the relevance 
of these laws, because their application was limited to naturalized citizens, while the dissenters saw these 
laws as supporting the view that the deprivation of citizenship was an acceptable form of punishment.
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inappropriateness as a punishment for certain defendants.  For example, the Court 
initially approved the death penalty for juveniles under the age of sixteen, and for the 
mentally retarded, but, in recent years, reversed both of these holdings.  These decisions 
have been closely contested, often issued with multiple concurring and dissenting 
opinions. (All five majority justices in Furman, for example, issued separate opinions.) 
 Notwithstanding the complexity occasioned by shifting majorities and multiple 
opinions, central themes and axes of disagreement have emerged.  ECM has been critical 
to the debate.  Since the death penalty has a long history of acceptance, the Court’s 
repeated examination of its constitutionality has raised questions about the importance of 
history.  Moreover, in recent years, the Court has twice reversed holdings based on 
intervening shifts in public attitudes and practices.  In these cases, a fault line has 
crystallized between two competing approaches to CUPC.  The prevailing approach is 
unabashedly universalistic and evolutive.  The current majority argues that, in applying 
CUPC, the justices should look for guidance to contemporary societal values (“CSV”).  
In assessing CSV, they look to a wide range of sources, including, not only state 
legislation, but also international practices, and the opinions of professional associations.  
For the majority, however, the CSV analysis is not, in itself, decisive.  The justices must 
also conduct their own independent assessment of the challenged punishment to 
determine its comportment with USEs.  A substantial minority of justices opposing this 
approach, has recently questioned the use of ECM.  Even accepting ECM, however, and 
the concept that CUPC’s application may change with evolving standards of decency, the 
current minority objects to the majority’s engaging in their own independent assessment.  
Unlike the majority, which appeals to USEs, the minority, like other Delegative Model 
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approaches we have seen, emphasizes the importance of particularistic sources for 
judicial decisionmaking.  On this view, there are only two available bases upon which the 
justices may invalidate legislation on CUPC grounds: (1) CUPC’s original meaning; or 
(2) CSV, as evidenced principally by legislative practices, and, to some degree as well, 
the behavior of juries.  This section discusses major cases in recent decades highlighting 
development of the majority’s approach, and the continuing axis of disagreement. 
 While Furman v. Georgia (1972)593 invalidated the challenged Georgia and Texas 
statutes, only two justices (Brennan and Marshall) held that the death penalty was 
inherently unconstitutional.  Three justices (Douglas, White, and Stewart) held that the 
death penalty was unconstitutional as applied.  Brennan explained his approach to CUPC 
in considerable detail.  His universalistic, evolutive framework considered four criteria.  
The first, the organizing principle, was the universalistic concept of human dignity.  “The 
primary principle,” Brennan wrote, “which I believe supplies the essential predicate for 
the application of the others, is that a punishment must not by its severity be degrading to 
human dignity.”594  The purpose of the framework’s other elements was “simply to 
provide means by which a court can determine whether a challenged punishment 
comports with human dignity.”595  “At bottom,” the Clause: 
prohibits the infliction of uncivilized and inhuman 
punishments. The State, even as it punishes, must treat its 
members with respect for their intrinsic worth as human 
beings. A punishment is ‘cruel and unusual,’ therefore, if it 
does not comport with human dignity.596 (269). 
 
Punishments that inflicted severe suffering were forbidden because: 
                                                 
593 408 U.S. 238. 
594 408 U.S. at 281 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
595 408 U.S. at 282 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
596 408 U.S. at 269 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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they treat members of the human race as nonhumans, as 
objects to be toyed with and discarded. They are thus 
inconsistent with the fundamental premise of the Clause 
that even the vilest criminal remains a human being 
possessed of common human dignity. 
 
The infliction of an extremely severe punishment . . . may 
reflect the attitude that the person punished is not entitled to 
recognition as a fellow human being.597  
 
Brennan considered the death penalty inherently and “uniquely degrading to human 
dignity,” since it involved “by its very nature, a denial of the executed person's 
humanity,” and excluded him from the “human family.”598
 The analysis, however, did not end there.  Due to capital punishment’s 
“longstanding usage and acceptance in this country,” Brennan did not think himself 
justified in invalidating it on the first criterion alone.  Brennan’s unusually detailed 
opinion provides an excellent illustration of the tension between universalistic and 
particularistic bases of rights.  Based on his own UR, Brennan considered the death 
penalty unconstitutional.  Despite the fact that he framed his entire inquiry around USEs, 
however, he did not consider himself justified in ruling on universalistic bases alone.  
While retaining USEs as guiding principles, he thought it necessary to incorporate 
particularistic bases into the analysis.  Just how universalistic and particularistic bases are 
to interact, however, poses a difficult challenge.  Brennan’s second criterion was CSV.  A 
constitutional punishment could not be unacceptable to contemporary society.  Public 
attitudes were evidence bearing on whether a punishment respected dignity.  “[R]ejection 
by society” was a “strong indication that a severe punishment does not comport with 
                                                 
597 408 U.S. at 272-73 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
598 408 U.S. at 290-91 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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human dignity.”599  Thus, Brennan relied on particularistic sources as evidence bearing 
on an ultimately universalistic determination, as justices have done in other issue areas 
(as when the Court viewed uniformity of practice as evidence of a criminal procedural 
right’s universalistic status (ch. 4, B)). 
 One of the persistent objections to UR has been the opportunity it presents for 
excessive judicial discretion, and the imposition of a judge’s subjective will.  Brennan 
was keenly aware of this difficulty associated with his use of UR, even when combined 
with an assessment of societal values.  He observed that the “danger of subjective 
judgment is acute” when judges assess public attitudes, or apply open-ended standards, 
such as whether a punishment is “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.600  To 
minimize the danger, it was critical for judges to rely on objective factors, such as “the 
history of a challenged punishment,” and “society’s practices with respect to its use.”601  
Brennan concluded that capital punishment had “been almost totally rejected by 
contemporary society.”602  “At the very least,” Brennan had to “conclude that 
contemporary society views this punishment with substantial doubt.”603  The persuasive 
evidence included: state legislation, showing that a number of states had abolished the 
death penalty, while others had limited its use; low rates of imposition of the death 
penalty by juries; and a substantial incidence of governors commuting death sentences.  
For Brennan, measurements of the actual imposition of the death penalty were more 
revealing of societal acceptance than legislative authorization.  It was true that state 
                                                 
599 408 U.S. at 277 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
600 408 U.S. at 278 n. 21 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting State of La. ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 
U.S. 459, 470 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
601 408 U.S. at 279 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
602 408 U.S. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
603 408 U.S. at 300 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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legislation, referenda, and public opinion polls indicated substantial approval of 
authorization of the death penalty.  However, in practice, society’s unease was reflected 
in the infrequency with which the death penalty was imposed in practice: 
The objective indicator of society's view of an unusually 
severe punishment is what society does with it, and today 
society will inflict death upon only a small sample of the 
eligible criminals.  Rejection could hardly be more 
complete without becoming absolute. 
 
 The rarity of the death penalty’s imposition was also closely related to another of 
Brennan’s criteria--arbitrariness.  The state “must not arbitrarily inflict a severe 
punishment[,] because . . . the State does not respect human dignity when, without 
reason, it inflicts upon some people a severe punishment that it does not inflict upon 
others.”604  Out of the total number of possible death sentences, the actual number was so 
small that it “smacks of little more than a lottery system.”605  The final criterion in 
Brennan’s framework was a form of ends-means testing traceable to Weems.  A 
punishment could not be “excessive in view of the purposes for which it is inflicted.”  
CUPC would be violated if there was “a significantly less severe punishment adequate to 
achieve the purposes for which the punishment is inflicted.”  If this were the case, the 
unnecessarily severe punishment would amount to the “pointless infliction of 
suffering.”606  This criterion also cut against the death penalty’s constitutionality, because 
the purposes commonly urged in the death penalty’s defense--deterrence and retribution--
were not served by its imposition.  Since all four criteria cut against constitutionality, 
Brennan concluded that the death penalty did not comport with human dignity. 
                                                 
604 408 U.S. at 274 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
605 408 U.S. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
606 408 U.S. at 279 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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 Marshall’s framework was also universalistic and evolutive.  He set forth a 
number of bases upon which punishments could violate CUPC.  First, the Clause 
prohibited “punishments that inherently involve so much physical pain and suffering that 
civilized people cannot tolerate them,” such as the rack or thumbscrew.  This inquiry was 
independent of “public sentiment . . . in a particular case or at any one moment in 
history.”607  An additional basis concerned public attitudes.  Independent of other criteria, 
a punishment violated the Clause “if citizens found it to be morally unacceptable,”608 or if 
“it shocks the conscience and sense of justice of the people.”  The determining factor was 
not actual public feelings, but “whether people who were fully informed as to the 
purposes of the penalty and its liabilities would find the penalty shocking, unjust, and 
unacceptable.”609  Thus, an examination of existing legislation was not determinative.  
Few people paid attention to the issue.  An informed public might feel differently.  
Marshall was insisting, not on rationality, but, on knowledge: 
This is not to suggest that with respect to this test of 
unconstitutionality people are required to act rationally; 
they are not. With respect to this judgment, a violation of 
the Eighth Amendment is totally dependent on the 
predictable subjective, emotional reactions of informed 
citizens.610
 
Notwithstanding evidence of public acceptance of capital punishment, Marshall believed 
the death penalty violated the Clause, because an informed public would not accept it: 
Assuming knowledge of all the facts presently available 
regarding capital punishment, the average citizen would, in 
my opinion, find it shocking to his conscience and sense of 
                                                 
607 408 U.S. at 330 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
608 408 U.S. at 360 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
609 408 U.S. at 361 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
610 408 U.S. at 362 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
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justice. For this reason alone capital punishment cannot 
stand.611
 
 In separate, concurring opinions, White, Stewart, and Douglas each focused on 
the infrequency with which capital punishment was inflicted.  White argued that capital 
punishment could not serve any of its purposes when inflicted so rarely.  Its use 
amounted to “the pointless and needless extinction of life with only marginal 
contributions to any discernible social or public purposes.”612  Stewart focused largely on 
the arbitrariness with which the death penalty was imposed. asserting that the  
Amendment could not tolerate a punishment “so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.”613  
Douglas found the principle of equal protection (protecting unpopular minorities from 
biased enforcement of the laws), implicit in the Amendment, and that this principle was 
violated by the arbitrary way in which the death penalty was imposed. 
 Given the long history of capital punishment in the United States, its invalidation 
implicated ECM.  Dissenting, Burger (joined by Justices Lewis Powell, Blackmun, and 
Rehnquist) did not challenge ECM or its link with public morality: 
[T]he Eighth Amendment prohibition cannot fairly be 
limited to those punishments thought excessively cruel and 
barbarous at the time of the adoption of the Eighth 
Amendment. A punishment is inordinately cruel, in the 
sense we must deal with it in these cases, chiefly as 
perceived by the society so characterizing it. The standard 
                                                 
611 408 U.S. at 369 (Marshall, J., concurring).  Like Brennan, Marshall’s framework also included ends-
means testing.  A punishment violated the Eighth Amendment if it imposed “excessive or unnecessary 
penalties,” and “serves no valid legislative purpose.” 408 U.S. at 331 (Marshall, J., concurring).  This 
element of Marshall’s analysis required consideration of “whether less severe penalties would satisfy the 
legitimate legislative wants as well as capital punishment.” 408 U.S. at 342 (Marshall, J., concurring).  
Considering six purposes offered to justify capital punishment (retribution, deterrence, prevention of 
repetitive criminal acts, encouragement of guilty pleas and confessions, eugenics, and economy), Marshall 
found that all of them were either illegitimate purposes, or were not actually served by the imposition of the 
death penalty.  Marshall conceded that his analysis of whether a punishment was excessive and 
unnecessary could be framed in such a way that it was barely distinguishable from the strict scrutiny test.  
408 U.S. 238, 359 n. 41. (Marshall, J., concurring). 
612 408 U.S. at 312 (White, J., concurring). 
613 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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of extreme cruelty is not merely descriptive, but necessarily 
embodies a moral judgment. The standard itself remains the 
same, but its applicability must change as the basic mores 
of society change.614
 
The Amendment forbade “the imposition of punishments that are so cruel and inhumane 
as to violate society's standards of civilized conduct.”615  The dissenters, however, 
advocated a different approach to assessing public attitudes.  Burger stressed the 
overriding importance of legislation.  In a democratic society, the legislatures, not courts, 
were “constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the 
people.”  Thus, “the legislative judgment is presumed to embody the basic standards of 
decency prevailing in the society. This presumption can only be negated by unambiguous 
and compelling evidence of legislative default.”616  Reliance on legislative judgments 
minimized the danger of subjective judicial decisionmaking. 
[W]here as here, the language of the applicable provision 
provides great leeway and where the underlying social 
policies are felt to be of vital importance, the temptation to 
read personal preference into the Constitution is 
understandably great. It is too easy to propound our 
subjective standards of wise policy under the rubric of 
more or less universally held standards of decency.617
 
The fact that Congress, the District of Columbia, and forty states had authorized the death 
penalty constituted overwhelming evidence that it comported with contemporary 
standards.  It was not “a punishment such as burning at the stake that everyone would 
ineffably find to be repugnant to all civilized standards.  Nor is it a punishment so 
roundly condemned that only a few aberrant legislatures have retained it on the statute 
                                                 
614 408 U.S. at 382 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
615 408 U.S. at 397 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
616 408 U.S. at 384 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
617 408 U.S. at 385 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
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books.”618  Without conceding their relevance, the dissenters also cited public opinion 
polls for the limited purpose of noting that “the reported results have shown nothing 
approximating the universal condemnation of capital punishment that might lead us to 
suspect that the legislatures in general have lost touch with current social values.”  The 
dissenters also opposed the ends-means testing employed by some of the majority 
justices.  The argument that capital punishment was unnecessary to achieving legislative 
goals was a policy, not a judicial, argument.  The Amendment “does not prohibit all 
punishments the States are unable to prove necessary to deter or control crime.”619  
 In Furman, then, there was agreement on two propositions: (1) the meaning of 
CUPC could evolve; and (2) CSV was relevant to how it evolved.  An important 
disagreement, however, concerned the measurement of CSV.  No justices denied the 
relevance of legislation, but the dissenters looked to it as the chief factor.  The 
combination of ECM and heavy reliance on legislation is troublesome, if constitutional 
rights are supposed to act as independent restraints on lawmakers.  Legislation is the 
product of lawmakers.  It should be constrained by CUPC.  If an approach recognizes that 
the meaning of CUPC evolves, and looks to the actions of legislatures as key 
determinants of how it evolves, then the approach risks failing to provide a check on 
lawmakers.  It should be recognized, however, that, in Furman, Burger essentially used 
an accounting of legislation as a rebuttal to the charge that the death penalty was 
inconsistent with contemporary values.  He did not use recent shifts in legislation to 
justify changes in meaning. 
                                                 
618 408 U.S. at 431 (Powell, C.J., dissenting, joined by the other three dissenting justices). 
619 408 U.S. at 397 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
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   Keying on the Furman opinions that stressed the arbitrariness of the death 
penalty’s imposition, many states amended their death penalty statutes.  In Gregg v. 
Georgia (1976),620 the Court upheld, 7-2, Georgia’s response to Furman. (Since 
Georgia’s approach included innovations that other state legislatures had implemented, 
the decision’s implications reached beyond a single state.)  Georgia’s legislation provided 
for a bifurcated trial.  If the first part of the trial resulted in a guilty verdict, then a 
sentencing trial was conducted.  Before the death penalty could be considered, the trier of 
fact had to find unanimously, and beyond a reasonable doubt, that at least one 
aggravating circumstance (of ten listed by the statute) applied to the defendant’s crime.  
If an aggravating circumstance was established, the trier of fact had to decide whether to 
impose the death penalty, taking into account mitigating and other aggravating 
circumstances.  The legislation also provided procedures for review on appeal, including 
completion by the trial judge of a questionnaire addressing matters relating to the 
possibility of arbitrariness, disproportionality, racial prejudice, or error concerning guilt. 
 In their opinion announcing the judgment of the Court, Stewart, Powell, and 
Stevens began by explaining why capital punishment was not per se unconstitutional.  A 
punishment could violate CUPC either because it was unacceptable to CSV, or because, 
independent of public attitudes, it transgressed universalistic standards.  Like other 
justices, Stewart, Powell and Stevens stressed the dangers of excessive judicial discretion.  
Judges had to resist the temptation to impose their own subjective preferences.  
Therefore, it was critical that judges look to “objective indicia that reflect the public 
attitude toward a given sanction.”621  Like the Furman dissenters, they emphasized that 
                                                 
620 428 U.S. 153. 
621 428 U.S. at 173. 
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courts were “not designed to be a good reflex of a democratic society.”622  A punishment 
selected by the people’s democratic representatives came before the Court with a strong 
presumption of validity.  This was especially true, because “the constitutional test is 
intertwined with an assessment of contemporary standards and the legislative judgment 
weighs heavily in ascertaining such standards.”623  State legislation enacted after Furman 
negated the argument that the death penalty was unacceptable according to societal 
standards.  Congress and at least thirty-five states had reacted to Furman by enacting new 
legislation that included the death penalty as a sentence for some crimes, while trying to 
address the constitutional concerns expressed by some of the justices.  The relative 
infrequency with which juries imposed the death penalty did not necessarily reflect 
categorical disapproval of capital punishment, but, rather, suggested that many believed 
the penalty should be reserved for egregious cases. 
 Stewart, Powell, and Stevens addressed the troublesome implications of relying 
too heavily on legislative practices in constitutional interpretation.  They indicated that 
CSV, with its heavy reliance on legislation, did not, alone, determine constitutionality.  
Since the Amendment protected the governed from legislative abuses, legislation could 
not be the sole determinant of the constitutionality of the punishments adopted by 
legislatures.624  As a basis for evaluating legislation that was independent of legislation, 
the justices looked to USEs.  They accepted Warren’s pronouncement in Trop that 
CUPC’s basic concept was that punishments must respect human dignity.  With human 
dignity as the overarching standard, they articulated more specific principles that 
followed, analogous to the role that IMPs have played in other issue areas.  To withstand 
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scrutiny, a punishment could neither “involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain,” nor “be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.”625  A punishment 
would not be invalidated on the grounds that a less severe penalty would adequately serve 
legislative ends, but a punishment could not “be so totally without penological 
justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.”626  Applying these 
criteria to the death penalty, Stewart, Powell, and Stevens could not find that capital 
punishment was, in all cases, unconstitutional.  They also found the statute adequately 
addressed Furman’s with arbitrary sentencing procedures.627
 In Woodson v. North Carolina (1976),628 the Court considered a different 
response to Furman.  North Carolina made capital punishment mandatory for first-degree 
murder.  The Court invalidated the legislation, 5-4.  As in Gregg, Stewart, Powell, and 
Stevens issued the opinion announcing the judgment of the Court.  Their examination of 
CSV focused on the acceptability of mandatory death penalty statutes.  While some states 
had imposed mandatory death penalties earlier in American history, by 1963, no states 
continued that practice.  Prior to Furman, “the practice of sentencing to death all persons 
convicted of a particular offense ha[d] been rejected as unduly harsh and unworkably 
rigid.”629  In the four years between Furman and Gregg, ten states enacted mandatory 
death penalty statutes.  The enactment of these statutes, however, did not reflect a change 
in public attitudes.  Rather, they reflected confusion in interpreting Furman.  Public 
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opinion polls, and jurors’ reluctance to impose death further demonstrated Americans’ 
disapproval of mandatory statutes. 
 In dissent, Rehnquist challenged ECM.  It was “by no means clear” that CUPC 
“was not limited to those punishments deemed cruel and unusual at the time of the 
adoption of the Bill of Rights.”  Thus, “evolving standards of decency” made for a 
“somewhat shaky point of departure.”630  Even accepting ECM arguendo, however, 
Rehnquist interpreted the evidence of CSV differently.  He placed greater weight on the 
fact that ten states that had adopted mandatory death penalty statutes since Furman, 
showing that they preferred mandatory statutes to abolishing the death penalty. 
 Gregg established that the death penalty could comply with CUPC, if 
implemented according to procedures adequately channeling sentencing discretion.  The 
Court has never wavered from position that the death penalty is not per se 
unconstitutional.  Since Gregg, however, the Court has considered claims that the death 
penalty could not constitutionally be imposed or certain categories of crime, or on certain 
classes of persons.  In Coker v. Georgia (1977),631 the Court held that the death penalty 
was an excessive punishment for the crime of raping an adult woman.  Announcing the 
Court’s judgment, White (joined by Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens) stated that a 
punishment violated the Amendment, not only if it was barbaric, but also if it was 
“‘excessive’ in relation to the crime committed.”  Citing Gregg, White stated that a 
punishment was excessive if it: 
(1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals 
of punishment and hence is nothing more than the 
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering; 
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or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the 
crime. 
 
 CSV was an element of the disproportionality analysis.  The specific question was 
the public acceptability of the death penalty as punishment for raping an adult.  
Concerning state legislation, White found, while the “current judgment . . . is not wholly 
unanimous, . . .it obviously weighs very heavily on the side of rejecting capital 
punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an adult woman.”632  In the fifty years before 
Coker, it had never been the case that a majority of the states authorized the death penalty 
in cases of rape.  When Furman was handed down, sixteen states had such statutes.  
Furman invalidated all death penalties in force at the time, and only three states 
reinstated the death penalty as a punishment for the rape of an adult.  With respect to jury 
verdicts, White noted, between 1973 and 1977, Georgia juries imposed the death penalty 
in less than 10% of the cases in which it was available as a punishment for rape.  White 
also referred to international practices.  Noting that the Court in Trop discussed the 
“climate of international opinion” with respect to the punishment at issue, White 
considered it “not irrelevant” that, according to a 1965 survey, only three of sixty 
countries surveyed employed the death penalty in rape cases.633  Like Stewart, Powell, 
and Stevens in Gregg, White indicated that the CSV analysis did not “wholly determine 
this controversy, for the Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will 
be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the 
Eighth Amendment.”  Nevertheless, the evidence concerning “the legislative rejection of 
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capital punishment,” served to “strongly confirm[] [the Court’s] own judgment” that 
capital punishment was excessive for rape of an adult.634  
 White’s reliance on state legislation was curious.  He stated that it “obviously 
weighs very heavily” against constitutionality.  Yet, by his own account, just five years 
before the decision, sixteen states had legislation similar to the statute at issue.  We have 
seen various ways of relying on evidence of practices.  We saw, for example, in the 
Court’s PDP jurisprudence that the Court sometimes pointed to uniformity of practice as 
evidence of a rights’ universalistic status.  The reasoning appeared to be that a right’s 
universal observance was evidence of its indispensability to cherished ends.  Conversely, 
lack of uniformity was evidence that reasonable people, committed to the same cherished 
ends, could disagree, and, consequently, that the right in question lacked universalistic 
status.  White, however, was not using legislation in this manner.  He was counting 
legislation very heavily against constitutionality when the evidence suggested a large 
degree of dissensus.  The difference in the use of legislation is not merely one of degree.  
It raises questions about what the relationship is between evidence of existing legislative 
practices and the Court’s determination.  If an issue is closely contested, then how does a 
snapshot of a temporary “lead” for one position over another inform constitutional 
analysis?  Similar questions were raised by Kennedy’s use of state legislation in 
Lawrence v. Texas (ch. 3, G).  Importantly, White in Coker, (like Kennedy in Lawrence) 
indicated that he was not relying exclusively on state legislation, but was bringing his 
own judgment to bear on the question.  Nevertheless, White’s statement of heavy reliance 
on legislation brings to the fore questions about its role. 
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 In dissent, Burger (joined by Rehnquist) challenged White’s CSV analysis.  He 
placed greater weight on the fact that, before Furman, sixteen states authorized the death 
penalty for rape of an adult.  The fact that Furman had invalidated those laws, and that, in 
responding to the legal confusion caused by that case, only three states had re-enacted 
such laws, was less relevant.  Moreover, even if only three states favored the death 
penalty as a punishment for rape of an adult, that would contradict a finding of the 
punishment’s unacceptability.  The mere fact that a minority of the states favored a 
certain punishment did not, in itself, establish its incompatibility with public morality.635
 Like Coker, Enmund. v. Florida (1982)636 concerned a challenge to the use of the 
death penalty as punishment for a certain category of crime.  The Court (White) held, 5-4, 
that death was an unconstitutionally disproportionate punishment for robbery, where the 
defendant did not intend or commit homicide (“non-homicide robbery”).  White again 
focused on existing legislation.  Of the thirty-six states that authorized the death penalty, 
only a “small minority” of eight provided the death penalty for non-homicide robbery.  In 
another nine states, the sentencing body could impose the death penalty, depending on its 
appraisal of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  Even if one counted all 
seventeen states as authorizing the death penalty for non-homicide robbery, White noted, 
this amounted only about a third of the states.  Moreover, of the eight states that enacted 
new death penalty statutes in the previous four years, none had provided the death 
penalty for non-homicide robbery.  Though the states were not unanimous, and the CSV 
evidence was less strong than in Coker, the evidence concerning state legislation 
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“nevertheless weighs on the side of rejecting capital punishment for the crime at 
issue.”637  Citing Coker for the proposition that the “climate of international opinion” was 
“not irrelevant,”638 White also noted that the doctrine of felony murder had been 
abolished in England and India, restricted in Canada and other Commonwealth countries, 
and was not used in continental Europe. 
 In addition to the CSV analysis, the majority also engaged in its own 
proportionality analysis, insisting that it was “for [the Court] ultimately to judge” the 
punishment’s constitutionality.  The majority’s own analysis led to the same conclusion.  
Robbery was not “so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response 
may be the penalty of death.”639  The difference in the seriousness of crimes between 
robbery and murder was substantial.  Citing Gregg, White considered whether imposing 
the death penalty for Enmund’s crime furthered either of capital punishment’s two major 
purposes: deterrence and retribution.  Neither of these purposes was served since 
Enmund’s crimes lacked the intent to kill.  Without making a contribution to these 
purposes, the death penalty was pointless infliction of suffering. 
 In dissent, O’Connor (joined by Burger, Rehnquist and Powell), disputed the 
majority’s analysis of state legislation.  More inclined to take sentencing provisions into 
account, O’Connor counted twenty-three states where existing laws authorized the death 
penalty for non-homicide robbery.  Thus, nearly half of the states, and nearly two-thirds 
of the states with death penalties, had legislation similar to that challenged in Enmund.  
Rather than weighing heavily in favor of invalidation, the evidence of state legislation 
demonstrated that the evolving standards of decency “still embrace capital punishment 
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for this crime.”640  O’Connor also objected to the majority’s arguments based on the 
punishment’s failure to serve capital punishment’s major purposes.  This was not 
legitimate judicial inquiry.  The ends and effectiveness of the law were better left to 
legislative judgment. 
 The Court has also heard claims that the death penalty could not constitutionally 
be imposed on certain classes of defendants.  In Thompson v. Oklahoma  (1988),641 the 
Court held, 5-3, that death could not be imposed on a person who was under the age of 
sixteen years old at the time of the offense.  Announcing the judgment of the Court,642 
Stevens (joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun), argued that the CSV evidence led 
to the “unambiguous conclusion that the imposition of the death penalty on a 15-year-old 
offender is now generally abhorrent to the conscience of the community.”643  Fourteen 
states had no death penalty.  Of the states with a death penalty, eighteen had minimum 
ages of at least sixteen years, and nineteen states did not establish a minimum age.  
Stevens also pointed to evidence from other countries.  The opposition in the United 
States to the execution of juveniles was consistent with the views of “other nations that 
share our Anglo-American heritage, and . . . the leading members of the Western 
European community.”644  The United Kingdom and New Zealand, which retained the 
death penalty for some crimes, did not allow the execution of juveniles.  The death 
penalty was abolished in West Germany, France, Portugal, The Netherlands, all of the 
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Scandinavian countries, Australia (except for the State of New South Wales), and the 
Soviet Union.  In another set of countries, including Canada, Italy, Spain, and 
Switzerland, the execution of juveniles was permitted only for exceptional crimes such as 
treason.  Stevens also found the evidence concerning jury verdicts persuasive, as it had 
been forty years since the last time a jury imposed death on a defendant under sixteen.  In 
addition, Stevens referred to “the views of respected professional organizations.”645  The 
American Bar Association and American Law Institute opposed execution of juveniles. 
 As the Court had done in earlier cases, following CSV analysis, Stevens indicated  
that the Court must reach its own independent judgment.  He inquired whether the 
imposition of the death penalty for juveniles under sixteen “measurably contributes” to 
the major purposes of capital punishment.  Focusing on psychological differences 
between adults and persons under sixteen, he concluded that retaining the death penalty 
for juveniles under sixteen served the goals of neither deterrence nor retribution. 
 In dissent, Scalia (joined by Rehnquist and White) interpreted state legislation 
differently.  The critical fact was that almost 40% of the states, including a majority of 
death penalty states, allowed the imposition of the death penalty in cases where juveniles 
were tried as adults, which could include persons under the age of sixteen.  Moreover, 
even with respect to the states that had rejected execution of juveniles, it had not been 
established that the reason for this was a societal belief in the moral unacceptability of 
executing juveniles.  The rejection could have reflected a general decline in support for 
capital punishment, and a belief that the execution of juveniles should be rare.  Scalia 
also argued that the practices of other countries were irrelevant.  The proper inquiry 
concerned attitudes within the United States.  That 40% of American states did not rule 
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out the challenged punishment showed that there was no national consensus against it.  
The practice, accordingly, was constitutional, “even if that position contradicts the 
uniform view of the rest of the world.  We must never forget that it is a Constitution for 
the United States of America that we are expounding.”646
 Scalia also challenged the notion that the Court should form its own independent 
judgment of the appropriateness of the challenged punishment.  There were only two 
bases upon which a punishment could violate CUPC: the original understanding of the 
Clause, and the evolving standards of decency of American society.  Stevens did not 
address original understanding, and the portion of his opinion extending beyond 
American attitudes exceeded the bounds of legitimate inquiry, opening the door to the 
justices’ reaching decisions based on their own personal consciences. 
 While Thompson that death could not be imposed on persons under sixteen, 
Stanford v. Kentucky (1989)647 upheld death for persons sixteen or older.  In his opinion 
for a four-person plurality, Scalia (joined by Rehnquist, Kennedy and White) accepted 
the premise that application of the Amendment could change with evolving standards of 
decency.  Again, however, he stressed that the relevant standards were those of “modern 
American society,” and not those of the justices, or places outside the United States.  
Legislation provided the most significant evidence of American standards of decency.  Of 
the 37 death penalty states, 22 allowed execution of sixteen-year-olds, and 25 allowed 
execution of seventeen-year-olds.  This data did “not establish the  degree of national 
consensus that the Court has previously thought sufficient to label a particular 
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punishment cruel and unusual”648  In Coker, for example, Georgia had been the only 
jurisdiction that imposed the death penalty for the rape of an adult (under the majority’s 
count, which was based on Furman’s mass invalidation of legislation).  In Enmund, only 
eight jurisdictions had authorized the same kind of punishment challenged in that case.  
Scalia limited CSV investigation to legislation and evidence of sentences actually 
imposed, refusing to consider public opinion polls or the positions adopted by 
professional associations: 
We decline the invitation to rest constitutional law upon 
such uncertain foundations. A revised national consensus 
so broad, so clear, and so enduring as to justify a permanent 
prohibition upon all units of democratic government must 
appear in the operative acts (laws and the application of 
laws) that the people have approved.649
 
 Having concluded CSV analysis, Scalia considered the Court’s role fulfilled.  He 
rejected the notion that the Court should bring its own independent judgment to bear on 
the decency, or moral acceptability, of the challenged punishment: 
[O]ur job is to identify the “evolving standards of 
decency”; to determine, not what they should be, but what 
they are. . . [W]e emphatically reject [the] suggestion that 
the issues in this case permit us to apply our own informed 
judgment . . . regarding the desirability of permitting the 
death penalty for crimes by 16- and 17-year-olds.650
 
To enforce the justices’ own views, as the dissenters advocated, would be “to replace 
judges of the law with a committee of philosopher-kings.”651
 In some ways, Scalia’s approach was similar to Delegative Model approaches we 
have seen employed by other justices, including Black and the first Harlan.  Scalia 
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emphasized particularistic bases--original understandings and American legislation.  
Scalia departed, however, in a significant respect from the approach advocated by Black 
and Harlan.  We have seen that a pillar of the Delegative Model is opposition to ECM.  
Here, however, Scalia accepted ECM with respect to CUPC.  The approach was troubling 
for similar reasons noted with respect to White’s in Coker.  He accepted that the meaning 
of CUPC could change based on CSV and relied on legislation as the critical determinant 
of CSV.  Scalia’s approach was more troubling than White’s, though, because Scalia did 
not allow for an independent judicial analysis apart from the CSV investigation. 
 In dissent, Brennan (joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens) interpreted the 
CSV evidence differently than Scalia.  Believing that non-death-penalty states should be 
included, Brennan counted 27 states that did not allow the execution of juveniles under 
eighteen, a figure he thought cut in the direction of invalidity.  Moreover, while Brennan 
agreed that CSV analysis should begin with legislation and juries, his analysis did not end 
there: “The views of organizations with expertise in relevant fields and the choices of 
governments elsewhere in the world also merit our attention as indicators whether a 
punishment is acceptable in a civilized society.”652  Thus, Brennan noted that a number of 
professional organizations, including the American Bar Association, the American Law 
Institute, and the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, opposed the 
execution of juveniles.  Brennan also considered foreign practices.  Over 50 countries, 
including almost all of Western Europe, had either abolished the death penalty entirely, 
or had limited it to exceptional crimes such as treason.  In 27 other countries, the death 
penalty had not been formally abolished, but was never used in practice.  Out of the 
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countries that retained the death penalty, a majority (65) did not allow the imposition of 
death on juveniles.  Sixty-one countries retaining the death penalty did not exempt 
juveniles, but some of these countries had ratified international treaties prohibiting 
execution of juveniles.  Three treaties ratified or signed by the United States prohibited 
execution of juveniles, and, according to Amnesty International, since 1979, worldwide, 
only eight persons under the age of eighteen had been executed.  Based on this evidence, 
Brennan concluded that: “Within the world community, the imposition of the death 
penalty for juvenile crimes appears to be overwhelmingly disapproved.”653
 Brennan again defended the view that justices should conduct their own analysis 
of a challenged punishment’s moral acceptability.  CUPC mandated that punishments 
accord with human dignity.  Justices had the responsibility to address that question.  This  
analysis inquired whether the punishment was “wholly disproportionate to the 
blameworthiness of the offender,”654 and “whether the sentence makes a measurable 
contribution to acceptable goals of punishment,”655 particularly the goals of deterrence 
and retribution.  Emphasizing psychological differences between juveniles and adults 
relating especially to the moral culpability of, and responsibility for, ones’ actions, the 
dissenters concluded that execution of juveniles violated CUPC.  The plurality’s refusal 
to conduct an independent evaluation of the challenged punishment amounted to an 
abdication of institutional responsibility.  The Constitution imposed constraints on 
legislatures, and it was the judiciary’s responsibility to enforce those constraints.  An 
approach to constitutional interpretation could not serve to constrain legislatures while 
placing as much as weigh as did the plurality on an accounting of existing legislation: 
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The promise of the Bill of Rights goes unfulfilled when we 
leave constitutional doctrine to be formulated by the acts of 
those institutions which the Constitution is supposed to 
limit, as is the case under Justice Scalia’s positivist 
approach to the definition of citizens' rights. This Court 
abandons its proven and proper role in our constitutional 
system when it hands back to the very majorities the 
Framers distrusted the power to define the precise scope of 
protection afforded by the Bill of Rights, rather than 
bringing its own judgment to bear on that question, after 
complete analysis.656
 
While providing the majority with its fifth vote, O’Connor did not fully join Scalia’s 
opinion.  She agreed with the dissent concerning the Court’s responsibility to bring its 
own judgment to bear on the punishment’s acceptability. 
 The Court has also confronted the constitutionality of executing persons who are 
mentally retarded.  In Penry v. Lynaugh (1989),657 the Court upheld the practice, but 
reversed itself in Atkins v. Virginia (2002).658  The case brings to the forefront questions 
about ECM, because the Court’s reversal was based on intervening changes in public 
attitudes and practices.  At the time of Penry, only two states had legislation prohibiting 
the execution of mentally retarded persons.  Even adding the fourteen non-death-penalty 
states, this had not established that the challenged punishment was inconsistent with 
evolving standards of decency.  The Court’s (Stevens) approach in Atkins was similar to 
the approach advocated by the four dissenters and O’Connor in Stanford.  First, in the 
CSV analysis, Stevens observed that eighteen states barred the execution of the mentally 
retarded, sixteen more than at the time of Penry.  Since twelve states had no death 
penalty, this meant a total of 30 states did not sanction the execution of the mentally 
retarded.  It was not simply the number of states that was significant, but “the consistency 
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of the direction of change.”659  No state that prohibited the execution of the mentally 
retarded had removed the prohibition. 
 Like the Stanford, dissenters, the Atkins majority considered indicators of societal 
standards beyond the actions of legislatures and juries.  Noting the opposition, on the part 
of a wide range of professional and religious organizations, to the execution of the 
mentally retarded, the majority concluded that the “legislative judgment reflects a much 
broader social and professional consensus.”  Polling data indicated “a widespread 
consensus among Americans, even those who support the death penalty, that executing 
the mentally retarded is wrong.”  The majority also considered indicators of societal 
standards beyond American borders, finding that “within the world community, the 
imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is 
overwhelmingly disapproved.”660  The international sources were not dispositive, but 
“their consistency with the legislative evidence lends further support to our conclusion 
that there is a consensus among those who have addressed the issue.”  The majority also 
followed the dissenters and O’Connor in Stanford in bringing their own judgment to bear 
on the acceptability of the challenged punishment.  Focusing on the lessened personal 
culpability of the mentally retarded, Stevens concluded that imposing the death penalty 
on the mentally retarded was excessive. 
 Stevens’ opinion in Atkins bears substantial similarities to Kennedy’s majority 
opinion in Lawrence.661  The opinion engaged in UR, allowed for ECM, and looked to a 
variety of societal indicators in determining changes in constitutional meanings.  State 
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legislation was one of the most important societal indicators, and recent changes in 
legislation were considered the most telling.  Stevens’s analysis, with its emphasis on the 
direction of change, is similar to Kennedy’s recognition of an “emerging awareness.”662  
Uniformity, or near uniformity of practice was not needed for state practices to support 
the existence of a right.  Even in the midst of obvious continuing dissensus on an issue, a 
discernible trend towards the observance of a right could provide substantial support.  As 
in Lawrence, the Atkins majority looked to societal indicators beyond legislation, and 
beyond American borders.  Moreover, in both cases the Court did not rely on the 
investigation of societal indicators alone.  The majorities also engaged in their own 
analysis, drawing on universalistic standards--the implications of liberty in Lawrence, 
and the requirements of human dignity in Atkins.  As in privacy cases the Court has 
reasoned from autonomy as an IMP expressing a critical bridge principle between USEs 
and application, so in the CUPC context the Court has viewed dignity as requiring that 
the death penalty measurably contribute to its purported goals of retribution or 
deterrence, else it amount to nothing more than the pointless infliction of suffering.663
 Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas dissented, with all three joining the opinions 
written by Rehnquist and Scalia.  The total of eighteen states prohibiting the execution of 
the mentally retarded (less than half of the states with a death penalty), did not establish a 
national consensus against the practice.  The data did not show anything close to the 
consensus shown in previous cases where the Court had invalidated punishments.  
Moreover, many of the states with legislation prohibiting the execution of the mentally 
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retarded had adopted that legislation recently,664 suggesting public attitudes were fluid.  
The Atkins dissenters reiterated other positions from the Stanford dissent, including 
opposition to reliance on CSV indicators beyond legislation and juries, and opposition to 
independent judicial evaluation of the challenged punishment’s moral acceptability.   
The justices had no authority to impose their own feelings and intuitions.  Only actions of 
legislatures and juries could be considered, because only this type of investigation could: 
be reconciled with the undeniable precepts that the 
democratic branches of government and individual 
sentencing juries are, by design, better suited than courts to 
evaluating and giving effect to the complex societal and 
moral considerations that inform the selection of publicly 
acceptable criminal punishments.665
 
Of the majority opinion, Scalia wrote: “Seldom has an opinion of this Court rested so 
obviously upon nothing but the personal views of its Members.”666
 Just as Atkins overturned a thirteen-year-old decision, Roper v. Simmons (2005)667 
overturned the Stanford decision issued sixteen years earlier.  Roper held, 5-4, that 
execution of persons under eighteen violated CUPC.  The majority employed a similar 
analytical framework to the one employed by the majority in Atkins.  In his opinion for 
the Court, Kennedy stated that the Court’s review of Eighth Amendment challenges 
began with “objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular by the enactments 
of legislatures that have addressed the question.”  The analysis of objective indicia of 
consensus provided the justices with “essential instruction..”  The Court then had to 
determine whether, in the Court’s own judgment, the death penalty was an 
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unconstitutionally disproportionate punishment when imposed on juveniles.668  In the 
CSV analysis, Kennedy noted that the objective indicia of consensus had changed in the 
sixteen years between Stanford and Roper.  The raw numbers with respect to legislation 
were comparable to those in Atkins.  By the time Roper was decided, eighteen states 
barred the execution of juveniles.  It was also important, Kennedy argued, to include the 
twelve states with no death penalty.  Together, a total of 30 states did not provide for the 
execution of juveniles.  While acknowledging that the case for a national consensus was 
somewhat stronger in Atkins,669 Kennedy argued that the evidence nevertheless supported 
a finding that societal standards were no longer consistent with the execution of minors. 
 Kennedy also engaged in an examination of the sentences in foreign countries.  
Between 1990 and the decision in Roper, only seven countries other than the United 
States had executed minors, and all of them had subsequently abolished or disavowed the 
practice.  Kennedy accorded particular weight to the experience of the United Kingdom, 
due to the “historic ties between our countries and in light of the Eighth Amendment's 
own origins.”670  Decades before abolishing the death penalty entirely, the United 
Kingdom had abolished the death penalty for juveniles.  In addition, a number of 
international human rights treaties banned the execution of minors, including the U.N. 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.  The United States was one of only two countries 
that had not ratified the Convention.  In short, Kennedy wrote, “the United States now 
                                                 
668 543 U.S. at 574. 
669 Kennedy conceded, for example, that the pace of the legislative trend against the execution of juveniles 
was slower than the pace of the legislative trend against the execution of the mentally retarded, for 
example.  Between Penry and Atkins, sixteen additional states had adopted legislation banning the 
execution of the mentally retarded, while, between Stanford and Roper, four states had adopted legislation 
banning the execution of minors (and the judiciary of another state had banned the practice). 
670 543 U.S. at 577.  The Eighth Amendment is widely considered to have roots in the English Bill of 
Rights of 1689. 
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stands alone in a world that has turned its face against the juvenile death penalty.”671  
Although the “opinion of the world community” was “not controlling,” it did provide 
instruction and “respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions”672  The 
Court’s determination that the death penalty was a disproportionate punishment for 
minors found “confirmation in the stark reality that the United States is the only country 
in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty.”673  In 
defense of his reliance on international sources, Kennedy wrote that the American 
Constitution: 
sets forth, and rests upon, innovative principles original to 
the American experience, such as federalism; a proven 
balance in political mechanisms through separation of 
powers; specific guarantees for the accused in criminal 
cases; and broad provisions to secure individual freedom 
and preserve human dignity. These doctrines and 
guarantees are central to the American experience and 
remain essential to our present-day self-definition and 
national identity. Not the least of the reasons we honor the 
Constitution, then, is because we know it to be our own. It 
does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride 
in its origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of 
certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples 
simply underscores the centrality of those same rights 
within our own heritage of freedom.674
 
Again, the majority also conducted its own independent analysis, concluding that the 
imposition of the death penalty on minors was excessive.  Due to the diminished 
culpability of minors for their crimes, growing out of psychological differences between 
juveniles and adults, such as lower levels of maturity and greater vulnerability to peer 
pressure, retaining capital punishment for minors did not serve deterrence or retribution. 
                                                 
671 543 U.S. at 577. 
672 543 U.S. at 578. 
673 543 U.S. at 575. 
674 543 U.S. at 578. 
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 In dissent, Scalia, joined by Rehnquist and Thomas (as in Atkins) argued that non-
death-penalty states should not be included in the count of states opposing the execution 
of minors, because the constitutionality of the death penalty in general was not before the 
Court, and the count of non-death-penalty states shed no light on attitudes specifically 
towards the execution of minors.  Among the death penalty states, only 47% had 
prohibited the execution of minors.  “Words have no meaning,” Scalia wrote, “if the 
views of less than 50% of death penalty States can constitute a national consensus.”  
Previous cases, Scalia asserted, had “required overwhelming opposition to a challenged 
practice, generally over a long period of time,” and no evidence of such opposition was 
present in Roper.675
 Scalia also elaborated on arguments he had made in other cases against reliance 
on international sources in interpreting the Eighth Amendment.  Kennedy referred to two 
international agreements with provisions banning the execution of minors.  In one (U.N. 
Convention on the Rights of the Child), the United States was one of only two countries 
that had not ratified the agreement.  In the other (International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights) the United States had ratified the agreement with an express reservation 
opting out of the provision banning the execution of minors.  International treaties were 
irrelevant to the extent that they concerned actions and attitudes outside the United States.  
To the extent that they reflected U.S. attitudes, however, if anything, they undermined the 
majority’s argument, since they underscored the lack of an American consensus against 
the execution of juveniles.  Scalia argued that the majority’s “basic premise . . . that 
American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world ought to be rejected out 
                                                 
675 543 U.S. at 609 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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of hand.”676  He added that the Court was inconsistent in the weight it accorded to 
international legal practices.  The Court had evidently not placed much weight on 
international practices in numerous other areas of constitutional law.  Scalia contended, 
for example, that the rest of the world had universally rejected the strict application of the 
exclusionary rule enforced in the United States, that most other countries committed to 
religious neutrality did not insist on the same degree of separation of church and states as 
the United States, and that the United States was one of only six countries in the world 
that allowed abortion on demand up to the point of viability.  In response to Kennedy’s 
assertion that the affirmation of certain rights by other countries could underscore 
America’s commitment to constitutional rights, Scalia argued that the majority was using 
foreign law, not to underscore established principles of American constitutional law, but 
to set them aside.   
 We have seen that, in Stanford and other cases, Scalia and other justices had 
advocated a different approach to Eighth Amendment analysis than the one taken by the 
majority in Roper.  It generally appeared, however, that Scalia had agreed with other 
justices on at least one point--that the application of the Eighth Amendment could change 
with evolving standards of decency.  In Roper, however, Scalia appeared to challenge 
even this premise.  He stated, for example, that the Court had “wrongly, long rejected a 
purely originalist approach” to the Eighth Amendment.677  “In a system based upon 
constitutional and statutory text, democratically adopted,” Scalia wrote: 
the concept of ‘law’ ordinarily signifies that particular 
words have a fixed meaning. Such law does not change, 
and this Court's pronouncement of it therefore remains 
authoritative until (confessing our prior error) we overrule. 
                                                 
676 543 U.S. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
677 543 U.S. at 626 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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The Court has purported to make of the Eighth 
Amendment, however, a mirror of the passing and 
changing sentiment of American society regarding 
penology.678
 
Scalia also rejected O’Connor’s assertion that there was something special about the 
Eighth Amendment, in its drawing meaning from evolving societal standards.  He noted 
that there was nothing in the Eighth Amendment’s language to indicate such a special 
character.  In any event, Scalia said, citing Lawrence and Casey, the Court had also taken 
an evolutive approach in other areas of constitutional jurisprudence.679  While Scalia 
disapproved of ECM, given the approach that had long been adopted by a majority of the 
Court--tying changes in meaning to evolving standards of society--it was imperative that 
the justices limit their analysis to discerning changes in societal standards through an 
examination of American practices.  Any departure from that analysis would put the 
judges in the position of prescribing new standards, rather than “identify[ing] a moral 
consensus of the American people.”  Scalia asked rhetorically: “By what conceivable 
warrant can nine lawyers presume to be the authoritative conscience of the Nation?”680
 O’Connor cast the fourth dissenting vote, but wrote separately, because she 
disagreed with elements of Scalia’s opinion.  She agreed with the majority on ECM, and 
the Court’s responsibility to conduct an independent analysis.  She also took the 
opportunity to argue for the relevance of international practices: 
Obviously, American law is distinctive in many respects, 
not least where the specific provisions of our Constitution 
and the history of its exposition so dictate. . . But this 
Nation's evolving understanding of human dignity certainly 
is neither wholly isolated from, nor inherently at odds with, 
the values prevailing in other countries. On the contrary, 
                                                 
678 543 U.S. at 629 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
679 543 U.S. at 627 n. 9 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
680 543 U.S. at 616.  (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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we should not be surprised to find congruence between 
domestic and international values, especially where the 
international community has reached clear agreement-
expressed in international law or in the domestic laws of 
individual countries-that a particular form of punishment is 
inconsistent with fundamental human rights. At least, the 
existence of an international consensus of this nature can 
serve to confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and 
genuine American consensus.681
 
Stevens (joined by Ginsburg), apparently prompted by Scalia’s questioning of ECM, 
wrote separately to reaffirm that the meaning of the Eighth Amendment changed with 
evolving standards of decency, stating that the Court’s position that “our understanding 
of the Constitution does change from time to time has been settled since John Marshall 
breathed life into its text.”682
 Relatively early in its CUPC jurisprudence, the Court adopted an evolutive 
approach that appealed to USEs.  Its early decisions also relied on prevalent practices as a 
source of guidance.  While many of the decisions in recent decades have been 
complicated by the issuance of multiple opinions, a fault line has emerged centering on 
the use of UR and ECM.  While the prevailing approach is evolutive and universalistic, a 
number of justices, most notably Scalia, have presented opposing views.  The opposition 
to the prevailing approach has not been consistent in its view of ECM.  In many of the 
Court’s decisions since Furman (1972), the use of ECM had gone uncontested.  In Roper 
and other decisions, however, Scalia, with others, has objected to ECM.  With opposition 
to ECM, the approach advocated by Scalia falls within the Delegative Model that Black, 
                                                 
681 543 U.S. at 604-05 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  O’Connor disagreed, however, with both the majority’s 
CSV and independent analyses.  Not seeing enough change in state legislation since Stanford to warrant a 
different conclusion concerning the national consensus, O’Connor believed that the decision turned on the 
Court’s own independent judgment.  In opposition to the majority, she did not agree that, as an absolute 
rule, the execution of a juvenile was an excessive punishment.
682 543 U.S. at 587 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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the first Harlan, and other justices have employed.  It looks to particularistic bases for 
rights interpretation, especially history and legislation, stressing the need to confine 
judicial discretion. 
 Since the currently prevailing approach incorporates CSV into its discernment of 
changes in constitutional meanings, the use of practices and other societal indicators 
takes on significance in the Court’s jurisprudence.   The Court’s CSV analysis looks to a 
variety of indicators, including state legislation, international practice, and the views of 
professional associations.  The Court’s approach to CSV analysis raises questions.  In 
decisions like Atkins and Roper, the Court has found support for the invalidity of 
punishments from state legislation, even in the face of considerable dissensus among 
state practices.  It has placed special weight on trends.  In itself, separated from other 
elements of the Court’s approach, the use of legislative trends as a basis for rights 
interpretation has troubling implications.  If mere trends justify newly popular policies, 
then the notion of constitutional rights as an independent restraint on lawmakers is 
undermined.  The Court’s use of a similar approach, recognizing an “emerging 
awareness” in Lawrence raises the question of whether the approach is one that the Court 
will use widely across various issue areas.  It is not clear that there is anything about the 
Eighth Amendment that separates it from other constitutional rights provisions.  While 
the term “unusual” in the Clause might be thought to provide textual direction to rely on 
changing practices, the Court’s jurisprudence does not appear to have hinged on this 
term.683
                                                 
683 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 276 n. 20 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“It is fair to conclude 
from these statements that ‘(w)hether the word ‘unusual’ has any qualitative meaning different from ‘cruel’ 
is not clear.' Trop v. Dulles,  356 U.S., at 100 n. 32. The question, in any event, is of minor significance; 
this Court has never attempted to explicate the meaning of the Clause simply by parsing its words.”). 
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 The prevailing approach, however, does not rest only on the CSV analysis.  The 
framework’s overarching standard is universalistic--the requirements of human dignity.  
More specifically, dignity is considered to require that punishments not be 
disproportionate to the crime, and that they measurably contribute to the penological 
goals of retribution or deterrence, lest they amount merely to the pointless infliction of 
suffering.  Thus, the Court conducts its own universalistic inquiry.  The relationship 
between the universalistic inquiry and CSV analysis is not entirely clear.  The 
combination, however, reflects the complex relationship between universalistic and 
particularistic bases we have seen in other issue areas.  Universalistic standards play a 
critical role in providing independent basis for constraining lawmakers, but also raise 
concerns about excessive judicial discretion.  CSV analysis, with its emphasis on 
quantifiable indicators perhaps diminishes the perception that justices are relying on 
nothing more than their subjective preferences.  Moreover, with history’s role undercut 
by the Court’s recognition of ECM, the importance placed on state legislative practices 
provides a link between rights interpretation and the indicators reflecting the American 















 The previous chapters indicate that UR has played an important role in the 
Court’s jurisprudence from the earliest rights decisions (e.g. Calder (1798), Fletcher 
(1810)) to the present day (e.g. Lawrence (2003), Roper (2005)), across a wide range of 
substantive issue areas, including the Contract Clause, substantive due process, 
procedural due process, the applicability of the Constitution in overseas territories, and 
the prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments.”  It also shows significant 
connections in the use of UR across areas and time periods.  The depth of these 
connections suggests that use of UR can best be understood when studied, not in the 
context of isolated issue areas or time periods, but as a fundamental question confronting 
the Court whenever it adjudicates rights disputes.  This chapter discusses the Court’s use 
of UR with an emphasis on the characteristics, similarities, disagreements, and shifts that 
transcend the boundaries separating one issue from another.   
 Section A discusses major roles UR has played in the Court’s jurisprudence, 
including assessment of rights’ relative importance.  Section B discusses the common 
combination of universalistic and particularistic elements in the Court’s reasoning, and 
the shift away from extra-constitutional reasoning.  Section C discusses the significance 
in the justices’ common linkage of universalistic and evolutive reasoning.  Evolutive 
approaches raise questions about discernment of changes in meaning.  Section D 
discusses ways the justices have used practices and other societal indicators in 
determining how meanings change.  While universalistic, evolutive approaches have 
predominated, some justices have objected.  Section E describes the competing 
Delegative Model a number of justices have advocated.  Section F concludes with a 
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discussion of the Court’s use of UR, and debate over its use, as a reflection of tensions in 
American constitutionalism.   
A. Universal Reasoning’s Major Roles in the Court’s Jurisprudence 
 One of the major ways the justices have used UR is in assessing the relative 
importance of categories of rights.  Contemporary constitutional rights jurisprudence is 
built around a hierarchical approach to rights categories.  Rights deemed of special 
importance receive substantially greater judicial protection than ordinary rights.   UR has 
played a critical role in the development of the hierarchical approach.  Earlier in the 
Court’s history, property rights were considered essential to liberty, and received the 
Court’s highest attention.  By the late 1930s, the Court no longer considered property 
rights as deserving of the highest status within the constellation of protected rights.  Other 
rights, including expression and privacy, however, were considered indispensable to free 
government.  These rights were elevated to the highest status, and continue to receive the 
highest level of judicial protection. 
 The justices have also used UR in addressing questions about which rights apply 
in certain contexts.  The Due Process Clause confronted the justices with questions about 
which rights applied against states.  In making those determinations, the justices did not 
adopt constitutional text as the sole determinant.  They did not determine that all Bill of 
Rights protections applied against states, solely on that basis.  Instead, they inquired into 
whether rights enjoyed universalistic status.  Their inquiries were centered around USEs, 
such as whether specific rights were indispensable to free, republican, government.  The 
Court was also confronted with questions about which rights applied in the context of 
overseas territories.  Here, too, the Court looked to USEs. 
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 The REP framework describes a general approach that the justices have 
commonly used.  Among the most pervasive USEs has been the requirements of liberty, 
or free government (used with respect to the Contract Clause and doctrine of vested 
rights,684 economic due process,685 expression,686 privacy,687 PDP,688 and the applicability 
of the Constitution in overseas territories).689  A right, or category of rights is identified 
as essential to the USE, such as property rights during the EDP era, or rights of 
expression by the 1930s.  The next step in the chain of reasoning is the articulation of 
IMPs, which represent principles, rights, or requirements that follow from the USEs.  
During the EDP era, IMPs included the right to a calling, from which the justices 
reasoned to the liberty of contract.  With respect to privacy, the protection of the home 
and marital relationship have long been IMPs, with the concept of autonomy emerging 
more recently.  In the context of procedural due process, IMPs have included notice and 
the opportunity to be heard in one’s own defense.  IMPs are used as the basis for 
reasoning to more specific applications.  Within the REP framework, the protection of 
each link is essential to the chain.  If an IMP is violated, then the USE is violated.  In 
Lochner, the maximum hours law was inconsistent with the requirements of liberty 
(USE), because it violated the liberty of contract (IMP). 
 The study shows that the justices have also used universalistic reasoning to 
elevate the importance of certain governmental powers.  In its Contract Clause 
jurisprudence, the Court developed the concept of inherent and inalienable governmental 
                                                 
684 E.g., Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. 43, 52 (1815). 
685 E.g., Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898). 
686 E.g., Schneider v. New Jersey,  308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939). 
687 E.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1992).
688 E.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908). 
689 E.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 282-83 (1901). 
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powers (ch. 2, C).  The police powers were rooted in the basic purposes of government, 
the inherent attributes of sovereignty, and the indispensable requirements for the 
collective pursuit of the public welfare.  The universality of the police powers actually 
operated as a restraint on legislatures.  Regardless of popular or legislative will, the 
powers could not be bargained away.  The Court also applied the concept in the realm of 
due process (ch. 3, E).  The Court’s use of universalistic reasoning with respect to rights 
and powers was interrelated.   By the late 1930s, the Court’s approach had become so 
deferential to legislatures that it ceased to act as a significant check.  The development of 
a hierarchical approach to rights adjudication preserved a meaningful role for 
constitutional rights protections with respect to the categories of rights deemed most 
essential to liberty and justice.   
B. Mixed Reasoning and the Shift Away from Extra-Constitutional Reasoning 
 
 In their use of UR, the justices have commonly combined universalistic and 
particularistic elements in articulating standards of evaluation.  Indeed, in considering 
different interpretive approaches, the question is not so much whether reasoning should 
be universalistic or particularistic, but how the two forms of reasoning should be 
connected.  In the Court’s earliest period, combined standards sometimes included 
elements that were extra-constitutional.  In Calder (ch. 2, A), for example, Chase 
employed a form of reasoning based on the social contract.  One element stressed that the 
people made collective commitments, while another stressed the universalistic content of 
these commitments.  The reasoning was extra-constitutional to the extent that, in 
discussing constitutions, Chase often seemed to be referring to principles inherent to the 
very concept of a social contract, rather than to a specific enactment.  In the Court’s first 
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major Contract Clause decision, Fletcher v. Peck (1810), in addition to textual arguments, 
Marshall employed MRR and extra-constitutional reasoning.  The MRR formulation 
rested the decision on “general principles which are common to our free institutions.”690  
The particularistic element found authority in the principles because the American people 
chose them, while the universalistic thread found authority in their comportment with 
mandates of freedom.  Marshall also argued extra-constitutionally, suggesting rights 
could be rooted in “certain great principles of justice, whose authority is universally 
acknowledged,”691 and in the “nature of society and of government.”692  Other decisions 
during this period also combined textual and extra-constitutional arguments. 
 As we saw (ch. 2, B; ch. 3, A(1)), the Court shifted away from extra-
constitutional reasoning, increasingly hewing to an approach that framed UR as 
interpretation of constitutional provisions.  The shift away from extra-constitutional, 
reasoning and the common use of MRR, reflect that American constitutional thought 
provides reasons for justices to cite both universalistic and particularistic bases.  A basic 
purpose of government is to protect universalistically grounded rights, and universalistic 
standards provide a basis of rights reasoning that is independent of lawmakers.  At the 
same time, realization of universal rights in practice entails the rule of law, and the 
allocation of limited authority to distinct branches of government.  Reliance on UR 
subjects justices to charges that they are operating outside of their institutional authority, 
and, thus, undermining, rather than serving, government’s basic purposes.  The extra-
constitutionality of the early Court’s use of UR made it more vulnerable to charges that it 
was operating outside its authority.   
                                                 
690 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 139 (1810). 
691 10 U.S. at 133. 
692 10 U.S. at 135. 
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 Shifting away from extra-constitutional reasoning, nevertheless, does not 
eliminate all concerns associated with the use of UR.  Universalistic principles, however 
framed, are typically vague and contested.  Justices employing UR have often been 
charged with merely enforcing their own subjective will.  MRR formulations have 
provided a means of enabling the justices to engage in UR, while extending a link 
between USEs and particularistic authority.693  One element of the mixed formula 
recognizes a particularistic commitment.  The source of the commitment may be cited as 
the Framers, the common law, American institutions, or the Constitution.  A second 
element identifies the universalistic standard or principles to which the commitment has 
been made.  Thus, in following the mandates of universalistic principles, the justices are 
at the same time following particularistic commitments to those principles.  Framing UR 
as textual interpretation is itself a form of MRR.  The constitutional provision serves as 
the source of commitment to USEs, as when justices view due process as embodying 
requirements of liberty, or the Eighth Amendment as requiring respect for human dignity. 
 Even the interweaving of universalistic and particularistic elements, however, 
does not fully insulate the use of UR from attack.  As discussed below, use of UR has 
remained subject to criticism (sec. E), and the Court’s reliance on certain societal 
indicators in connection with UR reflects concerns over containing judicial discretion 
(secs. D, F). 
                                                 
693 Examples include the seminal SDP/privacy case, Meyer v. Nebraska (1923), in which the Court referred 
to the “privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free 
men.” 262 U.S. 399.  In the landmark SDP/expression case, Schneider v. New Jersey (1939), the Court 
referred to the freedom of speech and press as reflecting “the belief of the framers of the Constitution that 
exercise of the rights lies at the foundation of free government by free men.” 308 U.S. 147, 161.  In the 
seminal PDP case, Hurtado v. California (1884), the Court stated that due process required states to operate 
“within the limits of those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil 
and political institutions.” 110 U.S. 516, 535  This MRR formulation has been used extensively in the 
Court’s PDP jurisprudence, and at times in the area of SDP as well.  E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479, 493 (Goldberg, J. concurring). 
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C. The Connection Between Universal and Evolutive Reasoning 
 
 This research also shows that the Court has commonly combined UR with an 
approach allowing for the evolution of constitutional meanings.  Arguments for ECM 
have been closely associated with UR, and critical to its developing use.  Justifications of 
ECM have recognized that public morality changes.694  Since the Constitution is meant to 
be enduring, it must be able to accommodate such changes.  The Framers could not 
possibly have anticipated all ways in which power might be abused.  The Constitution, 
therefore, cannot be understood as an exhaustive list of specific limitations on 
government.  Instead, constitutional provisions must be viewed as embodying general 
principles.  The argument is often advanced that the Framers themselves understood the 
Constitution in this manner.  At a broad level, the principles embedded within the 
Constitution remain constant.  It is in this sense that an ECM approach may still provide a 
form of fixedness.  The application of principles, however, must be allowed to adapt to 
new conditions, the education of experience, and evolving public understandings of law 
and rights.  Under this approach, ECM and UR are closely linked, because the general 
principles embedded within the Constitution are understood in universalistic terms.  The 
justices may reason from USEs, while allowing specific understandings about rights to 
evolve.  The spirit of the approach was captured by Brown’s statement in Holden (1898) 
that, while “the cardinal principles of justice are immutable, . . . the methods by which 
justice is administered are subject to constant fluctuation.”695  More recently, in extending 
due process protection to privacy rights, such as a woman’s choice to terminate 
pregnancy, and the right to choose one’s intimate sexual partners, the Court has spoken of 
                                                 
694 This does not mean, of course, that the use of ECM can solve deep-seated societal rifts.  See Graber 
2006, 4. 
695 Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 387 (1898).  
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the Constitution as a basic charter embodying broad principles, articulated in deliberately 
vague terms, allowing successive generations to give different meanings to those 
terms.696 The Due Process Clause embodies the concept of liberty.  The justices have not 
approached the interpretation of due process liberty as they would a “tax statute.”697  
Rather, they have inquired into the basic requirements of liberty. 
 ECM is critical to the Court’s jurisprudence in two sense.  First, as we have seen,  
the Court’s acceptance of changing constitutional meanings has played an important role 
in a wide range of issue areas.698  ECM is also important conceptually to the Court’s 
rights reasoning.  The use of ECM brings tensions between universalistic and 
particularistic bases of rights to the fore.  Under the Delegative Model (discussed further 
in sec. D), the role of particularistic sources in constitutional interpretation is stressed.  
Judicial authority is rooted in the will of the people, as reflected in text and tradition.  
Practices--past and present--are relevant because they provide the best evidence of the 
particularistic bases of rights.  Many constitutional provisions are vague, but the Framers’ 
intentions can be illuminated by reference to the practices they took for granted, or 
considered consistent with the text.  The logic of the DM is disrupted by the adoption of 
ECM.  Under the DM, history provides the necessary specificity to make the Constitution 
a meaningful constraint on lawmakers, and to simultaneously provide a meaningful 
constraint on the judiciary’s own discretion and power.  ECM declares history non-
                                                 
696 E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003); see also Home Building and Loan Association v. 
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-43 (1934); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910). 
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1884). 
697 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 540 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
698 Chapter Three, for example, discussed the importance of ECM to the Court’s demotion of property 
rights, and elevation of other categories of rights, including privacy.  In the area of PDP, we saw that the 
Court did not hold all procedures with historical pedigree binding on the states, but allowed them to adopt 
new procedures provided they comported with USEs (ch. 4). With respect to CUPC, too, we have seen that 
the justices have not viewed the Clause’s scope as confined to the punishments already known, and 
rejected, at the time of the Founding (ch. 6). 
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binding.  Even if an ECM approach retains a role for history, once history is no longer 
viewed as determinative, another standard must be introduced.  Without some other 
standard, it would not be possible to distinguish between different historical practices, in 
order to determine which were binding, and which allowed for deviation. 
 The adoption of ECM, then, naturally raises the question of which standards the 
justices will use to determine when, and how, constitutional meanings may be allowed to 
change.  As we have seen, the predominant approach has been for the justices to look to 
USEs.  As we have also seen, the use of UR raises difficulties concerning the possibilities 
for excessive judicial discretion.  The justices have not relied on UR in isolation, but, 
have often incorporated into their analysis consideration of history, current practices, or 
other indicators.  The following section discusses different ways in which the justices 
have done this. 
D. The Use of History in Conjunction with Universal Reasoning 
 Reliance on history and precedent are basic elements of the American common 
law system.  In itself, it is unremarkable.  This study has shown that the justices have not 
relied exclusively on history and precedent.  Rather, they have often employed a 
universalistic, evolutive approach that is not bound by history.  The use of UR, however, 
has not taken the form of free-standing universalistic musings.  The justices have 
typically combined UR with references to particularistic considerations, such as 
practices--past or present.  What, then, is the relationship between practices and UR?   
 One approach to incorporating practices into a fundamentally universalistic 
framework has been to examine practices in jurisdictions that are dedicated to the same 
USEs the justices are employing.  If one is interested in determining whether a right is 
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essential to free, republican government, then one may wish to investigate the extent of 
the right’s observance within free, republican societies.  Uniform observance might count 
as evidence of its indispensability.699  Conversely, a lack of consensus might count as 
evidence against the right’s indispensable nature.700  On this approach, the ultimate 
standard remains universalistic, yet existing practices serve as evidence for or against a 
right’s universal status.  Reliance on practices may also place importance on the beliefs 
of those who have adopted the practices.  This approach stresses that it is not simply the 
fact of a practice that is relevant, but the beliefs supporting the practice.  The 
investigation should focus on how often the right has been observed specifically because 
it was believed to enjoy universalistic status.701  Again, the governing standard remains 
universalistic, and the practices examined function as evidence bearing on the 
determination.  While other variations are possible, the important point, here, is that in 
the approaches described, practices may be relied upon while it is also clear that the 
governing standard is universalistic.  Practices play the role of evidentiary support.  Their 
role is not authoritative.  That is, the justices are not bound by the practices they observe.  
The justices retain the authority to make the determination based on USEs.  Given the 
nature of their role, there is no reason why the practices of other countries might not be 
examined as well.  On this view, the relevance of state practices is not based on the state 
legislatures’ authority, but on their expression, or reflection, of beliefs about rights’ 
universalistic status.  American jurisdictions may be of the greatest interest, but practices 
in other jurisdictions may be relevant too.702
                                                 
699 E.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). 
700 Wolf  v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 29 (1949). 
701 See, e.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
702 See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). 
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 As we have seen (chs. 3, G; 6, C), in recent decades, the Court has at times 
appeared used practices in a manner that differs substantially from previous uses.  In 
cases such as Roper (2005) and Lawrence (2003), the Court has found support for rights 
in rends towards certain practices.  In addition to legislation, the approach has also looked 
to other societal indicators, such as the opinions of professional associations.  The 
implications of this approach, and concerns it raises, are discussed below (sec. F).  
E. Disagreements over Universal Reasoning, and the Delegative Model 
 
 The discussion in this chapter thus far has focused on dominant approaches.  
While the use of UR has been common, however, this research also shows that the use of 
UR has been a subject of disagreement between the justices since the earliest rights 
decisions and across a wide range of issue areas.  Moreover, fault lines between justices 
have been similar across time periods and issue areas as well.  While justices’ opinions 
naturally express views somewhat differently, it is useful to recognize, broadly, two 
opposing types of approaches.  The first is the universalistic, evolutive approach that has 
predominated.  The second is an approach referred to here as the Delegative Model.  The 
DM stresses reliance on particularistic bases of rights as a basis for judicial decision.  
This does not mean that the DM advocate is not committed to universal rights.  The DM 
advocate might believe that the constitutional system is worthwhile because it is designed 
to protect universal rights.  Indeed, the DM advocate may accept the outlines of social 
contract theory.  The first part of social contract theory asserts the existence of universal 
rights, and their protection as government’s raison d’etre.  But the second part of social 
contract theory describes individuals’ subjection to government for the common good.  
Institution of government requires enactment of positive laws, particularistic in character.  
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From the perspective of DM, judicial authority, like the authority of other public officials, 
is carefully circumscribed by positive laws.  Justices fulfill their role through strict 
compliance with the positive laws and the boundaries of their institutional authority.  This 
places a premium on particularistic sources for rights interpretation--the mandates of the 
supreme positive law.  Constitutional text is the starting point, and reference to traditional 
understandings, which shed light on the understandings of those who framed and enacted 
the text, can help to provide the requisite specificity.  The critical particularistic source is 
the will of the people, which must not be superseded by the will of the judge.  The DM, 
therefore, is greatly concerned with minimizing room for the exercise of the subjective 
will of the judge at the expense of constitutional mandates. 
 From the perspective of DM, judicial reference to universalistic standards is 
unwarranted.  The Constitution itself may embody universalistic principles, but the text, 
then, already incorporates the relevant universalistic reasoning.703  The judge need not 
inject them.  The DM advocate is suspicious of UR, because it leaves too much room for 
the judge to impose personal preference.704  ECM is anathema to the DM framework.  It 
is the fixedness of original constitutional meanings that provide the essential to link to the 
will of the people, and at the same time, limits judicial will.  Prominent DM advocates, 
like Scalia, Black, and the first Harlan, therefore, have rejected ECM.705
 Although proponents of DM have generally not commanded a majority, and do 
not today, the arguments remain important.  The advocacy of DM, even from a minority 
                                                 
703 See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 380-82 (1901) (Harlan, J. dissenting). 
704 E.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 69-72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 
386, 398-99 (1798) (Iredell, J., dissenting). 
705 E.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 629 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); Downes, 182 U.S. at 380-82 (Harlan, J. dissenting). 
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position, highlight difficulties with evolutive, universalistic positions, putting pressure on 
those who continue to employ them.  The perception of excessive judicial discretion is a 
persistent concern for justices, and the articulation of DM positions brings even greater 
attention to these concerns. 
F. The Court’s Jurisprudence as a Reflection of 
 Basic Tensions Regarding Bases of Rights 
 
 Basic tensions complicate any attempt to articulate an approach to the basis of 
rights that can simultaneously: (1) maintain constitutional rights as an independent check 
on lawmakers; (2) allow for ECM; and (3) protect judges from charges of taking 
advantage of excessive discretion to impose subjective will.  As we have seen, the 
Court’s dominant approach allows for ECM, and it is likely to continue to do so.  
Ironically, ECM has been well-entrenched for so long that it carries the force of tradition.  
Indeed, ECM’s long reign would make it more difficult for DM advocates to overthrow 
it.  At the center of the DM is the link between particularistic bases and judicial authority.  
The link is maintained through reliance on original meanings, aided by reference to 
traditional understandings, with judicial precedents and common law often playing a role 
in drawing these connections.  Even if a majority of justices wanted to discard ECM and 
install the DM, this would be complicated by the absence of a body of jurisprudence built 
on the DM maintaining the link between text and interpretation.  The development of 
judicial precedent built on the ECM has created its own traditions.  The DM is strongest 
when it can view text, tradition and precedent (and underlying universal rights) as pulling 
in the same direction.  ECM’s long reign has upset this congruity.   
 ECM requires an approach to discerning how meanings change.  As we have 
seen, the dominant approach has looked to USEs.  Reliance on USEs is critical to 
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maintaining constitutional rights as an independent constraint on lawmakers.  It was 
noted earlier (ch. 1, A(1)) that, at the time of the Founding, different bases of rights were 
often asserted as if they were interchangeable.  The different bases were seen as 
supporting the same substantive outcomes.  As noted, however, different bases of rights 
are potentially in tension.  As long as universalistic principles, popular sovereignty, and 
tradition are seen as pointing towards the same outcomes, the tension may remain latent.  
One may maintain as a set of beliefs that the constitutional text, at once, embodies the 
proper universalistic ends for government of society, and reflects the will of the people.  
If, as well, traditionally accepted understandings are understood as reflecting the will of 
those who framed and enacted the supreme positive law, the tension remains only 
potential.  Indeed, this describes the heart of the DM, which explains why a justice, such 
as the first Harlan, could believe that he served universalistic ends best through strict 
enforcement of text and tradition.  ECM disrupts this harmony.  This is not meant to be 
an argument against ECM.  In fact, advocates of ECM may, and have, also laid claim to 
acting consistently with the Framers’ intensions.  One may plausibly argue that the 
Framers intentionally wrote vague rights provisions with the intention that interpretations 
be allowed to evolve with changes in societal conditions and public morality.  The 
literature is also thick, of course, with arguments that seeking to act in accordance with 
the Framers’ intentions is misguided in any event.  It is not necessary here to enter that 
debate.  The important point about the DM, for present purposes, is that it represents an 
account of the basis of rights that a number of justices have found persuasive, and have 
employed in a way believed to properly constrain judicial discretion through reliance on 
particularistic bases of rights.  The way that the DM promises to accomplish this is to 
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suppress or overcome potential tension between bases of rights.  The adoption of ECM is 
incompatible, because it brings to the surface tensions between bases of rights.  
Regardless of the Framer’s intensions, once ECM is adopted, text, tradition, and 
universalistic principles can no longer work in lockstep.  The adoption of ECM means 
that history is not dispositive.  Some other standard, then, must be adopted.  That a rights 
interpretation reflects understandings dating back to the Founding is no longer a decisive 
argument.  How, then, is one to distinguish between the traditional understandings that 
are to be maintained and those that are to be discarded? 
 Popular will, alone, is a problematic basis for rights, without a fixed set of 
understandings linking it to universalistic principles.  Once that link is broken, adherence 
to popular will as a basis of rights threatens to sanction any acts adopted by a momentary 
majority.  Acts of democratic lawmakers become self-justifying, and are no longer 
constrained by an independent sources.  The DM advocate argues that the judge need not 
directly reference universalistic principles.  All of the necessary universalistic reasoning 
is already captured by particularistic sources.  The ECM undermines that argument.   
With ECM entrenched, in order to maintain constitutional rights as an independent check, 
the justice is moved to reason directly from universalistic standards. 
 As a form of discourse, UR provides a rare forum within the branches of 
government for sustained debate over the roots and nature of our most fundamental 
rights.  Even at a highly general level, such debate is healthy within a political system 
that places importance on the protection of fundamental rights. We have seen that one of 
UR’s principal roles within the Court’s jurisprudence has concerned the relative 
importance of rights.  The shift from property rights to other categories of rights was an 
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event of tremendous importance.  Thinking of this shift in terms of the categories of 
rights that are the most essential to free government is a useful frame. 
 Indeed, the REP provides a useful framework for reasoning about rights.  At the 
highest level of generality, one may consider USEs.  To what kind of society are we 
committed?  To be sure, framed in this manner, the question is extremely general.  The 
justices have not tended to engage debate at this level of generality, but, rather, to appeal 
to a variety of USEs, including free government, liberty, and justice.  Nevertheless, 
discussion at this level of generality might be useful in prompting us to consider which 
concepts or principles we consider most fundamental to our polity.  In extending due 
process protection to rights of expression beginning in the 1920s and 1930s, the justices 
often spoke of the requirements of a society committed to allowing for peaceful change 
of public officials and policies.  The difference in emphasis may be slight, and operating 
at a level of extreme breadth, but still useful in terms of placing discussion within a 
conceptual frame that can guide the development of more specific principles.   
 REP also provides a way of thinking about the link between universalistic and 
particularistic bases of rights.  We saw that Chase, in Calder, spoke of the social contract 
in a way that intertwined universalistic and particularistic bases.  The American people 
entered into a social contract, but the social contract could be thought of as embodying 
principles at a high level of generality.  We have also seen that justices have more 
recently spoken of the Constitution as a basic charter of society containing general rights 
language by design, to allow for different generations to give the terms meaning.  The 
more recent approach avoids extra-constitutionality.  It frames the inquiry as 
interpretation of specific constitutional language.  We still may inquire into the essential 
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requirements of liberty.  Our collective commitment to the Constitution provides a 
particularistic grounding for the universalistic inquiry into the requirements of liberty.  
We may view ourselves as part of a society that is collectively committed to a set of 
general principles, and we may, as a people, debate the more specific implications of 
those commitments.  The universalistic framing of the inquiry conceptually provides a 
point of reference standing outside the processes of majoritarian lawmaking.  Relatedly, 
while it would require separate treatment to address the question in appropriate depth, the 
universalistic frame also resonates with the reasons that many people believe they have 
certain rights, especially within a society so diverse in terms of national background.  The 
violation that one feels in the face of government policies believed to transgress 
fundamental rights is not rooted only in American traditions or the force of popular 
preferences.  It is often rooted in an individual’s personhood.  It is for this reason that 
people may feel their rights claim is strongly justified even if there is no longstanding 
American tradition of recognizing the right, or even if it does not enjoy majority support. 
 The REP framework also provides a useful frame for discourse at the slightly less 
general levels of analysis.  Thus, we may inquire into the categories of rights that are 
essential to liberty (or other USEs), and into the IMPs that are essential to the meaningful 
protection of these rights.  The Court’s jurisprudence on privacy serves as a good 
example.  Initially, the identification of privacy as a right provided a distinct category of 
rights that had not previously been recognized.  Therefore, it provided a frame for 
thinking about whether, and why, certain governmental acts might violate the 
requirements of liberty.  Initially, the justices’ emphasis was on the subordinate 
requirements of protecting the sanctity of the home and marital relations.  Later cases, 
 267
however, brought to light that these IMPs did not capture what was ultimately at stake.  
After all, as later holdings confirmed, the rights really at stake in Griswold and Roe did 
not hinge on marriage, or acts taken specifically in the home.  The Court’s more recent 
development of autonomy as a framing concept is useful.  What was really at stake in 
Lawrence was individuals’ ability to make decisions concerning their choice of intimate 
partners without interference from the state.  This better captures what is really at stake in 
many privacy cases, and provides a conceptual jumping off point for considering which 
other rights might fall within the scope of privacy.  Is there a concept of privacy that is 
essential to liberty?  If so, does it entail autonomy?  And which kinds of decisions fall 
within its protection.  To consider this line of analysis useful, one need not believe that 
answer to these questions follow logically like geometrical proofs, nor that their 
articulation will prompt consensus.  It is enough that they provide a useful frame for 
identifying why we believe we have the rights we do, and may help to pinpoint the level 
of analysis at which disagreement emerges. 
 Once ECM is accepted, it is clear (if it was not considered so regardless) that 
rights interpretation cannot simply be a matter of consulting text and traditional 
understandings, perhaps ascertainable by reference to common law or other relatively 
“objective” sources.  If rights interpretation is going to turn on UR, it is better that it be 
well-articulated.  This allows the justices, majority and minority, to better engage each 
other on its use.  It provides better guidance to lower courts, and affords them a better 
opportunity to contribute to the crafting and application of UR arguments.  It allows 
litigants the opportunity to address the matters considered important to the justices.  In 
addition, it allows actors outside the court system to engage the debate.  First, political 
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actors with a direct influence over judicial affairs, such as U.S. Senators involved in 
confirmation proceedings, may have a better opportunity to participate in UR discourse if 
it is made explicit by the justices.  More broadly, discourse over the grounding and nature 
of fundamental rights should not be limited to the courts.   Fuller articulation of UR 
provides better opportunities for the Court’s opinions to interact with discourse outside 
the courts. 
 Within the American political system, the judiciary is especially well-positioned 
to engage in universalistic rights discourse.  As noted (ch. 1, A(2)), the practices of 
offering detailed explanations for decisions, and regularly engaging earlier opinions, 
provide a good institutional environment for the development of arguments concerning 
the grounding of fundamental rights.  Whatever might be considered a desirable division 
of labor between branches in principle, existing institutional practices leave the judiciary 
better equipped to sustain such debate.  This is especially so since the justices operate in a 
forum within which the reasoning of their opinions is treated by much of the legal 
community as part of the law itself, and not merely rhetorical commentary.  It should also 
be noted that the suggestion that the use of UR by the justices is a salutary practice does 
not require denial of the significant role that the individual judges’ personal political 
preferences surely play in the formation of judicial policies.  Whatever the precise nature 
of the interplay between personal attitudes and the writing of opinions, the justices’ 
articulation of judicial philosophies can play an important role in shaping discourse, 
especially within the various layers of the judiciary itself. 
 It was noted (sec. D) that in some recent cases the Court has used an Emerging 
Trends approach.  The significance of these cases does not lie in Emerging Trends having 
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gained dominance among today’s justices; such a claim would be premature.  The 
approach has not been fully articulated, and is contested.  But the approach, as discussed 
earlier, appears to be distinct in important ways from earlier approaches.  The interest of 
Emerging Trends lies in its capturing of the tension between universalistic and 
particularistic bases of rights as it confronts today’s justices.  The discussion above can 
help us to understand how the approach reflects basic tensions concerning bases of rights.  
The Court’s approach is clearly evolutive, and appeals to USEs.  At the same time, the 
justices are acutely aware of concerns over the judicial discretion arising from the use of 
UR.  This places a premium on incorporating into the analysis factors that have the 
appearance of objectivity.  The justices have appealed to range of factors, including state 
legislative practices, international practices, and the views of professional associations.  
The majority has combined ECM with an emphasis on an “objective” appraisal of 
societal values to create an approach that places weight on emerging trends with respect 
to rights understandings. 
 The Emerging Trends approach has potentially troubling implications.  On the 
one hand, we have seen that the adoption of ECM has been largely motivated by a 
recognition of dramatic shifts in public morality.  The argument is compelling that 
constitutional law must adapt in the face of long-term, fundamental shifts in public 
morality, such as the extension of basic human rights to women and blacks, and the 
recognition in the wake of the Industrial Revolution that laws must be allowed to protect 
the weak against those with the greatest economic resources.  A distinction, however, 
must be drawn between these kinds of deep-seated shifts and relatively specific, short-
term swings in policy preferences.  Where the line is to be drawn is not obvious, but it is 
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worth observing the dangers of ignoring the line completely.  Some of the Court’s recent 
opinions give the impression less of recognizing fundamental transformations than of 
taking a snapshot of preferences.  In many of the Court’s CUPC cases, the justices have 
engaged in highly detailed debates about the proper way to calculate the number of states 
favoring a certain policy.  There is nothing inherently special about CUPC as a 
constitutional provision, and Lawrence suggests the justices’ willingness to extend a 
similar approach in other issue contexts.  Placing great weight on the recent actions of 
state lawmakers comes dangerously close to simply ratifying the actions or attitudes of a 
temporary majority.  It is true that in these cases the Court has also engaged in UR.  The 
justices have long interwoven universalistic and particularistic bases, and there are good 
reasons for them to look for ways to do this.  The critical point, however, is that, for 
universalistic principles to continue to play their role in maintaining constitutional rights 
as an independent check, it must remain clear that the ultimate governing standards are 
universalistic.  When particularistic bases are employed, then, their role should be 
explained.  
 Another troubling aspect of the Court’s Emerging Trends approach is that the 
justices have often counted legislative practices, without establishing that the adoption of 
the practices was based on fundamental shifts in public morality, as opposed to mere 
policy preferences.  The justices also have not fully explained the relevance of the 
opinions of professional associations and international practices.  The point, here, is not 
that there is anything inherently objectionable about these sources, or that good 
explanations for their relevance might not exist, but that, without an articulated link 
between these sources and UR, there is a risk of confusion as to the ultimate grounds of 
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decision.  That a factor can be easily counted or listed in an opinion does not, in itself, 
help us to understand the basis of decision.  
 The use of a range of societal indicators is likely to remain at the forefront of 
controversy over the Court’s approach to rights adjudication, as the present majority 
seeks to cite evidence that can help reduce the impression that their opinions are based on 
whim.  Scalia is likely to remain an outspoken critic of the majority approach.  Scalia has 
at times opposed ECM, and at other times accepted ECM as a premise, while stressing 
the importance of legislative practices as the key factor in determining how meanings 
change.  The combination of ECM and emphasis on legislative practices it the most 
troubling approach, because, as other justices have noted, it abdicates the Court’s 
responsibility of maintaining constitutional rights as a meaningful independent check. 
 This study began with questions about the Supreme Court’s approach to the basis 
of rights.  The results show that studying the Court’s jurisprudence with an eye towards 
the interconnection between universalistic and particularistic bases of rights helps us to 
understand ongoing developments and axes of disagreement within the Court’s 
jurisprudence.  Public law literature has long recognized the role of natural law in certain 
discrete issue areas and time periods.  The use of natural law during, for example, the 
Marshall Court and the era of economic due process, is an important part of the Court’s 
jurisprudence.  There is much more to be learned, however, by expanding the focus from 
“natural law” to questions, more broadly, about the basis of rights and the role of 
universality.  
 Viewing the Court’s jurisprudence through this prism opens up avenues to 
important lines of further research.  First, while this study expands upon existing 
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literature by examining universality across time and issue areas, it would certainly be 
useful to incorporate additional issue areas into the research.  Since each issue area has its 
own historical context, this would allow us to better determine the extent to which use of 
UR is shaped by factors unique to specific topics.  Beyond that, we may ask questions 
about the influences on UR, and its impact on policies.  We may also, of course, ask 
questions about the use of UR in contexts beyond the Supreme Court, including, not only 
other actors in American politics, but also in other countries and in international bodies.  
Framing the investigation around a broader question may entail some limitations for a 
single study, but has important advantages in helping to understand issues that cut across 
legal topics.  This study shows that it is fruitful to view constitutional law through the 
prism of basic questions about the grounding and nature of our most cherished rights. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
CUPC  Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
 
CSV  contemporary societal values 
 
DM  Delegative Model 
 
ECM  evolving constitutional meanings 
 
EDP  economic due process 
 
IMP  intermediate premise 
 
LOK  liberty of contract 
 
MRR  mixed rights reasoning 
 
PDP  procedural due process 
 
REP  reasoning from essential principles 
 
RTC  right to pursue a lawful calling 
 
SDP  substantive due process 
 
UR  universalistic reasoning 
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